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Zusammenfassung 
Die Lebensgrundlage weiter Teile der Bevölkerung in den ländlichen Gegenden 
Thailands besteht aus Einkommen aus verschiedenen Quellen, wie Bodenproduktion, 
Viehzucht, Fischerei, landwirtschaftlichen Dienstleistungen, Forstwirtschaft, 
Lohnarbeit, selbstständiger Arbeit und Geldüberweisungen. Obwohl 
landwirtschaftliche Aktivitäten nur einen kleinen Teil des Bruttoinlandproduktes 
ausmachen, spielen sie vor dem Hintergrund mehrerer Millionen Menschen, die in 
diesem Sektor tätig sind, eine wichtige Rolle als Antriebsfaktor des ländlichen 
Wachstums. Allerdings sind diejenigen Haushalte, die in der Landwirtschaft 
arbeiten, in der Regel arm, insbesondere im Nordosten Thailands, in dem der 
Reisanbau die Hauptlebensgrundlage ist. Aufgrund der Bedeutung des Reisanbaus 
für ländliche Haushalte stellt die Verabschiedung des Gesetzes über Geografische 
Herkunftsangaben (GIs) im Jahr 2003, welches auch auf Reis angewendet werden 
kann, eine interessante Fallstudie dar. 
Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist es, den Schutz Geografischer Herkunftsangaben in 
Thailand zu beschreiben, die ökonomischen Aspekte von Geografischen 
Herkunftsangaben zu erörtern und ihre Bedeutung für die Lebensgrundlage 
ländlicher Jasminreisbauern im armen Nordosten Thailands zu untersuchen. Die 
spezifischen Ziele der Arbeit sind: (1) Den Schutz Geografischer Herkunftsangaben 
in Thailand zu untersuchen und die in diesem Zusammenhang bestehenden 
Herausforderungen in Thailand und anderen Entwicklungsländern zu diskutieren; (2) 
Das GI-Zertifizierungsverhalten von Jasminreisbauern zu studieren; (3) Die 
Auswirkung der GI-Zertifizierung auf ländliche Lebensgrundlagen zu evaluieren; 
und (4) Die Ergebnisse zweier empirischer Fallstudien, die in Indien und Thailand 
durchgeführt wurden, hinsichtlich der Wohlfahrtseffekte von Geografischen 
Herkunftsangaben gegenüberzustellen. 
Diese Arbeit leistet einen Beitrag zur Erweiterung der bereits bestehenden Literatur 
über den Schutz Geografischer Herkunftsangaben, indem sie die entsprechenden 
rechtlichen und institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen in Thailand detailliert darstellt. 
Sie schließt zudem bestehende Forschungslücken hinsichtlich der Übernahme von 
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Geografischen Herkunftsangaben durch ländliche Haushalte und der Auswirkung 
von GI-Zertifizierung auf die Lebensgrundlage ländlicher Haushalte. 
Die in dieser Dissertation durchgeführten statistischen Auswertungen basieren auf 
Querschnittsdaten, die im Rahmen einer Haushaltsbefragung in zwei Distrikten der 
Thung Kula Rong-Hai-Region im Nordosten Thailands von März bis Juni 2009 
durchgeführt wurde. Um Haushalte auszuwählen, die repräsentativ für die 
Grundgesamtheit sind, wurde eine disproportional geschichtete Zufallsstichprobe 
gezogen. Die Gesamtzahl der befragten Haushalte belief sich auf 541. Eine Reihe 
von ökonometrischen Verfahren wurde verwendet, um die Forschungsfragen, die 
sich aus den spezifischen Zielen (2) bis (4) dieser Arbeit ergeben, zu beantworten. 
Die Analyse der erhobenen Daten erbrachte mehrere wichtige Erkenntnisse, die im 
Folgenden kurz zusammengefasst sind. 
Das Gesetz zum Schutz Geografischer Herkunftsangaben in Thailand wurde nicht 
nur aufgrund von multilateralen Handelsverpflichtungen im Rahmen des 
Abkommens über handelsbezogene Aspekte der Rechte an Geistigem Eigentum 
(TRIPS-Agreement) unter der Schirmherrschaft der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) 
verabschiedet, sondern auch insbesondere wegen der zunehmenden Sorge um 
sogenannte Biopiraterie im Zusammenhang mit dem weltbekannten thailändischen 
Jasminreis. Diese Sorge wurde zu einem wichtigen Faktor, der den 
Gesetzgebungsprozess beschleunigte und somit zur Einführung eines Registrierungs- 
und Zertifizierungssystems für Geografische Herkunftsangaben in Thailand führte. 
Das GI Gesetz wurde 2003 in Thailand verabschiedet. 
Das Verhalten von Jasminreisbauern wurde mit Hilfe eines Adoptionsmodells 
untersucht. Es wurden mehrere dominierende Einflussfaktoren identifiziert, welche 
die Entscheidung der Haushalte, sich als GI-Bauern zertifizieren zu lassen, 
beeinflussen. Zu diesen Faktoren zählen der Zugang zu von staatlichen Stellen 
bereitgestellten Informationen über Geografische Herkunftsangaben, das Geschlecht 
des Familienoberhauptes sowie die Mitgliedschaft in landwirtschaftlichen 
Genossenschaften. Der Erfolg, mit dem ein GI-System eingeführt und gefördert wird, 
hängt maßgeblich von den Informationen über Geografische Herkunftsangaben ab, 
die den betroffenen Haushalten zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Landwirtschaftliche 
viii 
 
Genossenschaften sind wesentliche Mittler zwischen Haushalten und der Regierung, 
die als Hauptquelle von Informationen über Geografische Herkunftsangaben 
fungiert. Die Effektivität der Informationsvermittlung kann verbessert werden, indem 
die Rolle landwirtschaftlicher Genossenschaften gestärkt wird. 
Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit zeigen jedoch auch, dass der Verkauf von GI-
zertifiziertem Reis mit hohen Transportkosten verbunden ist und dass nicht alle GI-
zertifizierten Produzenten ihren Reis an einen der 13 GI-zertifizierten Händler 
verkauften. Eingeschränkte Vermarktungsmöglichkeiten, die aufgrund von hohen 
Transportkosten und einer begrenzten Zahl von GI-zertifizierten Händlern bestehen, 
können somit die Adoption von GI-Reis behindern. Als mögliche Lösung dieses 
Problems bietet sich eine Restrukturierung der Wertschöpfungskette an mit einem 
besseren Zugang zu Verkaufspunkten für GI-zertifizierte Produzenten, die zu 
höheren Anreizen, sich als GI-Produzent registrieren zu lassen, führen könnte. 
Die Auswirkung von GI-Zertifizierung auf ländliche Lebensgrundlagen wurde mit 
Hilfe des Propensity Score Matching-Verfahrens untersucht. Die Analyse ergibt 
einen positiven und signifikanten Effekt auf die Wohlfahrt der Haushalte und die 
Reduzierung ländlicher Armut. Die Ergebnisse der Analyse von Jasmin- und 
Basmatireis unterstützen die positive Rolle, die GI-Zertifizierung für ländliche 
Lebensgrundlagen spielt. Ohne einen formellen Schutz ist die Gefahr von 
Produktfälschungen allerdings sehr hoch. GI-Zertifizierung ist daher von essenzieller 
Wichtigkeit für den Erhalt ländlicher Lebensgrundlagen. Über den ökonomischen 
Nutzen hinaus trägt sie auch zur Bewahrung des traditionellen Wissens und Erbes 
des Ortes, welches das GI-Gut produziert, bei. 
Trotz des indizierten signifikanten Beitrags von GI-Zertifizierung auf die 
Verminderung von Armut und die Verbesserung der Wohlfahrt ländlicher Haushalte, 
besteht für politische Entscheidungsträger die Herausforderung darin, diesen Effekt 
auch langfristig zu sichern. Die positiven Auswirkungen von GI-Zertifizierung 
können nur dann über einen längeren Zeitrahmen erhalten werden, wenn sich alle 
Akteure der Wertschöpfungskette aktiv und nachhaltig engagieren. Lokale und 
nationale Entscheidungsträger müssen daher für eine überzeugende Atmosphäre im 
Kreis der Akteure sorgen. Kollektives Handeln und eine Erhöhung der Teilnahme an 
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der GI-Wertschöpfungskette sind von entscheidender Wichtigkeit, insbesondere im 
Hinblick auf noch unentschlossene Bauern in der Thung Kula Rong-Hai-Region. Das 
Bewusstsein der Jasminreis-Haushalte über die Möglichkeit, ihr Recht auf GI-
Zertifizierung wahrnehmen zu können, ist von entscheidender Bedeutung, da eine 
hohe Übernahmerate einen langfristigen positiven Effekt auf Wohlfahrt und 
Armutsreduzierung ermöglichen kann. Um den Registrierungsprozess zu 
vereinfachen, sollte das Registrierungssystem gut funktionieren und einfach 
zugänglich sein. 
Schlagwörter: Geografische Herkunftsangaben, Geistiges Eigentum, Ländliche 
Lebensgrundlagen, Ländliche Armut, Wohlfahrt von Haushalten, Jasminreis, 
Thailand 
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Abstract 
In rural Thailand, the livelihoods rely on cash and subsistence income from a number 
of sources, namely crop production, livestock production, husbandry, fisheries, 
agricultural services, forestry, wage employment, small-scale enterprises, and 
remittances. While agricultural activities account for only a small amount of the 
national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), they play an important role as an engine of 
the rural growth given the fact that millions are employed. However, rural 
households engaged in those activities are usually poor, especially the ones in the 
poorest part of the country, i.e. the Northeast where rice cultivation is its main 
livelihood strategy.  Given the importance of rice cultivation for rural livelihoods in 
the Northeast, the release of the Act on Geographical Indications (GIs) Protection in 
2003 which can be also applied to rice, provides an interesting case study in 
Thailand.  
The objective of this thesis is to describe GI protection in Thailand, to explore the 
economics of GIs and to investigate their role for the livelihoods of rural Jasmine 
rice households in poor Northeastern Thailand. The specific objectives of the thesis 
are: (1) to investigate GI protection in Thailand and discuss its challenges being 
relevant to developing countries and Thailand; (2) to study the behavior of Thai 
Jasmine rice households in adopting the GI certification; (3) to evaluate the impact of 
GI certification adoption on rural livelihoods, namely on the household welfare and 
rural poverty; and (4) to synthesize the results from two empirical case studies 
undertaken in India and Thailand regarding the welfare impacts of geographical 
indications. 
This first objective of this work is adding to the existing policy papers on GI 
protection by providing detailed information on how the legal and institutional 
framework of GI protection in Thailand is shaped. This work also fills the research 
gaps on the GI adoption studies as well as on the GI impact on the rural livelihoods. 
The thesis uses cross-sectional data collected from a household survey in two 
districts of the Thung Kula Rong-Hai area in Northeastern Thailand between March 
and June 2009. A disproportionate stratified random sampling technique was used to 
select representative sample households. In total, 541 farm households were 
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interviewed. To answer the research questions for the last three specific objectives, 
different econometric techniques were used to analyze the data. The investigation 
and data analysis yielded some important results in view of the research objectives 
being briefly summarized in the following paragraphs. 
The Thai GI Act was released not only due to the requirement of the multilateral 
trading framework under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) Agreement under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but 
also due to the concern about biopiracy related to the widely known Thai Jasmine 
rice. The biopiracy issue was seen as the main driving factor accelerating the process 
for enacting the GI Law which provides for a GI registration and certification 
system.    
The analysis of adoption behavior of Jasmine rice farm households using a logit 
model shows that the main factors influencing the decision of the Jasmine rice farm 
households on adopting the GI certification are the access to information on GIs from 
governmental bodies, gender and the membership in cooperatives. How a GI system 
is successfully introduced and promoted in specific GI regions depends crucially on 
the information about GIs provided to the rural farm households and finally on the 
information sources. Agricultural cooperatives serve as a crucial intermediary 
between farm households and the government being the primary source of 
information about GIs. The effectiveness of information dissemination can be thus 
promoted by strengthening the role of the agricultural cooperatives.  
However, the descriptive findings demonstrate that the GI rice sale is involved with 
high transportation costs and not all certified GI producers sold their rice to the 
thirteen certified buyers who provide the price premium payment guarantee. Limited 
marketing options of GI certified rice, characterized by high transportation costs and 
limited availability of certified buyers, may thus be a potential constraint to GI 
certification adoption. A restructuring of the value chains with better access to points 
of sale for certified GI rice farm households should be provided in order to increase 
the farmers’ incentives to adopt GI certification.  
The findings of an evaluation of impact of GI certification adoption on rural 
livelihoods using the Propensity Score Matching method indicate a positive and 
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significant impact of GI adoption on the household welfare and rural poverty 
reduction. The results of an analysis of Jasmine rice along with the case of Basmati 
rice support a positive role of GI protection on the livelihoods of farm households in 
rural communities. Without formal protection, the likelihood of counterfeiting is very 
high. GI protection is essential for rural livelihoods not only in terms of its economic 
prominence, but it also preserves the traditional knowledge embedded in a GI good 
as well as the traditional heritage of the locality that produces the good. 
Despite the significant contribution of GI introduction on the reduction of the 
poverty incidence and an improvement of the household welfare in rural areas, a 
crucial point for any policy-makers is a long-lasting positive effect. The positive 
effect of GI introduction can only last longer given the active and sustainable 
participation of all stakeholders in the GI product value chain. This suggests the 
challenge of the local and national policy-makers and policy implementers in 
creating a persuasive atmosphere among all stakeholders. The motivation of 
collective action and increase of the participation level within the GI value chain are 
also crucial, particularly by those TKR farm households who are unassertive to 
participate in this value-added process using GI label. The awareness of the TKR 
farm households to make use of their embedded right to apply for GI certification is 
crucial, since the rate of GI adoption of the TKR farm households can guarantee a 
long lasting positive effect of GI certification on the household welfare and poverty 
reduction in rural areas. In order to facilitate the registration process for GI 
certification of the TKR farm households, the GI registration system should be 
sustainable, well-functioning and for the producers reachable. 
 
Keywords: Geographical Indication, Intellectual Property, Rural Livelihoods, Rural 
Poverty, Household Welfare, Jasmine rice, Thailand 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1  BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Poverty alleviation is one of the primary objectives in economic development. The 
concepts of rural livelihoods, rural poverty and rural development are related to each 
other in the development discourse. Rural development aims at improving household 
welfare or reducing poverty in rural areas (Toborn, 2003). In rural development 
projects, participatory or bottom-up approaches have been promoted instead of top-
down or supply-driven approaches which have been found to have insignificant 
impacts on poverty reduction (ADB, 2004). The concept of rural livelihoods is 
regarded as an entry point for the participatory approaches emphasizing the local 
perspectives (Scoones, 2009). However, rural livelihoods are complex and dynamic. 
Based on disposable livelihood resources, rural people pursue several livelihood 
strategies such as agricultural intensification and extensification, migration and 
livelihood diversification in order to improve their well-being and reduce poverty 
(Scoones, 1998 and 2009; Hussein and Nelson, 1998). 
In Thailand, rural livelihoods rely on cash and subsistence income from a number of 
sources, namely crop production, livestock production, husbandry, fisheries, 
agricultural services, forestry, wage employment, small-scale enterprises, and 
remittances. Agriculture accounts for only 12% of the GDP (Office of Agricultural 
Economics (OAE), 2011). However, the agricultural sector is regarded as a basis of 
the rural livelihoods and is the predominant economic sector in many rural regions of 
Thailand. As an engine of rural growth, it employs a large share of the rural labor 
force (Bresciani and Valdés, 2007; Cervantes-Godoy and Dewbre, 2010) or around 
13.5 million people accounting for approximately 35% of the total labor force 
(National Statistical Office (NSO), 2012).  
Rural households engaged in agriculture are mostly poor in particular in the 
Northeast of Thailand where rice cultivation is one of the most important livelihood 
activities, with almost 70% of the total agricultural land being used for rice 
cultivation (OEA, 2011). The importance of rice for Thailand is not only because it is 
a major staple food for domestic consumption, but it is also considered as one of the 
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most important export crops of the country. Thailand has been one of the world’s 
largest rice exporters for nearly three decades since 1982 (IRRI, 2005). Its market 
share amounted to more than 25% between 2005 and 2010, leaving the second and 
third largest exporters, i.e. Viet Nam and Pakistan far behind. Exporting rice to the 
world market has resulted in considerable export revenues for Thailand as a whole 
but also for the individual rice farmers. Jasmine rice makes up more than a quarter of 
Thai rice exports each year. In 2011, approximately a third of the rice export value 
stemmed from exporting Jasmine rice which brought foreign currency of around US$ 
2 billion to Thailand (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MoAC), 2009 and 
2010). 
Geographical Indications (GIs) indicating that a certain good originates in a 
particular region where a given quality of the good is attributable to its geographical 
origin (TRIPS Agreement) are a new form of intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
being hotly debated at the multilateral trade level. Given its characteristics that do 
not exist in other kinds of Intellectual Property (IP), they offer a valuable framework 
for advancing economic and commercial interests while potentially integrating local 
needs anchored in cultural tradition and broad levels of participation of all 
stakeholders (Giovannucci et al., 2009). In this aspect, GIs can provide higher 
economic returns to holders of traditional knowledge through price premia (see e.g. 
Teuber, 2007), foster tourism (Vivas-Eugui, 2001; Suh and MacPherson, 2007; 
Giovannucci et al., 2009) and therefore act as rural development tools (e.g. Tregear 
et al., 2007). The European Union (EU) for example has long seen their potential, 
included them as one of two pillars of its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
(Folkeson, 2005; Teuber, 2009), and made exploitation of the marketing potential of 
them as an important element of its agriculture and rural development strategy 
(Giovannucci et al., 2009; Becker, 2009). 
GIs recognize and support the concept of “local” via market mechanisms. Their 
potential long-term value is not only economic as to greater income, or fostering 
tourism, but also social as to the recognition of value-adding and habitual traditions 
which convey a very local sense of people, their history and their relationship to a 
place. The local characteristics of GIs thus relate them directly to the concept of rural 
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livelihoods. Given the fact that only 10% of the world’s protected GIs come from 
developing countries, there is a great potential to use GIs as a tool to reduce poverty 
(Giovannucci et al., 2009).  
Unlike other forms of IP, GIs are a unique and important form of collective 
intellectual and cultural property with various rights. They may be registered and 
protected in different forms including sui generis
1
 systems, trademarks, certification 
marks, collective marks, and denominations of origin. Sometimes, they are also 
protected via administrative ruling or under generic laws on unfair competition 
(Giovannucci et al., 2009). Some countries such as China protect them with a dual 
system of protection: On the one hand, geographical names are protected as 
certification and collective trademarks. On the other hand, geographical names of 
specific products of high quality are protected by the sui generis system (Xiaobing 
and Kireeva, 2007). Sometimes, they are not legally protected and may be 
recognized due to accepted common use such as in the case of Basmati rice (Indo-
Pakistani rice) (Giovannucci et al., 2009, Jena and Grote, 2012).  
In many cases, the forms and scope of protection for certain GIs are often different 
from country to country or they are protected in one country but not in another. This 
is well-known with the case of Feta and Champagne which are protected in the EU 
but not in the United States (US) (Giovannucci et al., 2009). GIs are also not 
necessarily the geographical names such as Basmati rice or Feta (cheese from 
Greece) (Belletti and Marescotti, 2005; Giovannucci et al., 2009). Standing at the 
intersection of the three important issues of international law, i.e. intellectual 
property, international trade, and agricultural policy (Rauschtiala and Munzer, 2007), 
GIs and their protection thus become popular.   
From the intellectual property point of view, the rationale of GI protection is 
triggered by the problem of asymmetric information. This is especially true for the 
quality products, because information on quality is difficult and expensive for 
consumers to obtain despite their experience or search activities (Nelson, 1970). And 
                                                             
1 Sui generis is a Latin expression, literally meaning unique in its characteristics. In IP law, this expression is 
mainly used to identify a legal classification that exists independently of other categorizations due to the specific 
creation of an entitlement or obligation or its uniqueness (Giovannucci et al., 2009). 
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such public goods as information on quality are typically under-supplied without a 
clear assignment of property rights (Waglé, 2007). Without correct information on 
quality for the consumers, sellers tend to sell low quality products with the same 
price as high quality products leading to the problem of “the bad driving out the 
good” in the market or known as Akerlof’s (1970) market for lemons. If such quality 
products are not protected, particularly once their reputation has been established and 
their market value has increased, they are at risk from fraud which reduces market 
value and damages reputation. This can lead to the loss of consumer confidence and 
thus the drop in price and finally producers may not maintain quality standards 
(Sautier et al., 2011). 
The public intervention such as the introduction of GIs, labeling, branding, and/or 
regulation all serve to reduce potential inefficiencies resulting from imperfect 
information about product characteristics (Beales et al., 1981; OECD, 2000; Marette 
et al., 1999; Vivas-Eugui, 2001; Marette and Babcock, 2008). GIs, like other forms 
of IP, with a peculiar feature relating to pieces of information that are incorporated 
into tangible objects (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), 2002), confer the exclusive right to all producers from a particular 
region to use a distinctive sign to identify their products (Raustiala and Munzer, 
2007; Giovannucci et al., 2009; Sautier et al., 2011). Highlighted in the label, they do 
not confirm only a link between a product and a specific geographic region like 
trademarks, but usually they also indicate unique production methods, characteristics 
or qualities that are known to exist in the particular region (Giovannucci et al., 2009). 
GIs, thus, enable the producers to convey a considerable quantity of information on 
quality to consumers and become a worthwhile marketing tool if they are used 
properly and well protected (Tregear et al., 1998; Addor and Grazioli, 2002; 
Rangnekar, 2004; Jena and Grote, 2010).  
Thailand ensures GI protection by having enacted a GI law in 2003. An effective GI 
protection is expected to have important implications for Thailand’s rural 
households, since many of them are involved in the production of GI products. 
Benefits of having effective GI protection under the specific Act may arise for many 
regions of Thailand since GIs could provide an assured and continuous source of 
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income through their reputation. Within the last ten years, 42 different products have 
been registered and certified as GIs in Thailand. As of July 2012, there have been 
eight product types, i.e. handicrafts, food, coffee, wine and spirits, horticultural 
products, rice, pottery, general textiles and textiles goods and silk registered as GIs. 
The most often registered GI products are horticultural products with 12 products, 
followed by eight kinds of GI rice.  
Thung Kula Rong-Hai Thai Hom Mali Rice (TKR) from the poor Northeast being the 
most popular registered GI rice counts as the first registered Thai Jasmine rice, 
followed by Surin Hom Mali Rice from the same region. To promote its cultivation 
and marketing world-wide, the Thai Hom Mali Rice Trade Association Thung Kula 
Rong-Hai Geographical Indication (THAT) has been established in 2008. By 
2008/2009, there were 1,131 Thai Jasmine rice farmers, 13 exporters and four 
processors certified as GI operators for the TKR by the DIP (Ngokkuen and Grote, 
2011 and 2012). At the international level, the GI registration application for the TKR 
labelled “Khao Hom Mali Thung Kula Rong-Hai” has been submitted by the DIP to 
the EU’s GI Registry on 20 November 2008 (European Commission, 2010). This GI 
application is the first one from Asia and the first attempt to seek GI protection 
abroad, although as of July 2012 its protection under the EU GI law has still not been 
ensured.  
However, the proportion of Jasmine farm households being GI certified for the TKR 
accounts only for around 1.3 percent of the total TKRH farm households (Ngokkuen 
and Grote, 2012). The question thus arises why not more farmers adopt GI 
certification, especially against the background of price premia being generally paid 
to GI products (Suh and MacPherson, 2007; Teuber, 2007). There should be existing 
factors predicting the behavior of the farmers in adopting or rejecting such new idea. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the role of these determining factors to 
ensure the design of a successful introduction of new projects or policies such as GIs 
for rural development. Furthermore, the question arises whether GI adoption has had 
an impact on the livelihoods of the TKR farm households being GI certified as 
compared to the TKR farm households not being GI certified. A positive impact 
would suggest a stronger promotion of GI certification adoption in the region in 
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order to reduce rural poverty. Finally, there exist GI-like rice products such as 
Basmati rice which are not officially registered yet as a GI product. A further 
investigation of the impact of Basmati rice and of a legal GI product such as Jasmine 
rice on the rural livelihoods is useful to show the implications of GI registration for 
the livelihoods of smallholder farmers from the period of transition to the 
establishment of GI protection. 
1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The overall research objective of this thesis is to describe GI protection in Thailand, 
to explore the economics of GI and to investigate its role for the livelihoods of rural 
Jasmine rice households in poor Northeastern Thailand. The specific objectives of 
the thesis are as follows: 
1. To investigate GI protection in Thailand and discuss its challenges being 
relevant to developing countries and Thailand.   
2. To study the GI adoption behavior of Thai Jasmine rice households, i.e. to 
identify factors that are likely to predict the behavior of Jasmine rice farm 
households in the Thung Kula Rong-Hai area in adopting GI certification; 
and to estimate the marginal effects of key factors on the probability of 
adoption. 
3. To evaluate the impact of GI certification adoption on rural livelihoods, 
i.e. to assess the causal effect of GI certification on the well-being of Thai 
Jasmine rice households and rural poverty. 
4. To synthesize the results from two empirical case studies undertaken in 
India and Thailand regarding the welfare impacts of geographical 
indications.  
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The dissertation is organized in three main parts. The next part consists of three 
modules including five articles. Table 1 provides an overview about all included 
articles and their allocation to one of the three modules.  
7 
 
Table 1: List of articles included in the dissertation 
Module Authors Title 
Published in/Submitted to/ 
Presented  at 
I C. Ngokkuen Protection of geographical indications  Submitted to Asia-Pacific Development 
Article (1) U. Grote in Thailand Journal  
II C. Ngokkuen The prediction of household’s behavior  Published in 
Article (2) U. Grote in adopting geographical indication The GSTF Business Review (GBR), 
  (2011) certification for jasmine rice from Vol. 1 (August 2011), No. 1: 173-178 
    Northeastern Thailand   
      An earlier version was accepted for  
      presentation at the International Conference 
      on Qualitative and Quantitative Economics  
      2011 (QQE 2011) in Singapore 
II C. Ngokkuen Geographical indication for jasmine  Published in 
Article (3) U. Grote rice: Applying a logit model to predict  Quarterly Journal of International  
  (2012) adoption behavior of Thai farm Agriculture, (QJIA)  Vol. 51 (2012), 
    households No. 2: 157-185 
        
      An earlier version was presented at the  
      German Development Economics Conference 
      2010 (AEL Conference 2010) held at Leibniz 
      University Hannover, 18 June 2010,  
      Hannover, Germany. 
        
      Presented at the Tropentag 2011 held at the  
      University of Bonn, 5-7 October 2011, Bonn,  
      Germany 
III C. Ngokkuen Impact of geographical indication   Submitted to International Journal 
Article (4) U. Grote adoption on household welfare and of Arts and Sciences (IJAS) 
    poverty reduction   
      Presented at the Jour Fixe International    
      at Leibnizhaus hosted by the DAAD-Freundeskreis 
      Event -Section Hannover and the International 
      Office of Leibniz University Hannover, 
      8 May 2012, Hannover, Germany 
        
      Presented at the  3rd International Journal of Arts  
      and Sciences’ (IJAS) International Conference  
      for Academic Disciplines held at Harvard University,  
      27-31 May 2012, Cambridge, USA 
        
      Accepted for presentation at the Tropentag 2012 
      organized by University of Göttingen   
      and University of Kassel-Witzenhausen, 
      19-21 September 2012, Göttingen, Germany 
III P.R. Jena Geographical indication protection Submitted to 
Article (5) C. Ngokkuen and rural livelihoods: Some insights Journal of Rural Studies   
  U. Grote from Asia    
Source: Own presentation 
 
Module I consists of one article discussing the legal and institutional framework of 
GI protection as well as its challenges. The article describes the economic rationale 
of the GI protection and gives an overview of the GI protection in Thailand. 
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Examples of already registered GI products in Thailand are given. At the end, it 
discusses challenges of Thailand and other developing and least developed countries 
with respect to GI protection given the rising trend of bilateral trade talks and 
conflicts of interests concerning different types of intellectual property rights. 
Module II includes two articles investigating the behavior of Jasmine rice households 
in adopting GI certification. Both articles are based on the logistic regression analysis 
to help finding factors determining the adoption behavior of the households. The 
analysis in module II is based on cross-sectional data collected in two districts of the 
Thung Kula Rong-Hai (TKRH) area in Northeastern Thailand between March and 
June 2009. The total sample size used for this analysis is 370 representative 
households. 
Module III deals with results of the impact evaluation. It consists of two articles, 
article (4) and article (5). Article (4) studies the impact of GI certification adoption 
on the rural livelihoods in Northeastern Thailand. The study uses the non-parametric 
Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method to assess the causal effect of GI 
certification on household welfare and rural poverty. The same data set is used for 
data analysis. The total sample size of 541 farm households is used for the data 
analysis. Article (5) synthesizes general findings of the impact studies on the role of 
GI for rural livelihoods in the two GI-proponents, i.e. India and Thailand.  
The third part of the thesis provides a synthesis summarizing the main results, 
drawing conclusions and policy recommendations as well as highlighting limitations 
of the study and suggesting other areas or aspects that merit further research. 
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PROTECTION OF GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS IN 
THAILAND  
 
Chuthaporn Ngokkuen
 
 and Ulrike Grote 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the legal and institutional framework for the protection of 
Geographical Indications (GIs) in Thailand and discusses challenges the country has 
been facing. Though the legal protection of GIs has been ensured under the realm of 
the World Trade Organization, GI protection remains an important issue in Thailand. 
Biopiracy, existing conflicts of interests concerning different types of intellectual 
property rights (trademarks and patents versus GIs), and the rise in regional and 
bilateral trade deals create major challenges at the multilateral level. Taking the 
example of GI products, especially Jasmine rice, these challenges to GI protection 
will be further analyzed from the perspective of Thailand. This paper finally suggests 
how these challenges can be mitigated and in which direction trade negotiations 
should be shaped. 
JEL Classification:  O13 O34 Q17 Q18  
Keywords: Intellectual property, geographical indications, biopiracy, Jasmine rice, 
Thailand 
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I. Introduction 
In the past three decades, the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in 
agribusiness has increased enormously. The Green Revolution in the 1960s was the 
most significant reason for the introduction of proprietary aspects in industrial 
agriculture. Seeds became private property of multinational seed companies and 
international research institutions like the International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Centre (CIMMYT) or the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). 
The protection of IPRs is ensured by various conventions such as the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants with its resulting 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV), the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. While developed countries 
producing most of the world’s intellectual property (IP) and possessing 
biotechnological knowledge, accuse developing countries of IP piracy, the latter 
accuse the former of biopiracy despite the existing IPR Conventions. There were 
reported attempts of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) mainly owned by 
developed countries to exploit advantages and weaknesses in various conventions by 
trying to monopolize the seed and germplasm industry (Adi, 2006). However, their 
attempts often neglect due consideration of farmers in the developing countries who 
own large reserves of the earth’s pool genetic resources (Adi, 2006; GRAIN, 1998).  
Some developing countries such as India, Kenya and Thailand thus hope to 
utilize the TRIPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to protect 
their national intellectual and cultural heritage as well as their rich biodiversity 
resources (Zou, 2005). The TRIPS Agreement which establishes a comprehensive 
framework on intellectual property protection covers the following main areas of 
IPRs: copyright, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, the 
lay-out designs of integrated circuits, and undisclosed information. It is considered as 
the first international treaty to protect GIs through substantive provisions (Jain, 
2009). GIs which indicate that a certain good originates from a particular region, 
where a given quality of the good is attributable to its place of origin, have become a 
hotly discussed issue in the international trade context. They stand at the intersection 
of three issues in international law: international trade, intellectual property and 
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agricultural policy (Rauschtiala and Munzer, 2007). The demand for extending 
protection on products other than wine and spirits under the multilateral framework 
is becoming stronger and louder not only because GIs provide protection against 
counterfeiting and free riding on the reputation of the GI products and protect public 
goods like traditional and indigenous knowledge (Grote, 2009). But there is also 
evidence that they can provide higher economic returns to holders of traditional 
knowledge through price premia (see e.g. Teuber, 2007), foster tourism (Suh and 
MacPherson, 2007) and therefore act as rural development tools (e.g. Tregear and 
others, 2007).  
Until now, there is still no conclusion as regards the scope extension of GI 
protection at WTO. The stalemate at the WTO is caused by two strands of 
viewpoints with respect to the exceptions clause:  the grandfather clause under article 
24.5 of the TRIPS Agreement has driven the rise in regional and bilateral trade talks 
between the Member countries led by the United States of America and the European 
Union (EU). While the United States emphasizes in its regional and bilateral trade 
deals the exceptions clause in favour of trademarks that are identical with or similar 
to GIs, provided certain conditions are satisfied, the EU seeks to eliminate the 
exceptions available under this clause in order to establish a sui generis form of GI 
protection that clearly prevails over trademarks (Das, 2007; Jain, 2009). Given 
endless negotiations regarding the GI protection extension under WTO and being 
convinced of the economic benefits and trade potential inherent to GIs, some 
developing countries voluntarily started to register their GI products in other 
countries. Thailand e.g. registered its GI products in the EU (Grote, 2009).  
At the national level, Thailand ensures GI protection by having enacted a 
special GI law in 2003. An effective GI protection is expected to have important 
implications for Thailand’s rural households, since many of them are involved in the 
production of GI products. Benefits of having effective GI protection under the 
specific Act may arise for many regions of Thailand since GIs could provide an 
assured and continuous source of income through their reputation. This could reduce 
vulnerability to poverty of the rural poor and thus reduce the migration to urban areas 
by retaining labour and other production factors in the geographical area (Correa, 
2002).  
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This paper analyzes how the legal and institutional framework of GI protection 
in Thailand has been shaped. It is structured as follows: chapter 2 gives a theoretical 
background of the GI protection. Chapter 3 describes the legal and institutional 
modes of and needs for GI protection in Thailand. It illustrates important issues 
around the institutional framework for GI protection in more detail and provides 
information on the registration process in Thailand. Chapter 4 describes the current 
status of the GI registration and mentions important GI products in Thailand, while 
chapter 5 highlights the challenges of GI protection. Chapter 6 concludes and gives 
some policy recommendations. 
II. The economics of GI protection 
An overview of the economics of GI protection has been provided by Bramley 
and others (2009), Jena and Grote (2010), and Teuber and others (2011). This 
chapter focuses on some economic aspects of GIs being of relevance to this paper, 
namely the role of information on quality and reputation which is conveyed via 
certification or labelling. The GI registration and certification process again involves 
the institutional framework of GI protection which will be discussed later on. 
The importance of GI protection can be explained on the basis of different 
theories: i.e. information theory, Shapiro’s reputation theory and theories from New 
Institutional Economics (NIE). The use of distinctive or quality signs such as 
geographical names is based on the information theory or Shapiro’s model on 
reputation (OECD, 2000). Despite the experience or search activities of consumers, it 
is more difficult and more expensive for them to obtain information about quality 
than about prices (Nelson, 1970). The consumers are not always able to use the 
experience from repeated purchases to discern the product quality (Marette and 
others, 1999). Akerlof (1970) stressed the importance of information for the proper 
functioning of the market, since market failures occur when asymmetric information 
exists. If the qualities are given exogenously, the problem is one of adverse selection 
meaning that the sellers know the actual quality of their products while the 
consumers do not. Without any means of differentiating goods, there will be no 
incentives for producers of high-quality goods to remain in this market, because all 
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goods tend to be sold at the same price. This situation is well-known under the term 
“market for lemons”.  
One solution to reducing information asymmetry and improving consumer 
information about product quality could be public intervention for example by 
introducing labeling schemes which supply consumers with information about 
ingredients, production methods, packaging, storage, product origin, etc. (Beales and 
others, 1981; OECD, 2000, Marette and others, 1999; Vivas-Eugui, 2001). Apart 
from labelling, both private sector and government can take a number of steps such 
as advertising (e.g. Nelson, 1970), certificates of guarantee (OECD, 2000), or 
warranties (e.g. Allen, 1984).  
To protect themselves from the risks of asymmetric information, producers use 
various signs as markers of quality and assurance of reputation. Thus, distinctive 
signs and reputation (e.g. Stigler, 1961; Schmalensee, 1978; Shapiro, 1982 and 1983) 
which denotes the persistence of quality (Stigler, 1961), play an important role in 
signalling a certain level of quality (Rangnekar, 2004). Reputation which is conveyed 
via a distinctive sign economizes search costs for consumers (Stigler, 1961; 
Rangnekar, 2004). The saving in search costs then allows reputable goods to receive 
a price premium, which consumers are somewhat willing to pay (Stigler, 1961) and 
which also serves compensating sellers for their investments in reputation (Shapiro, 
1983). This is true especially with the case of origin-linked products for which 
reputation is a factor that can lead to a higher price based on the recognized tradition 
and excellence of the product. Such a reputation thus often requires the use of legal 
instruments to protect the product name (Vandecandelaere and others 2009). Like 
trademarks and commercial names, GIs are used to identify products and confer the 
exclusive right to all producers from a given geographical area to use a distinctive 
sign to identify their products. GIs thus enable the producers to convey a 
considerable quantity of information to consumers and become a worthwhile 
marketing tool if they are used properly and are well protected (Tregear and others, 
1998; Addor and Grazioli, 2002; Rangnekar, 2004; Jena and Grote, 2010). 
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III. GI protection in thailand 
For the consolidation of benefits via GI protection for developing countries 
possessing GI assets, actions are needed not only at the international level in order to 
reach a consensus on the extension of GI protection for products other than wine and 
spirits, but also at the national level. Since negotiations in the WTO might take years 
to reach any consensus, an international recognition of GIs already registered 
nationally is needed (Vivas-Eugui, 2001). National regulations which only apply to 
one country are not sufficient in a global economy where products often travel 
beyond national borders (Addor and Grazioli, 2002). The most fundamental aspects 
that GI protection encompasses are legal rules and their implementation. The legal 
rules ensure adequate protection not only for countries’ own GIs at the national level, 
but also the effective protection granted for all GIs at the international level (Jena 
and Grote, 2010). Regarding the implementation of GI rules, setting product 
standards as well as origin requirements is needed to justify the strong rights granted 
not subject to any defence of genericness. A GI regulation might therefore be 
desirable for both low- and high-quality producers, especially when an imperfect 
enforcement mechanism is given (Anania and Nisticò, 2004). Without such 
regulations, the value of a GI for all other legitimate users may be negatively affected 
when one registered GI user decides to sell his or her low-quality products on the 
high-quality market (Anania and Nisticò, 2004; Jena and Grote, 2010). The system of 
GI registration therefore serves as a tool by which producers can reach the consumers 
with a consistent quality signal.  
Calls for better geographical indications protection: the issue of biopiracy  
Being a member of the WTO and an attendant of the TRIPS Agreement, it is 
required to take appropriate measures to implement the provisions within the 
domestic legal framework. However, enacting the GI protection law in Thailand is 
not only a consequence of this requirement, but it is also considered as an urgent 
necessity to be able to attack biopiracy which is an exploding issue in Asia 
(Thailand, 2003a). Biopiracy means the uncompensated exploitation of developing 
countries’ natural resources (Afreen and Abraham, 2008). It arises when the IP 
systems are used to legitimize the exclusive ownership and control of genetic 
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resources and knowledge without recognizing the rights and without compensating 
the indigenous and rural communities (Delgado, 2002). Biopiracy can be related to 
the spread of genetic resources and to the traditional knowledge which has been 
gained, adapted and embedded in the local culture of an indigenous community over 
time. For the past years, there has been an increasing number of reported cases of 
biopiracy and commercial exploitation of plants, genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge from developing countries. Natural products such as Neem, Turmeric, 
Ayahuasa, Hoodia Cactus and Basmati rice are well-known examples of such 
reported cases of misappropriation (O’Connor, 2003). 
Thailand experienced the first cases of biopiracy when their medical plant 
called Plao-noi (Croton sublyratus) and a variety of bitter gourd (Momordica spp.) 
which is known to slow the HIV virus (Kerr and Yampoin, 2007) have been 
reported. However, a big shock hit Thailand when a newly developed hybrid variety 
was registered under the name “Jasmati” by the Rice Tec Corporation at the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in 1997. The name contains two 
variants of two rice varieties: Jasmine rice from Thailand and Basmati from India. 
However, „Jasmati“ rice which is a hybridized variety called Della and which was 
developed from the Italian Bertone rice in the United States has characteristics other 
than those one could find in the Basmati and Jasmine rice. The use of the name 
Jasmati could therefore mislead rice consumers by making them wrongly believe that 
Jasmati rice would have the same characteristics as Jasmine rice from Thailand 
and/or Basmati rice from India, even though the rice was not genetically related to 
the Jasmine rice grown in Thailand. This concern was reinforced by a market survey 
finding that over half of the consumers in the United States buying “Jasmati” thought 
it was related to Jasmine and Basmati rice (Roggemann, 2005).
1
  
The discussion on special protection of GI products has been brought to the 
public since the case of “Jasmati” (O’Connor, 2004). Concerns have derived from 
the economic importance of Thai Jasmine rice which is one of Thailand’s most 
                                                             
1 More threatening than the „Jasmati“ patent is “Jasmine 85” which was developed by IRRI to create 
an „improved“ Jasmine rice variety that can be grown in the United States using Jasmine rice seed, 
namely Khao Dawk Mai 105 which is a major rice variety grown in the Northeast of Thailand, 
although it still has a limited effect in the United States market, especially for Asian Americans 
(Goodwin and others, 1992). 
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crucial agricultural export crops and which is regarded as a source of culture and 
belief. Against this backdrop, the adoption of a more proactive approach was 
considered in Thailand: the Geographical Indications Act B.E. 2546 entered into 
force on 28 April 2003. Prior to its enactment, no specific provisions existed to 
protect GIs in the country (Thailand, 2003a). However, Thailand has been providing 
general protection against the deceptive use of GIs for many years via e.g. the 
Consumer Protection Act 1979, the Food Act 1979, and the Penal Code B.E. 2499 
(A.D. 1956) as amended by the 1994 Act. Furthermore, certain general legislations 
such as the protection under criminal law, tort law and the protection under the 
Trademark Act were applied, although they provide only inadequate protection in the 
Jasmati case (Thailand, 2003a; O’Connor, 2004). 
Act on GI Protection B.E. 2546 (2003) 
Implementing TRIPS standards on GI protection at the national level can be 
done either through the sui generis system following the collective or public 
approach inherent to a GI, or the common-law system of certification trademarks 
(CTMs) pursuing an individual ownership or private approach (Vivas-Eugui, 2001; 
Addor and Grazioli, 2002; Vandecandelaere and others, 2009). Many countries have 
chosen to protect GIs using the CTM system. This means that if one specific country 
wants to register a GI in any common-law country, it would then have to protect the 
GI through the registration of a CTM in the national office of that country (Vivas-
Eugui, 2001). For Thailand, the sui generis GI Protection Act is based on collective 
approach. Its objectives are: (i) to protect consumers from misleading information 
about the product and producers from unfair competition; (ii) to add value to 
products and serve as marketing tool for the producers; (iii) to maintain product 
standards; (iv) to distribute GI income to rural areas and support industries in the 
rural communities; and (v) to protect traditional knowledge and strengthen 
indigenous community (Thailand, 2004).  
According to the Thai Act on GI Protection B.E. 2546 (2003), GIs are defined 
(Thailand, 2003b, Section 3) as „a name, symbol or any other thing used for calling 
or representing a geographical origin and capable of identifying that the goods 
originating in that geographical origin are the goods, the particular quality, reputation 
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or characteristic of which is attributable to such geographical origin“. The 
geographical origin refers to a certain area, district, region or locality, including sea, 
lake, river, watercourse, island, mountain or alike.  
The Act therefore classifies GIs into two types: (i) direct GI - a geographical 
name that relates directly to GI products such as Chaiya Salted Eggs or Thung Kula 
Rong-Hai Thai Hom Mali Rice (TKR) and (ii) indirect GI – sign or anything that 
does not contain a geographical name to identify the geographical origin or 
production origin such as a „Yamo“2 picture. 
Excluding services, the Act refers to goods that can be purchased, exchanged 
or transferred. They can originate from nature or they can be agricultural products 
including handicrafts and industrial products. There are two protection levels: (i) 
general protection against any use of GIs that are misleading or constitute unfair 
competition (Section 27), and (ii) higher level of protection for special products 
named by the Minister of Commerce. Salted eggs producers in Chiangmai can for 
example not use the name “Chaiya Salted Eggs” since it would mislead consumers 
and constitute unfair competition. A higher level of protection is provided, even 
when the use of such GI does not mislead the public about the true origin. The 
prohibition is also valid for any use of GI in translation or accompanied by the 
expressions „kind“ or „type“ or the like. Thailand has named special products for this 
category of GI protection such as rice, silk, wine and spirits. 
The owners of a registered GI are communities or organizations located in the 
geographical origin. These owners have the exclusive right to prevent all third parties 
to use their GI. Since GIs are the rights of the community, they cannot be transferred 
or consented to others for their use. 
 GI registration process in Thailand 
In order to have GIs being protected, the Thai GI Protection Act provides for a 
registration system through application by certain stakeholders. Section 7 of the GI 
Act identifies three groups of stakeholders eligible to apply for registration: i.e. (i) 
governmental bodies, governmental offices, state-owned enterprises or local 
administration organizations which are registered as a juristic person; (ii) single 
                                                             
2 A female hero from Nakornratchasrima Province in Northeastern Thailand.  
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persons, groups of persons or juristic persons who do business with GI products and 
who are located or live in the GI area; and (iii) groups or organizations of consumers 
who make use of GI products. These stakeholders represent the interests of producers 
of the products concerned (Thailand, 2003b). In addition, applicants can be Thai 
nationals or foreigners. Foreigners who want to register their GIs in Thailand must 
either hold a nationality in the Member countries of treaties or multilateral GI 
Protection Agreements of which Thailand is a Member, or they must have settled 
down or own enterprises in Thailand or in its Member countries. Regarding foreign 
GIs, there must be clear evidence showing that they have already been granted 
protection in the country of origin and used until the date of GI application in 
Thailand. Section 5 of the Act gives a list of GI names which cannot be registered: 
i.e. generic names or names that are commonly used in the trading of those goods as 
well as those GIs being contrary to the public order, morality and public policy 
(Thailand, 2003b). 
According to the Department of Intellectual Property (DIP) (undated), there are 
several stages for obtaining a GI. Starting with the network building of business 
operators of a specific GI, all business operators in the production line from upstream 
raw material producers to downstream process operators must be assembled and then 
the goods which need protection under the GI Protection Act are identified. The 
origin and quality as well as the reputation or other characteristics of the goods along 
with the history of the production of concerned goods in that geographical origin 
must be documented. Furthermore, there should be evidence about the consumer 
perceptions concerning those goods, and finally a cost benefit analysis which 
considers the monitoring and marketing costs should provide insights on whether GI 
application would pay off for the stakeholders involved. It is clearly noted that not all 
area names or all kinds of products need protection in the form of a GI. The product 
specification also requires the zoning or boundary setting for the GI production and 
the establishment of the inspection structure and control system. The draft production 
standard can be then submitted to request for certification of such standard from a 
foreign Certification Body (CB). Finally, marketing and public relation plans for GI 
products should be established. Once all these stages have been finalized, the GI 
registration application must be submitted either to the GI Registry or the Provincial 
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Office of Commercial Affairs under the Ministry of Commerce (MOC). The DIP is 
then responsible for the examination of all applications, the registration of GIs and 
ultimately the licensing of a Thai GI label. 
Within 120 days from the date of receiving the application, the examination 
officer must submit the examination report to the Registrar who will consider the 
report and make a decision whether to register the product in question as GI or not. 
In case the Registrar sees the fulfillment of all inherent conditions of the GI 
application for registration, the DIP will make an announcement of the GI 
registration application. If there is no opposition of other interested parties, the 
product in question will be registered as GI as shown in Figure 1 (Line No. 1). 
  
Figure 1. Featuring procedures for registration of GIs in Thailand 
 
Source: own presentation based on Thailand (2003b) and information on the DIP 
homepage. 
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Any interested parties or even the government official is entitled to request the 
GI Commission not to register a product of concern as GI, or to cancel already 
registered ones if (Thailand, 2003b): 
(i) The registration application for a GI or a GI registration has 
not been proceeded publicly or any statement in the application 
does not reflect the true reality during the registration 
procedure; and  
(ii) The changed situation after registration leads the registered GI 
to become generic or contrary to public order, morality and 
public policy or this changed situation leads to the change of 
the characteristics, quality and reputation of the concerned GI 
goods. 
Once the name is registered as GI by the Registrar, the protection of GI is valid 
from the submission date onwards and the GI label, as shown in Figure 2, can be 
used. Only producers of that geographical origin and entrepreneurs of such GI 
products are granted the right over the use of the particular GI and its label. 
However, it is important to note that only the producers must come from the 
geographical origin, but not the entrepreneurs who do not necessarily originate from 
that particular GI area. The use of a GI by the GI value chain actors on their GI 
product can nevertheless be cancelled when it is misleading and deceptive and leads 
to reputation damage of other users of the same GI and when GI is used for other 
products which are not registered and do not come from the same origin (Section 27 
of the Act). Any person who uses a GI without the legitimate right or uses it to 
mislead the consumers shall be liable to a fine of up to 200,000 Baht. 
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Figure 2. GI label for Thai GIs 
 
Source: DIP, Thailand’s Ministry of Commerce. 
 
GI certification process in Thailand 
After approval of the GI membership application, the GI producers and 
business operators of that particular GI product still need to be certified. Figure 3 
illustrates the GI certification process in Thailand. According to Ngokkuen and Grote 
(2011), three important steps are required for certifying commercial operators of the 
GI product production line: (i) self-control; (ii) internal control; and (iii) external 
control by the foreign CB on behalf of the Competent Authority (CA), i.e. the DIP. 
The self-control is the initial step of the quality control management of the concerned 
GI product. This implies that producers follow the producer manual and the control 
plan given by the DIP in order to maintain the quality of the concerned GI product. 
The internal control means the control within the border of the country. It involves 
the control of all GI producers, processors or other stakeholders involved by local 
and national governmental bodies, usually the GI committee at the provincial level. 
Finally, these actors have to be certified by the DIP. The external control involves 
the quality control and formality checks by the foreign CB. This is particularly the 
case when such GI products are exported abroad in particular to the countries where 
the GI certification is required (Ngokkuen and Grote, 2011). The external control 
will also be carried out by the Accreditation Body (AB) which has the responsibility 
to accredit the CB. The responsible AB in Thailand is the Thai Industrial Standards 
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Institute (TISI) and the National Bureau of Agricultural Commodity and Food 
Standard (ACFS). 
   
Figure 3. GI certification process and GI control system in Thailand 
 
Source:  Own presentation based on information on DIP Homepage and Ngokkuen 
and Grote (2011, p. 174). 
 
After being certified by the DIP, the GI producers or GI business operators can 
use the GI label on their product packages and for their marketing campaigns. 
However, the membership status of the GI business operators must be yearly 
renewed by the CA. 
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IV. GI products in Thailand  
Within the last ten years, 42 different products have been registered and 
certified as GIs in Thailand. Panasnikom Handicrafts, Trang Roast Pork, Doi Tung 
Coffee and Phurua Plateau Wine became the first four registered GIs of Thailand 
(see Annex 1). As of April 2012, there have been eight product types, i.e. 
handicrafts, food, coffee, wine and spirits, horticultural products, rice, pottery, 
general textiles and textiles goods and silk registered as GIs. Most of the registered 
GIs in Thailand are Thai GIs. Seven registered GIs are foreign GIs. The most often 
registered GI products are horticultural products with 12 products, followed by eight 
kinds of GI rice. Thung Kula Rong-Hai Thai Hom Mali Rice (TKR) being the most 
popular registered GI rice has been counted as the first registered Thai Jasmine rice 
from the Northeast, followed by Surin Hom Mali Rice from the same region.   
The importance of rice for Thailand is not only because it is a major staple 
food for domestic consumption, but it is also considered as one of the most important 
export crops of the country. Thailand has been one of the world’s largest rice 
exporters for nearly three decades since 1982 (IRRI, 2005). Its highest market share 
amounted to more than 25 per cent between 2005 and 2010, leaving the second and 
third largest exporters, i.e. Viet Nam and Pakistan far behind as shown in Figure 4. 
Exporting rice to the world market has resulted in considerable export revenues for 
Thailand as a whole but also for the individual rice farmers. 
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Figure 4. World market shares of rice export by country, 2005-2011 
 
 
Sources:  Own presentation based on data from Grains: World market and Trade 
Archives, The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
 
Jasmine rice makes up more than a quarter of Thai rice exports each year. As 
Table 1 shows, in 2011, approximately a third of the rice export value stemmed from 
exporting Jasmine rice which brought foreign currency of around US$ 2 billion to 
Thailand (Thailand, 2009 and Thailand, 2010).   
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Table 1. Rice trade 
Item 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
World rice exports (1 million ton of milled rice) 29.48 31.93 29.22 29.53 31.61 34.76 
Thailand’s world market share (%) 25.4 28.8 35.0 29.1 29.5 30.2 
Domestic consumption (1 million ton of milled rice) 10.50 10.73 11.28 12.12 12.08 12.08 
Export 
     
 
   - Total export volume (1 million ton of milled rice) 7.49 9.19 10.22 7.26 8.94 10.71 
   - Total export value (1 000 million US$)a 2.59 3.45 6.06 5.01 5.30 6.40 
   - Total Thai Jasmine rice export volume (1 million ton of milled rice) 2.60 3.07 2.52 2.63 2.36 2.36 
   - Total Thai Jasmine rice export value (1 000 million US$)a 1.06 1.39 1.81 2.0 2.0 2.09 
Export price for Thai Jasmine rice (US$/ton)a 475 565 910 937 1023 1043 
Note:  a Exchange rates for 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 are 37.93 Baht/US$, 34.56 Baht/US$, 
33.36 Baht/US$, 34.34 Baht/US$, 31.73 Baht/US$ and 30.49 Baht/US$ respectively (Bank of 
Thailand (BOT), 2002-2011). 
Source:  Own presentation based on data from Thailand (2009); Thailand (2010) and 
Thailand (2011). 
 
Jasmine rice or Hom Mali rice (in Thai: Khao Hom Mali) is a rice variety 
which is grown in the uplands of Thailand only once a year using two kinds of Thai 
Jasmine rice seeds: Khao Dawk Mali 105 and RD15 (in Thai: Gor Khor 15). Khao 
Dawk Mali 105 is a result of the further development of the local Thai Jasmine rice 
seeds. It was first discovered in Laempradoo Sub-District, Panasnikom District of 
Chonburee Province in Southeastern Thailand. It was then taken to be cultivated in 
Tatonglang Sub-District in Bangkla District of Chachoengsao Province, a neighbour 
province of Chonburee, and it was found that it reached high yields and became 
therefore very popular among farmers. Even though this traditional Jasmine rice was 
not widespread and relatively expensive, it became popular among Thai consumers, 
in particular among the rich from Bangkok. Since 1950, this traditional Thai Jasmine 
rice was further bred and developed at the field trials of Chachoengsao Province’s 
Rice Research Centre. After six years of cultivation tests in many areas of Thailand, 
it was found that the Northeast with its unique sandy loam and rain-fed upland is the 
most appropriate part for Jasmine rice cultivation using Khao Dawk Mali 105 seed. 
The next generation of rice breeders used Khao Dawk Mali 105 as a parent for the 
crossing and then irradiated it by the Gamma ray to allow the mutation of the rice. 
The outcome of this breeding development is the RD 15 which has been cultivated in 
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the North and Northeast of Thailand since 1965 (Thailand (undated); iCoopThai, 
undated).  
After it was found that the Northeast of the country called Isaan is the most 
appropriate area for Jasmine rice production, the Royal Thai government has made 
efforts to promote the cultivation of Jasmine rice using Khao Dawk Mali 105 and RD 
15. However, since the Northeastern Thais prefer sticky rice as a staple food, a 
breakthrough was achieved only in three Southern Isaan provinces, namely 
Bureeram, Surin and Srisaket where local people are Khmers with a preference for 
Jasmine rice. Within these provinces, a huge flat and dry area called Thung Kula 
Rong-Hai (TKRH) was then used for the cultivation of the first Thai Jasmine rice. 
This premium rice has a unique texture and a natural and distinct aromatic fragrance 
of Jasmine flower from the smell essence called 2-acctyl-1-pyrroline (2AP). The 
popularity of Jasmine rice has been passed through to consumers not only in 
Thailand, but also beyond. 
To promote its cultivation and marketing world-wide, the Thai Hom Mali Rice 
Trade Association Thung Kula Rong-Hai Geographical Indication (THAT) has been 
established in 2008. By 2008/2009, there were 1,131 Thai Jasmine rice farmers, 13 
exporters and four processors certified as GI operators for the TKR by the DIP 
(Ngokkuen and Grote, 2011). 
At the international level, the GI registration application for the TKR labelled 
“Khao Hom Mali Thung Kula Rong-Hai” has been submitted by the DIP to the EU’s 
GI Registry on 20 November 2008 (European Commission, 2010). This GI 
application is the first one from Asia and the first attempt to seek GI protection 
abroad. As of April 2012, the term Khao Hom Mali Thung Kula Rong-Hai has still 
not been registered by the EU’s GI Registry due to the opposition of five EU 
countries. Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom contend 
that Thailand should not be the only country allowed to register the term Khao Hom 
Mali, as other countries can also grow Jasmine rice. EU’s rice traders were 
concerned about not being able to use the word Khao Hom Mali in branding other 
Jasmine rice products from Thailand once the term Khao Hom Mali Thung Kula 
Rong-Hai would have been registered as GI in the EU. They suggest that Thailand 
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should apply for GI registration only with the term Thung Kula Rong-Hai (“Five 
European nations oppose Thai registration of Thai Hom Mali rice”, (MCOT online 
news (Bangkok), 26 January 2011). Thailand then agreed to apply for GI protection 
only for the term Thung Kula Rong-Hai. Nevertheless, the DIP insisted on having its 
Thung Kula Rong-Hai Jasmine rice to be sold at a premium price with the GI 
designation displayed on the packaging. In addition, the rice must be packed at the 
site where it was cultivated and be traceable back to the field in order to keep the 
quality of the concerned Jasmine rice which originated from the GI area. Thailand 
does not forbid the EU’s rice traders to import and pack in the EU varieties of Thai 
Jasmine rice grown in other areas of Thailand, next to other premium rice, brown 
rice, or other kinds of rice provided that the traders have an appropriate supervised 
packing system making all rice imported from Thailand being traceable to the origin. 
This is in order to protect the reputation of Thai rice (“Hom Mali rice GI registration 
likely this year”, Bangkok Post (Bangkok), 25 June 2011; "Thailand/European 
Union: EU nations oppose Thailand's registration with European Commission for 
geographical indication of Thai jasmine rice." Thai Press Reports, 2011). 
Besides the attempt to protect the reputation of Thai Jasmine rice abroad via 
the GI protection law, there have been also intensive attempts by the Thai 
government to protect it under the trademark law in other countries since 2001 
(Thailand, 2002). Thai Jasmine rice under the name “THAI HOM MALI RICE” with 
an official Thai-language term “KHAO HOM MALI THAI” or “KAOW HOM 
MALI THAI” has already been successfully registered as a certification mark, as 
shown in Figure 5, by the Trademark Office in more than 50 countries including 
Australia, Canada, Malaysia, Singapore or the United States (Thailand, 2002). The 
Thai-language terms “Khao” and „Hom Mali“ refer to rice and Jasmine in English, 
respectively. The reason behind the registration application of Thai Jasmine rice 
labelled „Khao Hom Mali“ instead of “Jasmine rice” is due to the existing common 
law in some countries, including the United States of which the court considers the 
term Jasmine as generic. The Department of Foreign Trade (DFT) of Thailand’s 
MOC controls the use of the certification mark which is aimed to provide consumers 
with the information and the assurance that rice imported with the mark meets its 
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quality standards. The mark is also used to certify the origin, composition and 
method of production, quality or other quality characteristics of a product. 
 
Figure 5.  Certification mark/ Trademark of THAI HOM MALI RICE 
originated in Thailand 
 
Source: Department of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Commerce of Thailand. 
 
V. Challenges of GI protection  
Regional Trade Agreements, TRIPS-Plus and TRIPS-Minus 
Due to the slow progress of completing the current Doha Round, more and 
more regional and bilateral Free Trade Agreements (RTAs and FTAs) have been 
negotiated in the recent past (El-Said, 2005). This changing trend in trade 
negotiations has also been induced by (i) Article 24.1 of the TRIPS Agreement 
which encourages the WTO Members to have recourse to bilateral agreements and 
by (ii) the TRIPS Agreement’s minimum IP standards allowing the creation of higher 
standards in any IP agreement negotiated subsequent to TRIPS among WTO 
members. This introduction of minimum IP standards is allowed as long as the 
principles of non-discrimination, i.e. Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) and National 
Treatment (NT), are respected (Mercurio, 2006). However, it is important to note 
that these newly generated RTAs and FTAs operate outside the jurisdiction of the 
WTO, since they are only notified to the WTO, but not governed by its rules and 
dispute settlement arrangements. And since a new trade round can be launched easier 
than under the multilateral framework, they are thus multiplying very fast (GRAIN, 
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2001). As of 15 January 2012, a total of 511 RTAs were notified to the GATT/WTO, 
of which 319 agreements were in force with most of them being FTAs (90%), while 
customs unions account only for 10% (WTO, 2012).    
Having failed to achieve stronger IPR protection in the TRIPS negotiations, 
developed countries have included more protectable subject matter, broader and 
more extensive coverage, increased harmonization, stronger enforcement 
mechanisms, and a weakening of flexibilities and special and differential treatment in 
the bilateral FTA negotiations with the developing and least developed countries 
(Mercurio, 2006). The TRIPS provisions contained in the RTAs and FTAs are 
considered as the “TRIPS-plus” provisions if the country is being forcefully required 
to implement more extensive levels and standards of IPR protection than required 
under the TRIPS Agreement, or if they have to reduce the scope of their rights and 
exceptions as well as to eliminate an option which was awarded to them under the 
TRIPS Agreement (Musungu and Dutfield, 2003). The TRIPS-plus agenda was made 
particularly by the United States and the EU through a series of RTAs and FTAs, 
with the United States pursuing its strategy of „competitive liberalization“ and thus 
counting as the most active country on bilateral trade talks (Mercurio, 2006).    
While the EU stressed in FTAs with other countries the recognition of selected 
European GIs, particularly GIs for wines and/or spirits, the United States focused to a 
large extent on the elimination of domestic sui generis GI protection systems and 
their replacement by regular trademark systems (Vivas-Engui and Spennemann, 
2006a and 2006b). Vivas-Engui and Spennemann (2006a) term such provisions by 
the United States as “TRIPS-minus” provisions. This preference by the United States 
for trademarks is explained by their own legal tradition of having trademarks, and 
also because they do not consider GIs as community rights but rather as private 
rights which can be licensed or sold (Charlier and Ngo, 2007). Binding into FTAs or 
RTAs with such standards will therefore prevent a government to use proactive legal 
measures created under the national GI Act to punish free-riders in case of deception 
or misuse of the national GIs by the trading partner. Agreeing to such standards 
therefore not only means agreeing to amend the national IP law, but it also means 
that countries may be agreeing to standards that are far from their own economic and 
social needs (Mercurio, 2006). The TRIPS-plus or TRIPS-minus provisions have 
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therefore very important implications for developing countries because of their 
higher level of flexibilities which again put developing countries as negotiating 
partners in a plight (George, 2004). Rules and practices under these concepts limit 
their ability to protect the public interest (Musungu and Dutfield, 2003).   
Even though Thailand supports multilateral trade liberalization, as a member of 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and as a Party to the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the country is also committed to 
„open regionalism“. Since 2002, Thailand has actively negotiated preferential trading 
arrangements with countries such as Australia, China, India, New Zealand and the 
United States. As of 5 April 2012, Free Trade Talks of Thailand comprised totally 22 
FTAs and RTAs of which six agreements became effective (Thailand, 2012). Many 
FTAs and RTAs are seen as beneficial for Thailand’s economy. However, the 
Thailand-United States FTA has been considered as the most critical one since it is 
comprehensive and very detailed. GIs sections in its chapter on IPRs have included a 
dual system of protection with GIs/trademarks meaning that trademark holders are 
granted exclusive rights over third parties who use trade-identical or similar signs 
including subsequent GIs (TDRI, 2003).  
Farmers, especially Jasmine rice farmers, activists and academic people in 
Thailand have voiced strong opposition against the FTA negotiations with the United 
States due to the fear of their strong power and particularly due to their role as a 
funder of Jasmine rice bioengineering projects (Roggemann, 2005). The imbalance 
in bargaining power for developing countries vís-à-vís developed countries is very 
pronounced and can be more easily exploited in the bilateral negotiations context 
than in the multilateral setting. The developing countries, particularly the smaller and 
weaker amongst them, have little ability to counter the negotiating demands of 
powerful trading partners, in particular the United States in bilateral FTA 
negotiations (Buckley and others, 2008). A challenge for a developing country like 
Thailand is thus how to counter the negotiating demands of the United States. 
Until now, the Thailand-United States FTA has not been concluded. The 
negotiations have been put on hold by the United States since February 2006, mainly 
due to the political situation in Thailand. The hold was also due to the expiration of 
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the United States Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) Act of 2002 in June 
2007. The Act has still not been renewed or extended by the Congress since then 
(Hornbeck and Cooper, 2011). The continuation of the FTA negotiations with the 
United States has therefore been postponed to an unknown date (Thailand, 2012).
3
 
Thus, Thailand still has some time to explore means to strengthen its national 
legislation for better GI protection before committing itself to such an FTA and 
concluding further FTAs or RTAs with other leading economies. This could be done 
for example by amending and upgrading the existing GI Protection Act to a higher 
level of protection over the trademark law but still being conform with the TRIPS 
rules. The country should also carefully assess whether the ensuring obligations in 
the RTAs or FTAs correspond with its economic, cultural and societal priorities 
(Vivas-Eugui and Spennemann, 2006a and 2006b). This challenge is therefore a 
domestic matter. 
It is important to emphasize that the GI protection should be based on the same 
standards for all countries, namely rather under the multilateral trade framework and 
not under the bilateral ones (Mercurio, 2006). At the international level, Thailand and 
all other developing and least developed countries should make sure that long-term 
policy goals and coherence with the multilateral obligations are adequately taken into 
account (Vivas-Eugui and Spennemann, 2006a and 2006b). The multilateral trading 
system is beneficial for them because of its ability to extend dispute settlements 
across agreements (Mathur, 2001). Moreover, in the WTO forum, they have at least 
the power of numbers. By grouping together similarly situated Members, they have 
been able to have a significant impact on the direction of the multilateral trade 
agenda, whereas such outcome is not feasible in the bilateral context (Buckley and 
others, 2008). Thailand should thus stress its position to support the multilateral trade 
rules of the TRIPS Agreement under the auspices of the WTO. The country should 
actively work more closely together with other „GI alliances“ in order to make the 
GI issue more public. The target should be not only to improve information for 
                                                             
3 Senator Jim Webb, a Chairman of the United States Senate’s Subcommittee on East Asian and 
Pacific Affairs, has lately expressed hope that both countries will coordinate their bilateral 
cooperation and further foster the already strong relations between the two countries and that the 
United States was ready to support Thailand with the newly elected government of Ms Yingluck 
Shinnawatra in various fields during his visit in Thailand (“US senate committee welcomes new Thai 
PM”, Editorial, Thailand Business News (Bangkok), 16 August 2011).  
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consumers of Thai GIs in the world market but also to raise recognition from all 
parties about the importance of having domestic GIs being better protected. Given 
the facts that the Member countries are already banded into different groups, that 
developing countries themselves do not share the same viewpoints with respect to the 
issue of GI protection extension under TRIPS, and that the promotion of bilateralism 
by developed countries such as the United States also encompasses „dividing“ 
developing coalitions (Mercurio, 2006), it is currently very difficult to gather 
alliances and find the consents for setting standards for GI protection at the 
multilateral level.  
Conflicts of interests concerning different types of intellectual property rights 
and the future of Hom Mali Rice  
Since January 2008, the National Science and Technology Development 
Agency (NSTDA) in Thailand has obtained the patent on genes that generate aroma 
in the world famous Jasmine rice in the United States. This was considered by 
NSTDA as a necessity to be able to protect Thailand’s national treasure by keeping 
other countries from obtaining the patent on rice which would damage Thai farmers 
and rice industry. However, due to the existing conflicts of interests regarding IPR 
types, i.e. whether GI products should be protected by the patent and trademark law 
or by the specific GI Act, this move to patent Thai Jasmine rice genes could send a 
wrong signal to other trading partners. Since the country has strongly opposed the 
patent registration of living organisms and genetic resources, the alliance seeking 
activities with respect to better protection of agricultural GIs at the multilateral level 
are therefore in the situation of self-challenge. However, this rice patent could later 
develop into a double-edged sword due to the limited duration period of the patent 
protection of up to 20 years. Law experts, NGOs and farmers thus see this rice patent 
as more harmful than beneficial for the long-term protection of Thai Jasmine rice. 
Anybody could benefit from it by adopting the genetic engineering technology to put 
these aromatic genes in any rice variety to make it aromatic like Thai Jasmine rice 
after the expiration of the patent protection period. Combining this concern with the 
issue of biopiracy, the damage would be much more tremendous, since foreigners 
could also apply for patents of other living organisms and genes (“Thai rice gene 
patent sends wrong signal’”, Editorial, Bangkok Post (Bangkok), 3 July 2009), even 
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though such living organisms and genetic resources do not have an origin in their 
countries. Old bad experiences such as the cases of Plao-noi and a variety of bitter 
gourd could affect Thailand again. 
Even though there still exists a space for relief, since the CBD tends to be 
willing to assign ownership rights to the first phase of the biotechnology process and 
at the multilateral level, the TRIPS still does not grant patent protection to any 
products resulting from the first phase of the biotechnology process (Kerr and 
Yampoin, 2007) and it allows Member countries to exempt and exclude plant and 
animal patents from their national patent laws (El-Said, 2005). However, the 
harmonized convention to protect such living organisms and genetic resources is still 
not ratified at the international level. Furthermore, even if the products from the first 
phase of the biotechnology process will not be granted patent protection under 
TRIPS, the extension of GI protection under Article 23 of the TRIPS to agricultural 
products is still under negotiation. The challenge for the GI protection would 
therefore increase to a greater extent not only for the GI protection in Thailand, but 
also for the whole GI protection system under the TRIPS. What Thailand could do 
alternatively with respect to the concerned issue is to take the initiative to open the 
floor for negotiations going much further than the existing request of extending GI 
protection under Article 23. Upgrading its national sui generis system for GI 
protection could be alternatively done by adding the protection on genetic resources 
of GI plants. Such tightened sui generis system should not only be integrated into the 
national legal framework but it should also conform well to specific needs of 
indigenous communities and best protect the genetic resources of the country. Hence, 
a comprehensive approach with a bundle of complementary legal, non-legal and 
voluntary mechanisms such as GI registration currently serves as the best solution for 
enhanced GI protection. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In the recent past, the discussion on better IPR protection has taken center 
stage. Developed nations which produce most of the world’s IPs resulting from high 
knowledge-based technologies seek to protect their self-interest by trying to 
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influence the IPRs Conventions. They complain about the inadequacy of IPR 
protection in developing countries and accuse them of IP piracy. The developing 
countries, however, accuse the developed countries of biopiracy. Given the endless 
negotiations to extend the GI protection to products other than wine and spirits at the 
multilateral level, together with no ratification of the CBD, the ability of the WTO to 
cope with the problem of biopiracy around the globe is weak. Some countries, in 
particular those which possess GI products, have released a national law to protect 
their GIs. Thailand with its sui generis GI protection system hopes to mitigate the 
problem of exploitation. The Thai GI Act was released not only due to the 
requirement of the multilateral trading framework, but also due to biopiracy related 
to its widely known Thai Jasmine rice. The biopiracy issue was seen as the main 
driving factor accelerating the process for enacting the GI Law.  
However, increased trade liberalization through bilateral FTAs and RTAs with 
economies such as the United States and the attempt to protect its national „assets“ 
by obtaining the patent for the rice genes in the USPTO have started to challenge the 
GI protection in Thailand. This is due to the limited protection period for patents 
registered in the United States of only up to 20 years. Furthermore, patenting life 
forms was never a position of Thailand at the multilateral trade negotiation on patent 
protection. Suggestions on how to solve such problems do exist like e.g. opening 
negotiations which go much further than the existing request of extending GI 
protection under Article 23, or upgrading its national sui generis system for GI 
protection by adding the protection on genetic resources of GI plants. However, there 
is a cost to such suggestions and the expected outcome is unsure. Raising the issue of 
automatic protection on genetic resources of GI plants within the scope of GI 
protection is much more challenging, while there is criticism of the sui generis 
system of GI protection by opponents in a series of bilateral FTAs and RTAs. It is to 
question whether the country would be better off by using its resources on other 
facets of development that are more likely to yield sustainable outcomes. While 
creating consumers’ awareness about GIs for example is generally recommendable, it 
must be also considered that GI promotion is expensive and sustainable benefits are 
not guaranteed. Nevertheless, given the social, cultural and economic importance of 
GIs for Thailand, it is necessary and worth trying to seek win-win solutions which 
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are of benefit to both sides, the opponents and proponents of GI protection. Many 
Thai GIs are of agricultural nature involving all kinds of actors from poor rural 
households to GI exporters. Losing „GI assets“ due to inadequate protection might 
reduce an independency in self-sufficiency for the country and the costly possible 
outcome would be the economic burden which concerns most of the million poor in 
the rural areas. 
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Annex 
A1: Registered GIs in Thailand classified by product type, 2003 – 2012 
No. Geographical indications Product type Registered date 
1 Panasnikom Handicrafts Handicrafts 26 August 2005 
2 Bor Sang Umbrella Handicrafts 01 June 2006 
3 Chiang mai Celadon Handicrafts 31 August 2007 
4 Yok Blabri Nan Handicrafts 23 December 2010 
5 Trang Roasted Pork Food 18 April 2006 
6 Surat Thani Oyster Food – Seafood 23 June 2006 
7 Prosciutto Di Parma Food – Ham 21 July 2006 
8 Chaiya Salted Eggs Food- Eggs 27 September 2007 
9 Doi Tung Coffee Coffee 18 April 2006 
10 Doi Chaang Coffee Coffee 27 September 2007 
11 Phurua Plateau Wine Wine 18 April 2006 
12 Brunello Di Montalcino Wine 27 September 2007 
13 Napa Valley Wine 12 June 2008 
14 Cogyac Spirits 27 September 2007 
15 Pisco Spirits 30 September 2007 
16 Champagne Sparkling Wine 15 December 2006 
17 Scotch Whisky Whisky 13 July 2007 
18 Chainat Khaotangkwa Pomelo Horticultural Product 23 June 2006 
19 Sriracha pineapple Horticultural Product 23 June 2006 
20 Chiangrai Phulae Pineapple Horticultural Product 15 December 2006 
21 Nanglae Pineapple Horticultural Product 15 December 2006 
22 Nakornchaisri Pomelo Horticultural Product 30 September 2007 
23 Petchabun Sweet Tamarind Horticultural Product 30 September 2007 
24 Phuket Pineapple Horticultural Product 26 October 2007 
25 Phet Rose Apple Horticultural Product 17 April 2008 
26 Glauy Hin Bannang Sata Horticultural Product 8 June 2009 
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27 Kathon Hor Bangkrang Horticultural Product 11 May 2010 
28 Nont Durian Horticultural Product 11 May 2010 
29 Sangyod Muang Phatthalung Rice Rice 23 June 2006 
30 Hang-Hom-Thong-Sakon-Tawapee Rice Rice – Brown rice 15 December 2006 
31 Kaowong Kalasin Sticky Rice Rice – Sticky rice 16 May 2007 
32 Thung Kula Rong-Hai Thai Hom Mali Rice Rice – Jasmine rice 27 September 2007 
33 Surin Hom Mali Rice Rice – Jasmine rice 26 February 2008 
34 Khao Kum Lanna Rice 17 September 2008 
35 Jek Chuey Sao Hai Rice Rice 30 December 2008 
36 Leuang Pratew Chumporn Rice Rice 30 December 2008 
37 Ban Chiang Pottery Pottery 10 August 2007 
38 Kohkret Pottery Pottery 11 May 2010 
39 Mae Jam’s Tin Jok woven cloth Textiles and Textile Goods 27 September 2007 
40 Lamphun Brocade Thai Silk Silk 27 September 2007 
41 Praewa Kalasin Thai Silk Silk 27 September 2007 
42 Chonnabot Mudmee Thai Silk Silk 14 January 2009 
Source: DIP, own compilation 
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2.2 MODULE II: GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATION CERTIFICATION ADOPTION: 
JASMINE RICE HOUSEHOLDS’ BEHAVIOR 
 
2. NGOKKUEN, C. and GROTE, U. (2011). “The Prediction of Household’s Behavior in 
Adopting Geographical Indication Certification for Jasmine Rice from Northeastern 
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The Prediction of Household’s Behavior in Adopting 
Geographical Indication Certification for Jasmine Rice 
from Northeastern Thailand 
C. Ngokkuen and U. Grote 
 
 Abstract— Since the release of the Act on Geographical Indication (GI) protection 
in Thailand, Thung Kula Rong-Hai Thai Hom Mali Rice (TKR) is considered as the 
first officially registered GI Jasmine rice under this Act. This paper aims at 
identifying factors that predict the behavior of Jasmine rice households in adopting 
GI certification for TKR rice. The logit model was used to analyze the primary data 
of 370 households collected through a formal survey in two districts of the Thung 
Kula Rong-Hai (TKRH) area. The logistic regression results indicate the significant 
influence of institutional and social factors such as information, membership in a 
cooperative and transportation costs on the decision of the Thai Jasmine rice 
households to adopt the GI certification-. 
 
Keywords: Certification, Geographical Indications, Jasmine rice, Logit Model, 
Thailand 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Geographical indications (GIs) are a kind of intellectual property right which are 
used to identify products and confer the exclusive right to all producers from a given 
geographical area to use a distinctive sign to identify their products as in [1]. They 
have gained increasing interest since their protection has been ensured multilaterally 
under the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The “Act on Geographical Indications 
Protection B.E. 2546 (2003)” is a first specific Act on GI protection released by the 
Thai government in 2003. Its release was mainly driven by the public interest in the 
fight against biopiracy along with the given attempt of the EU in seeking alliance for 
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better GI protection around the globe. The act release as a proactive legal provision is 
also due to the WTO requirement to the Member countries to provide a legal and 
institutional framework of GI protection in their own national borders as in [2]. As of 
May 2011, totally 35 products from different regions in Thailand were registered as 
GIs.  
Thung Kula Rong-Hai Thai Hom Mali Rice (TKR) which is traditionally being 
produced in the Thung Kula Rong-Hai (TKRH) region in the Northeast region is 
considered as the first registered GI Thai Jasmine rice. GI certification is expected to 
promote its export which currently mainly goes to the EU. Through the establishment 
of such quality labels, economic agents involved in the GI product value chain are 
able to gain economic advantages due to differentiation. They can obtain 
differentiated incomes via increasing the added value of the product as in [3]. 
Consumers consider the distinctive signs as markers of quality and assurance of 
reputation are thus willing to pay a price premium as in [4]. There are many studies 
about technology and innovation adoption e.g. in [5]. Also studies on the adoption of 
certification schemes, like for organic rice in Thailand, have shed some light on the 
factors that play a crucial role in affecting the household’s adoption decision e.g. in 
[6]. However, studies on GI adoption are still missing and this paper would 
contribute to fulfill this research gap. This paper aims to identify the determining 
factors that are likely to predict the behavior of Jasmine rice households in the 
TKRH area in adopting GI certification and to estimate the marginal effects of key 
factors on the probability of adoption. 
 
II. PROCESS OF GI CERTIFICATION IN THAILAND 
Fig. 1 presents the process of GI certification for Jasmine rice from the Northeast 
region of Thailand. Once the product of concern is registered and certified as GI 
from the registrar, Thailand’s Department of Intellectual Property (DIP), the use of 
the GI label for identifying GI products is possible. The procedure of certifying 
commercial operators of the GI product production line encompasses three important 
steps as follows: (i) self-control; (ii) internal control; and (iii) external control by the 
Certification Body (CB). The self-control step is the initial step of the quality control 
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management of the concerned GI product. According to this, producers have to 
follow the producer manual and the control plan given by the DIP. The internal 
control means the control within the border of the country and involves the control 
by local and national governmental bodies. The internal control is ensured by the 
membership application of all related GI business operators within the GI area. The 
producers and other business operators of the production line of a specific GI product 
must apply for a membership in the GI club. Finally, these actors have to be certified 
by the national CB which is also the responsibility of the DIP. The external control 
involves the quality control and formality checking by the foreign CB. In case of the 
TKR, the company BioAgriCert based in Italy is responsible for the external 
inspection. This is particularly the case when such GI products should be exported 
abroad in particular to the EU where the GI certification is required. After being 
certified as GI producers or GI business operators by the DIP, in particular those who 
directly use the GI label can then use the GI label on their products packages and use 
it together in their marketing campaign. The GI label then serves as information or 
reputation channel for consumers. 
How a GI certification is adopted is based on the diffusion of innovation theory 
of [7]. An innovation is defined in [7], p. 12 as an “idea, practice, or object that is 
perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption.” A GI certification is the 
innovation since all parties in the GI area considered it as a new certification system, 
whereupon an organizational innovation resulting from it is particularly seen as a key 
part in disseminating knowledge and innovation on the ground and in relating quality 
policy to the entire value chain as in [3]. 
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Figure 1. Process of GI certification in Thailand 
 
Source: own presentation 
 
This study relates to four main stages defined by [7] in the innovation-decision 
process as follows: (i) knowledge, (ii) persuasion, (iii) decision, and (iv) 
implementation. The TKR farmer households accumulate knowledge by learning 
from the existence of a GI certification system and gain some information and 
understanding of how the GI certification system functions. The persuasion stage is 
reached when the households form a favorable or unfavorable attitude towards the GI 
certification. The decision occurs when the households engage in activities that lead 
to a choice of adopting or rejecting the GI certification. They decide to adopt when 
registering their name with the national CB. Finally, the implementation is reached 
when the GI certification is used, i.e. they follow the TKR production manuals 
received from the GI CB. This manual is released to control quality of the TKR 
production at the initial stage of the TKR value chain. 
Adoption in this classical adoption diffusion model is regarded as being 
inevitable since the model assumes that the innovations are profitable and that the 
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farmers behave rational in economic terms as in [8]. According to [8], in the case GI 
certification which is considered as commercial innovation, a lack of adoption can be 
solely explained by the lag time in the communication between the extension agency 
and an individual farmer household or the lag time in how long the individual farmer 
takes to try-out the GI certification. In addition, the opportunity to adopt new 
technologies or innovations might also sometimes be limited by infrastructure such 
as access to inputs, to markets as in [8] and to information as e.g. in [9]. 
 
III. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND LOGIT MODEL  
Even though economic theory has been criticized to provide limited guidance on the 
selection of variables to explain the behavior of the farmers in the adoption decision 
as in [10], the variables selection for this study is however mainly based on the 
helpful guidance of the theoretical model of the innovation-decision process as in [7] 
along with the research literature accumulated about variables related to 
innovativeness as e.g. in [5] and [8]. Moreover, an econometric model of a logistic 
regression (logit model) is used to help selecting key variables which could best 
explain the behavior of the farmer households to adopt GI certification. A logit 
model is a probability model which is a regression of the conditional expectation of 
Y on X. It allows one to examine how a change in any explanatory variable changes 
all the outcome probabilities as in [11]. The model in terms of Y is written in (1) as 
follows: 
 
where Yi is a dichotomous dependent variable; and Yi=1 when a household adopted 
GI certification and Yi=0 otherwise. Xk is a vector of independent variables 
determining the probability of adoption. The parameter α is the unknown constant 
term and βk are regression coefficients of k explanatory variables to be estimated and 
ε is the error term. The key is therefore to find β that produces the logits and the 
conditional mean of Y given X values that have the greatest likelihood of producing 
the observed data as in [12].  
  

K
1k
kk i XY
(1) 
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The GI issue involves three different levels, namely (i) micro level: the 
individual farmer household; (ii) meso or community level: this is when factors such 
as bargaining power, communication behavior indicated by a variable participation 
and social status indicated e.g. by income play a role; and finally (iii) macro level: 
this level involves the institutional aspects such as information provided by the 
government and transaction costs (search and monitoring costs). Accordingly, this 
study classifies factors influencing the adoption decision into three main categories 
with the first two being summarized in [7]: (i) household and farm characteristics, 
(ii) socioeconomic factors, and (iii) institutional factors. All variables included in the 
model are described in Table I.  
 
Table I. Classification and Description of Variables Used in the Model 
Different level  
Variables in each category  Description Values/measure involved in the 
 GI issue 
Micro level 
Household and farm characteristics 
  Gender (X1) Sex of household head 1= male; 0= female  
Education (X2) Schooling of household head years 
Land size (X3) Total land size for  agricultural use Rai 
Meso level 
Socioeconomic factors 
  Member of cooperative (X4) Household is a member of the cooperative 1= yes; 0= no  
Participation  (X5) Household participated in meetings  1= yes; 0= no 
 
organized in the village 
 Bargaining power (X6) Household could bargain the price 1= yes; 0= no 
Income (X7) Total annual income Baht 
Macro level 
Institutional factors 
  
Information (X8) Access to information  1= yes; 0=  no 
Time to markets (X9) Time to the nearest markets for rice sale hours 
Transportation costs (X10) Transportation costs per unit sold Baht per ton 
Monitoring costs (X11)  Household faces information asymmetry  1= yes; 0= no 
 
in the quality control 
 
Source: own compilation 
 
Key categorical factors shaping the adoption behavior of the decision-making 
unit defined in [7] are socioeconomic characteristics, personality variables and 
communication behavior. They play a role in the initial stage of the innovation-
decision process when the decision-making unit seeks information about the new 
innovation. 
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IV. DATA COLLECTION 
A case study was conducted in Rasrisalai District and Kasetwisai District in the 
TKRH area in Northeastern Thailand. Using the disproportionate stratified random 
sampling technique, the total population for each district was then stratified into two 
main groups: GI group and non GI group. The data were collected through a formal 
survey from March to June 2009. The total sample size for data analysis is 370 
households. Sampling weights are applied to the data during the data analysis to 
correct for unequal probabilities of selection due to stratification and finally to obtain 
unbiased and consistent estimates as in [13]. 
 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Descriptive Findings 
Table II presents the descriptive and comparative statistics of variables included in 
the model. Comparing both groups, the results show that the GI group has a higher 
number of male farmers with almost 60 percent compared to that of the non GI group 
with only 38 percent. The average education level of household heads in our sample 
is quite low with only around six years of schooling and 70 percent of them having at 
most primary education. The adjusted Wald test indicates a significant difference in 
the education level of the household head between both groups at 5 percent level. 
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TABLE II. DESCRIPTIVE AND COMPARATIVE STATISTICS OF 
FACTORS AFFECTING GI CERTIFICATION ADOPTION 
Variable Mean (Std. dev.)  Mean (Std. dev.)   Mean (Std. dev.)  Test of 
 
or % for Total 
Sample 
or % for GI 
Group 
or % for non-GI 
Group 
significance 
 
(N=370) (n=142) (n=228)   
Household and farm characteristics   
   
Gender (1=male) in % 38.54 59.87 37.74 10.41** 
Education (years) 5.27 (2.81) 6.21 (11.03) 5.23 (2.22) 5.42** 
Land size (Rai) 38.93 (29.98) 43.93 (110.86) 38.75 (23.90) 1.23 
Socioeconomic factors 
    
Member of cooperative (1=yes) in % 67.88 81.09 67.38 5.27** 
Participation (1=yes) in % 79.62 88.31 79.3 2.96* 
Bargaining Power (1=yes) in % 0.00046 0.6 0.03 14.48*** 
Income 388.20  (374.04) 393.80 (1738.53) 387.99 (293.07) 0.01 
Institutional factors 
    
Information (1=yes) in % 40.97 66.48 40 15.17*** 
Time to markets (hours) 0.86 (0.65) 0.97 (2.69) 0.85 (0.51) 1.61 
Transportation costs (Baht per ton) 233.29 (430.97) 309.13 (2011.67) 230.42 (337.35) 1.08 
Monitoring Costs (1=yes) in % 8.3 10.35 8.22 0.26 
Source: own compilation 
 
The participation in cooperatives is relatively widespread among the sampled 
farmers. Comparing between groups, we find that more GI households (approx. 80 
percent) than non GI households (approx. 67 percent) are member of the cooperative. 
The Pearson chi-square test confirms the significant difference at the 5 percent level.  
Regarding other social factors, it can be seen that a high proportion (almost 80 
percent) of the households participate in meetings organized in the village. The 
bargaining power has been found to be negligible for the sampled farmers. 
With respect to information, we find a significant difference between both 
groups. More GI farmer households (66 percent) received information than non GI 
farmers (40 percent). Regarding the negotiation costs, we find that the rice farmers 
face the problem of long distance to rice markets. They spend on average close to 1 
hour to reach the markets in order to sell their rice. With respect to transportation 
costs, the farmer pays on average 233 Baht per ton. While GI farmers pay around 
309 Baht per ton, the non GI farmers pay only 230 Baht per ton. These higher costs 
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for the GI farmers are due to the fact that they face longer distances because many of 
them (42 percent) sell rice to the certified GI buying points located in the district 
center as shown in Table III. Many non GI households, however, sell rice to other 
buyers, as shown in Table III, such as government (20 percent), middlemen (25 
percent) or small traders (8 percent) who usually come directly to the rice field or to 
the village to take the rice. A slightly higher percentage of the GI farmers than the 
non GI farmers sells their rice to private rice mills which are known for their strict 
rice quality controls, as opposed to other rice buyers such as middlemen, retailers in 
the district center or small traders. Around 8 percent of the farmer households 
reported the existence of information asymmetry in the quality control when selling 
their rice to private rice mills. 
 
TABLE III. RICE BUYERS IN THE TKRH AREA 
Rice  buyers GI (in %)
a 
Non GI (in %)
a 
Local markets (Fresh) 0 2.29 
Agricultural cooperatives 12.03 13.4 
Middlemen 17.72 23.53 
Traders 5.06 5.88 
Private rice mills 10.13 7.19 
Government 12.03 20.26 
Retailers 0.63 0 
Certified GI buyers 42.41 27.45 
a The numbers do not add up to 100 because of several choices. 
Source: own calculation 
 
A. Logistic Regression Results 
A series of logistic regression diagnostics were applied for detecting interaction 
effects, correlations, multicollinearity and other specification errors. Moreover, a 
two-stage Hausman specification test as described in [14] was used to determine 
whether any of the adoption variables was endogenous in the model. The test failed 
to reject exogeneity at P < 0.05. Finally, a goodness-of-fit test of [15] showed no lack 
of fit of the selected logistic regression model using survey sample data.  
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The logistic regression results presented in Table IV show that four factors 
gender, member of cooperative, information, and transportation costs have 
significant impacts on the decision of Thai Jasmine rice households to adopt GI 
certification. 
 
TABLE IV. PARAMETER ESTIMATES AND ODDS RATIO 
aDependent variable: certified GI and non-certified GI farmer households; n=370 
bSignificant at 1% level; c5%; d10% 
 
F-adjusted mean residual test to test a goodness-of-fit F (11,370)  = 0.676; Prob > F = 0.731 
Area under the ROC curve    0.7469 
 
Source: own calculation 
 
At the significance level of 5 percent, gender has a positive influence on GI 
adoption which was previously expected. The rate of adoption was found to be 
increased by more than 100 percent if the household heads are male farmers. The GI 
adoption rate was found to be increased by approximately 96 percent when farmer 
households are members of the cooperative. The odds ratio of 2.61 for member of 
cooperative confirms the estimated result that being member of a cooperative makes 
the GI certification adoption 2.61 times more probable. Beside the role of 
Variable
a 
Coef. Linear. t P>t [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
Odds 
Std. Err. Ratio 
Intercept -6.5547 0.758 -8.64 0.000 -8.05 -5.06  
Gender 1.0936 0.384 2.85 0.005
c
 0.34 1.85 2.99 
Education 0.0694 0. 057 1.23 0.221 -0.04 0.18 1.07 
Land size 0.0051 0.005 1.01 0.314 -0.01 0.02 1.01 
Member of coop. 0.9577 0.437 2.19 0.029
c
 0.01 1.82 2.61 
Participation 0.6908 0.4712 1.46 0.144 -0.24 1.62 2.00 
Bargaining power 1.7938 1.557 1.15 0.250 -1.27 4.86 6.01 
Income -0.0000 -0.000 -0.73 0.469 -0.00 -0.00 1.00 
Information  1.3336 0.351 3.80 0.000
b
 0.64 2.02 3.79 
Time 0.1147 0.238 0.48 0.629 -0.35 0.58 1.12 
Transportation costs 0.0006 0.000 1.67 0.095
d
 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Monitoring costs 0.4030 0.559 0.72 0.471 -0.70 1.50 1.50 
64 
 
information dissemination as well as knowledge and skills transfer, the cooperatives 
in the TKRH area are depicted by the fact that they also help facilitating the farmer 
households in case of the membership application for a GI club. 
The coefficient for information is statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
and is the largest positive and significant coefficient. This implies that GI 
certification adoption is increased by 133 percent if the farmer households have 
access to information about GI certification. The odds ratio of 3.79 for information 
reinforces this finding which implies that information makes the GI adoption about 
three times more probable. Information transfer is regarded in the literature to be the 
primary factor that influences the adoption rates as mentioned in [16]. Similarly, 
extension services by the government promote innovations or technologies by 
providing necessary knowledge and information to enable the farmer households to 
apply the new idea as in [17]. Reference [18] stresses the importance of accurate 
information as a basis for farmers through contacts with such extension agencies for 
a cost-benefit analysis of such innovations. Limited access to information due to a 
lack of well-functioning extension services hence negatively influences the decision 
making of farmers to adopt a new innovation as stated in [9], since the farmers may 
be extremely uncertain about its profitability. 
 Another factor that may have a significant impact on the adoption decision is 
transportation costs. In this study, its extent depends on the distance between the 
residence or the rice field and the markets. The road condition also matters as e.g. in 
[19]. The rice markets are sometimes located in the district center, while the 
households are widely dispersed in the huge TKRH area. Moreover, the road 
conditions in the area are mostly poor so that the households often have to make 
detours to reach the markets. It was therefore expected that the higher the 
transportation costs per unit the less willing the farmer households are to adopt GI 
certification. The coefficient of 0.0006 for transportation costs is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level. This result is positive and contrary to the a priori 
expectation. It implies that the higher the transportation costs the higher the 
likelihood of a farmer household’s adoption of GI certification. The coefficient is 
very low but nevertheless implies an existing direct relationship between 
transportation costs and GI adoption. A plausible explanation for the positive 
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correlation relates to the location of GI markets. After the rice harvesting period, the 
households in the TKRH area have choices to sell rice to many different buyers such 
as retailers in domestic markets, agricultural cooperatives, middlemen, traders, 
private rice mills, government and/or certified GI rice buyers  as shown in Table III. 
Due to quality control in the value chain of GI products, GI rice is given a GI price 
premium if and only if rice meets the given quality and is sold to certified GI buyers. 
Accessing GI rice markets for the GI households is therefore associated with limited 
choices when they want to get the GI price premium. As confirmed by Table III, 
more than 40 percent of the GI households sell rice to the certified GI buyers. As 
previously mentioned, these specialty markets are normally located in the district 
center which is quite far away from their residence. Thus, higher transportation costs 
are necessarily associated with the GI certification adoption. Nevertheless, the GI 
farmers were promised to get a price premium of 500 Baht per ton when selling their 
rice to the certified GI buying points. This premium should serve as a financial 
incentive for the farmers to enter the GI certification system and to sell the most part 
of their rice to the certified GI buying points. It should also take the function to 
compensate for the higher costs relating to the rice transportation to the district 
center. Sometimes the price premium is also paid by other rice buyers since jasmine 
rice from the TKRH area is in demand due to its high quality. Fig. 2 gives this 
illustration and confirms the results in Table III that most of the GI farmers got the 
price premium amount as have been promised of 500 Baht per ton. Fig. 2 also shows 
that even the ones who were not certified as GI farmers also got the price premium 
by the rice sale. These non-GI farmers are mostly the ones who are in the process of 
practicing the organic cultivation. 
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Figure 2. Price premium gain of jasmine rice households in the TKRH 
 
Source: own presentation 
 
Table V shows some more detailed figures related to the price premium gain 
by the rice sale of farmer households. Around 18 per cent (=25/142) of GI farmers 
got the GI price premium from the rice sale to the certified GI rice buyers and an 
average GI price premium for the GI group amounts to around 222 Baht per ton. 
Compared to the average total transportation costs of 309 Baht per ton for the GI 
group as mentioned before, it seems that this average GI premium amount is not 
enough to compensate for the higher transportation costs at the first look. However, 
considering the average total premium gain of the price premium gained group (GI) 
(N=25), we find a considerable higher amount of the average price premium, says 
around 1,500 Baht per ton. And it is even higher than the average total transportation 
costs per ton of the premium gain groups (N=25 for GI group and N=40 for non GI 
group). So that we can conclude that the higher transportation costs were 
compensated by a received price premium for the farmer households who got the 
price premium in practice. Other GI farmers who also sold their rice to the certified 
GI buyers but did not get the GI price premium should thus improve their rice quality 
in order to meet the given quality of the GI buyers. 
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TABLE V. AVERAGE PRICE PREMIUM GAIN BY THE RICE SALE OF 
JASMINE RICE HOUSEHOLDS IN THE TKRH AREA 
a N=142 for [I] and N=228 for [II];  b N for these two columns are the total numbers of households who gained the 
price premium due to the rice sale where N=25 for [I] and N=40 for [II]. 
c N=25 for [I] by the rice sale to certified GI rice buyers located in the district center and N=40 for [II].  
 
Source: own calculation 
 
B. Marginal effects 
In terms of marginal effects, Table VI shows that the model predicts higher and more 
significant marginal effects for four factors, namely information, membership in a 
cooperative, participation and gender. All other significant variables including 
transportation costs and participation also have positive but extremely small effects 
on the probability of adoption for the TKR farmer households. The marginal effects 
thus indicate the same trend as the parameter estimates in Table IV. 
 
  
Household Group Average Total GI 
Price Premium 
Gain by Rice Sale 
to Certified GI 
Rice Buyers
a
 
(Baht/ton) 
Average Total 
Price Premium 
Gain by Rice Sale 
to All Rice 
Buyers
a
  
(Baht/ton) 
Average Total 
Price Premium 
Gain of Price 
Premium Gained 
Groups
b
 
(Baht/ton)
 
Average 
Transportation 
Costs of Price 
Premium Gained 
Groups
b,c
  
(Baht/ton)
 
[I]  GI  221.90 356.17 1,515.90 174.21 
[II] Non GI 16.2 17.21 2,082.98 191.99 
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TABLE VI.    MARGINAL EFFECTS 
a dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. The marginal effect is the marginal 
change in probability (after svy: logit) evaluated at the sample means. 
 
Source: own calculation 
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
This article investigated the determinants which are likely to predict the behavior of 
farmer households in adopting GI certification for the TKR rice from the Northeast 
of Thailand. A major finding of this study stresses the importance of institutional and 
social factors, i.e. access to information and membership of a cooperative which 
mostly determine the probability of GI certification adoption by Thai Jasmine rice 
households in the TKRH area. This finding is in line with previous adoption studies 
confirming the importance of the access to information and the status of being a 
member in organizations such as cooperatives for the farmers’ adoption decision. 
How a GI certification system is successfully introduced and promoted in specific GI 
regions depends particularly on the information provided to farmer households and 
finally on the information sources. Organizations such as cooperatives serve as a 
crucial intermediary between a primary source of information about GI, i.e. 
government and farmers. Strengthening its role may therefore promote the 
effectiveness of information dissemination. 
In this study, GI farmer households do not sell all their rice to certified GI 
buyers, although a GI price premium would be paid once their rice quality meets the 
quality criteria. Instead, they also sell part of their rice to other rice buyers such as 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. z P>z X 
Gender
a 
0.0296 0.0112 2.63 0.008 0.39 
Education 0.0016 0.0013 1.24 0.216 5.27 
Land size 0.0001 0.0001 1.01 0.312 36.88 
Member of cooperative
a 
0.0194 0.0074 2.63 0.008 0.68 
Participation
a 
0.0133 0.0076 1.76 0.078 0.80 
Bargaining power
a 
0.1032 0.1734 0.60 0.552 0.00 
Income -0.0000 0.0000 -0.74 0.460 388200 
Information
a
  0.0366 0.0102 3.59 0.000 0.41 
Time 0.0026 0.0055 0.48 0.628 0.86 
Transportation costs 0.0000 0.0000 1.69 0.090 233.29 
Monitoring costs
a 
0. 0110 0.0176 0.62 0.534 0.08 
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agricultural cooperatives, government or middlemen who sometimes also give them 
the price premium for their rice. This selling behavior could be explained by the fact 
that selling Jasmine rice to the certified GI buying points results in additional and 
high transportation costs since the certified buying points are located in the district 
center which is quite far away from their residence or their rice field. In contrast, 
many non GI farmers sell their rice to middlemen or small traders who usually come 
to the rice fields or to the village. Furthermore, it is because the price premium was 
also paid by other rice buyers. It therefore seems that a GI system faces the problem 
of not collecting enough of the GI rice to keep the certification system going. Too 
little supply of the GI rice for business operators of the GI rice value chain would 
cause high marketing costs and it could result in the business operators losing 
interests to continue participating in the GI certification system. The price premium 
seems therefore essential in compensating the transportation costs which are 
associated with the GI certification adoption and more importantly in guaranteeing 
the net benefit of being GI farmers. It is also expected to provide an incentive to rice 
farmers to adopt GI certification leading to higher production volumes, thus solving 
the problem of too little GI rice supply. A restructuring of the value chains with 
better access to points of sale for certified GI rice farmer households should be 
provided in order to increase the farmers’ incentives to adopt GI certification. Future 
research is still needed to analyze the welfare impact of GI certification for the 
households in the TKRH area and to conduct a cost benefit analysis of such 
certification. To what extent the access of GI farmer households to their points of 
sale can be improved would be additionally best revealed by a value chain analysis. 
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Abstract 
Geographical indications (GIs) have gained increasing interest since their protection 
has been ensured multilaterally under the TRIPS Agreement of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). Thung Kula Rong-Hai Thai Hom Mali Rice (TKR) is the first 
officially registered GI Jasmine rice in Thailand. This paper aims at identifying 
factors that predict the behavior of Thai Jasmine rice farm households in adopting GI 
certification. Primary data of 370 Thai Jasmine rice farm households were collected 
through a formal survey in two districts of the Thung Kula Rong-Hai (TKRH) area. 
The results of the logistic regression analysis indicate that social and human capital 
variables significantly influence the decision of Thai Jasmine rice farm households to 
adopt GI certification.  
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1. Introduction 
As one kind of intellectual property right, geographical indications (GIs) have gained 
increasing interest since their protection has been ensured multilaterally under the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement under the 
auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In order to have GIs being 
protected by the TRIPS rules, WTO Member countries are required to provide a legal 
and institutional framework of GI protection in their own national borders (Grote, 
2009). In the fight against biopiracy and given the EU’s attempt in seeking alliance 
for better GI protection around the globe, the Thai government has released its first 
specific Act on GI protection in 2003, known as “Act on Geographical Indications 
Protection B.E. 2546 (2003)”. As of January 2012, totally 38 products from different 
regions in Thailand were registered as GIs.  
Under the protection of the Act, Thung Kula Rong-Hai Thai Hom Mali Rice (TKR) 
is the first registered GI Thai Jasmine rice. It is traditionally being produced in the 
Thung Kula Rong-Hai (TKRH) region in the Northeast of Thailand, and GI 
certification is expected to promote its export which currently mainly goes to the EU. 
Stakeholders involved in the GI production line can apply for membership in a GI 
club which allows them to use a label on their certified product in order to reap 
benefits from the GI protection. In 2008, there were totally 13 TKR processors and 
exporters and 1,131 TKR farm households being GI certified. Thus, the proportion of 
the GI certified farm households is still very small accounting only for around 1.3 
percent of the total TKRH farm households. The question arises why not more 
farmers adopt GI certification, especially against the background of price premia 
being generally paid to GI products (Suh and MacPherson, 2007; Teuber, 2007). 
There should be existing factors explaining the behavior of the farmers in adopting or 
rejecting such new idea. Thus, it is important to understand the role of these 
determining factors to ensure the design of a successful introduction of new projects 
or policies such as GIs for rural development.  
Against this background, the objectives of this paper are to: (i) identify factors that 
are likely to predict the behavior of Thai Jasmine rice farm households in the TKRH 
area in adopting GI certification; and (ii) to estimate the marginal effects of key 
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factors on the probability of adoption. A logit model will be used to analyze the 
primary survey data collected from individual farm households in Northeastern 
Thailand. The rest of the paper is divided into five sections: (i) the literature review, 
(ii) the conceptual framework and model specification, (iii) the survey site and data 
collection, (iv) empirical results, and (v) the conclusion.  
2. Literature review  
A thorough and comprehensive survey of the literature on the economics of 
geographical indications has been provided by Bramley et al. (2009) and Teuber et 
al. (2011). Empirical evidence from Europe related to the socio-economics of GIs 
has been reviewed by Rangnekar (2004). There are also quite a few policy papers 
discussing GIs under TRIPS calling for enhanced protection (e.g. Addor and 
Grazioli, 2002; Carboli, 2006). However, only very few quantitative papers on GIs 
have been published so far. The following subsections present the theoretical and 
empirical literature reflecting some of the specific economic aspects of GIs being of 
relevance to this paper. These include the role of information, reputation, quality and 
price along the value chain as well as welfare implications. The GI adoption by farm 
households is for example expected to depend on quality and price premia paid by 
final consumers and being transferred to the producers along the value chain. 
2.1 Asymmetric information, reputation and governance of value chains  
Unlike information on prices, the information on quality is difficult to obtain 
(Nelson, 1970). In the market of high-quality goods, consumers often face the 
problem of asymmetric information when quality cannot be readily ascertained prior 
to purchasing. The experience from repeated purchases does not help the consumer 
to discern the product quality (Marette et al., 1999). In order to avoid market failure 
due to adverse selection, Akerlof (1970) stressed the importance of information. He 
found that there will be no incentives for high quality producers to remain in the 
market without any means of differentiating goods, because all goods tend to be sold 
at the same price and quality. Stigler (1961) and Schmalensee (1978) pointed out that 
reputation is very important in signaling a certain level of quality. Reputation which 
is conveyed by a distinctive sign reduces search costs for the consumers, and the 
savings in search costs allow reputable goods to receive a premium on the price. 
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Shapiro (1983) stressed that the quality premia resulting from reputation serve 
compensating the producers for their investments in the reputation. Some empirical 
studies e.g. of Cañada and Vázquez (2005) found that quality labels such as the GI 
label (i.e. Protected Designations of Origin (PDO) labels) can become useful means 
of producers to signal reputation linked to the distinctive quality of their products to 
the consumers. 
Another issue being crucially related to quality signals is their credibility. Raynaud et 
al. (2002) stressed the importance of relationships between quality signal owners and 
suppliers in the value chain of many agricultural products. They hypothesized that 
there must be an efficient alignment between quality characteristics and governance 
of the value chain in order to assure the credibility of a quality signal. The results of 
a structural analysis of 42 case studies in three different agrifood sectors conducted 
in seven European countries showed that when an agent creates a quality signal 
whose value can be influenced by several other agents in the chains, he will design 
the governance of transactions in order to assure product quality and improve the 
credibility of his signal. Barcala et al. (2009) used the case of fresh meat to analyze 
the governance aspects of the vertical chain and its impact on product quality. They 
concluded that the quality of end products largely depends on decisions made by 
economic agents at various stages of the value chain and concluded that the vertical 
chain could be more efficiently organized as a GI than in the case of hierarchy in 
order to promote high-quality products. In addition, Verhaegen and Van 
Huylenbroeck (2001) in their cost-benefit analysis of farmers’ participation in 
innovative marketing channels for quality food products found that co-operation of 
the farmers decreases transaction costs. Without investing excessive capital or labor, 
the farmers are enabled by collective initiatives to enter the pathway of quality-food 
production. 
2.2 Consumers’ willingness to pay for GIs 
Growing attention has been paid to the questions how consumers perceive high-
quality products originating from a particular region and whether quality premia exist 
for these goods, in particular the ones with distinctive signs like GIs. Menapace et al. 
(2011) analyzed on the Canadian olive oil market the demand for two distinct label 
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types: country of origin (COO) and GIs. They investigated whether consumers value 
the informational content of a set of geographical origin labels with different levels 
of geographical differentiation. They found that consumers’ willingness to pay varies 
with the oil’s COO and is greater for GIs than for non-GIs. Van Ittersum (2007) 
investigated consumers’ image of regional certification labels by proposing a 
structural equation model that relates this image to consumers’ willingness to buy 
and pay for protected regional products. Results suggested that consumers’ image of 
these labels consists of a quality warranty dimension and an economic support 
dimension, which positively relate to consumers’ willingness to pay for the protected 
regional product. Teuber (2009) investigated the case of GI for coffee from the 
region Marcala, i.e. Café de Marcala, using a hedonic price analysis. Her results 
indicate that coffee from this region has on average higher quality than coffee grown 
in other Honduran regions and achieves on average higher prices. However, whether 
this GI coffee can also achieve a higher price due to an already established reputation 
could not be confirmed.  
2.3 Welfare analysis 
Some theoretical studies considered the welfare impact of labeling policies of 
agricultural products with specific characteristics. Zago and Pick (2004) e.g. found 
that consumers and producers of high-quality goods are better off, while producers of 
low-quality goods are worse off. With high administrative regulation costs and low 
quality differences, the total welfare impact of the labeling policies can be negative. 
Findings also show that when producers of high-quality goods can exercise market 
power either in the form of land restrictions or joint price determination, the labeling 
policies could be more easily accepted by producers, but the impact on consumers 
would be negative. Not only theoretical studies focused on the analysis of welfare 
given the asymmetric information problem, as discussed in Section 2.1, also many 
empirical studies explored the implications of GI certification for consumer and 
producer welfare. Lence et al. (2007) found that legal systems that limit the producer 
organizations’ market power can lead to reduced social welfare and result in large 
technological distortions. In addition, increased fixed costs of development and 
marketing costs lead to an increased need for supply control to cover the fixed costs 
associated with the introduction of differentiated products. Contrary to intuition, they 
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also highlighted that stronger IPR protection for producer organizations may enhance 
welfare even after a differentiated product has been developed. Moschini et al. 
(2008) found a supportive role of GI certification on a competitive provision of 
quality leading to clear welfare gains for consumers, though it falls short of 
delivering the first best outcome. Producers may also reap some benefits if 
production of high-quality products draws on scarce factors they own. Anders et al. 
(2009) investigated the extent to which a phased reduction of initial governmental 
support levels impacts farmers’ price premia and welfare by using the equilibrium 
displacement model for markets segmented by regional-origin labeling with quality. 
They found that the price impacts on high-quality and low-quality segments crucially 
depend on substantive relationships between the markets and the advertising 
elasticities. Welfare implications for producers depend on costs of participation 
including quality control and on the co-financing mechanism between the 
government and producers. 
Langinier and Babcock (2008) adopted the interpretation of GIs as “club goods” 
(nonrival, congestible, and excludable) and modeled a group of producers as a club 
and analyzed the certification decision of the club and its welfare implication. They 
found that for intermediate values of certification costs, the industry and the club of 
given size have divergent incentives, and there may be overprovision of certification. 
A conflict between the efficient outcome (that maximizes the aggregate profit of the 
firms) and the equilibrium may exist, which may be socially undesirable. However, 
in the absence of a barrier to entry, it is less likely that the club will emerge. 
Benavente (2010) proposed a model on the welfare effects on the retrieve or so-
called “claw-back” of GIs; i.e. the protection in a country (Home) of a GI of another 
country (Foreign). She found that although there is a loss in global welfare when 
fewer varieties are available in a market, results suggest that industrialized Home 
countries with sophisticated consumers tend to lose less from protecting Foreign GIs 
(e.g. Basmati rice) than developing Home countries, where the opposite is true. Since 
benefits and rents may be available for developed countries, for the developing 
countries, however, these benefits are not sustainable given the fact that they have 
few such claw-back GIs with strong consumer attachments based on geographic 
association. Scarce resources should thus be better utilized on other development 
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strategies being more likely to yield sustainable development as discussed by Kerr 
(2006).  
Not only welfare impacts of GI certification have been studied, but also the impacts 
of GI certification on rural development. This strand of empirical literature has been 
taken up e.g. by Tregear et al. (2007) or Callois (2004) but will not be further 
reviewed here. 
2.4 GI certification adoption 
Studies on GI certification adoption are still missing, however, results of previous 
adoption studies can be a useful guidance to help selecting appropriate factors 
determining the GI certification adoption. Adoption studies generally focus on an 
innovation or a technology, mostly agricultural modern technologies such as high 
yielding varieties (HYVs) and the inputs associated with them (e.g. fertilizer, 
irrigation, and pesticides) as well as corresponding land practices. A number of 
constraints have been identified impeding the rapid innovation adoption like the lack 
of credit, limited access to information, aversion to risk, inadequate farm size, 
inadequate incentives associated with farm tenure arrangements, insufficient 
laborers, absence of farm equipment, insufficient supply of complementary inputs 
(e.g. seed, chemicals, and water), inappropriate transportation, or poor infrastructure 
(Feder et al., 1985). However, the factors affecting farmers’ adoption behavior may 
differ across techniques, across socioeconomic groups and over time.  In addition, 
adoption studies may be based on different definitions of adoption as stated by Feder 
et al. (1985). Thus, generalization is to be avoided.  
Therefore, it is important to concentrate on adoption studies being closely related to 
GI certification. There are in fact a number of empirical studies which focused on the 
adoption of certification schemes in certain agricultural sectors. Carambas (2007) 
studied the adoption of certification schemes e.g. for organic rice in Thailand, and 
Dörr (2009) looked at the fruits sector in Brazil. Factors such as certification costs 
and trust have been found to play an important role in determining the adoption of 
certification by farm households in these two cases. Asfaw (2008) investigated the 
adoption of the GlobalGAP certification for vegetables in Kenya. He found that 
education, household wealth, access to information technologies and group 
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membership have the positive role on the decision of the small-scale vegetables 
producers in adopting the GlobalGAP certification. In addition, Kersting and Wollni 
(2011) studied the GlobalGAP certification adoption behavior of small-scale fruit 
and vegetable farmers in Thailand and found that age, availability of family labor, 
education, household wealth, farm size, intensity of irrigation use, support by 
exporters and farmer trainings have a significant influence on the farmer adoption 
decision. 
The literature review highlights some major issues being also of relevance to the GI 
certification process. Some of these relevant factors have been incorporated in Figure 
1 which presents the legal and institutional process for GI registration and 
certification in Thailand. 
Figure 1: The legal and institutional process for GI registration   
 
Source: own presentation 
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How a GI certification is adopted by a decision-making unit is conceptually informed 
by Rogers’s (1962) theory of diffusion of innovation. According to the theory, an 
innovation is an “idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or 
other unit of adoption” (Rogers, 2003, p.12). GI certification is considered as an 
innovation since it is new to all parties in the GI region. An organizational innovation 
resulting from such systems is seen as a key part in disseminating knowledge and 
innovation on the ground and in relating quality policy to the entire value chain 
(Cañada and Vázquez, 2005). Four main stages in the innovation-decision process 
defined by Rogers (2003) are related to this study: (1) knowledge, (2) persuasion, (3) 
decision, and (4) implementation. In the context of GI certification adoption of TKR 
farm households, knowledge occurs when the farm households learn from the 
existence of the GI certification and gain some information and understanding of 
how it functions. The second stage is called persuasion. This is when the farm 
households form a favorable or unfavorable attitude towards the GI certification. At 
the third stage of the innovation-decision process is the decision which occurs when 
the farm households engage in activities that lead to a choice of adopting or rejecting 
the GI certification. The farm households decide then to apply for membership in a 
GI club, the TKR club, by registering their names with the GI Certification Body 
(CB) (Figure 1). The final step of an innovation-decision process is implementation. 
The use of the innovation by the farm households in this context means that they 
follow the manuals for the TKR production received from the GI CB. This 
production manual is released in order to control quality of the TKR production at 
the initial stage of the TKR value chain.  
GI certification adoption depends on the available livelihood resources or different 
types of capital of a farm household. These include i.e. natural, economic or 
financial, human and social capital (Scoones, 1998). It is hypothesized in this study 
that the farm households’ decision to adopt or reject a GI certification is influenced 
by a wide range of factors categorized into two domains as shown in Figure 1. The 
first domain includes four types of household’s livelihood resources: (i) human 
capital variables e.g. age, gender, education, and experience; (ii) natural capital 
variables such as land size; (iii) economic capital indicated by such variables as 
income or wealth; and (iv) social capital variables including social participation, 
81 
 
networks, bargaining power, being member of cooperatives, trust, information and 
negotiation costs. The second domain includes institutional or access-related 
variables like time to markets and transportation costs. A number of hypotheses can 
be developed with respect to the importance of these factors for the adoption of GI 
certification for Jasmine rice by Thai farm households. 
3. Conceptual framework and model specification  
When trying to answer the question which factors influence the decision of the farm 
household to adopt GI certification, decision theory tells us what the farm household 
may rationally prefer between choices (to adopt or to reject) (Dreier, 1996). It is 
presupposed that rational farm households optimize their objective function such as 
expected utility (Dreier, 1996; Kalyebara, 1999) or net present value of benefits from 
adopting the innovation (Dörr, 2009). However, economic theories have been 
criticized for providing only limited guidance on the selection of variables to explain 
the behavior of farmers in the adoption decision (Gyawali et al., 2003; Kalyebara, 
1999).  
Therefore, the linear random utility model is applied in this study. It provides an 
alternative interpretation on the individual’s utility of two choices by considering the 
observed choice between the two revealing which one provides the greater 
observable utility (Green, 2003). Due to the fact that the farm household’s perception 
of utility or profit, its level of risk aversion and the weights it puts on profitability, 
risk and subsistence requirements are difficult to estimate, the probability of adoption 
is predicted as a function of proxy factors that are likely to predict the expected 
values of the farm household’s objective function (Kalyebara, 1999). The variables 
selection in this study is guided by the literature review in general, and by the model 
of the innovation-decision process of Rogers (1962) in particular. Furthermore, we 
use an econometric model of a logistic regression (logit model) to help selecting key 
variables which could best explain the behavior of farm households to adopt GI 
certification. A logit model is a probability model regressing a set of independent 
variables (X), which can be categorical or continuous, on the conditional expectation 
of the binary dependent variable (Y) (Liao, 1994). The logit model uses a logistic 
cumulative distribution function to estimate the linear determinants of the logit (Li) 
or the logged odds and has the following form:  
82 
 
X  
 P-1
 P
ln  )(L 0
i
i
 i k 





   (1) 
where (Pi /1- Pi ) is the odds expressing the conditional mean or probability of an 
occurrence of the event relative to the likelihood of a nonoccurrence given X; β0 is 
the unknown constant term or intercept, βk is a vector of regression coefficients to be 
estimated and X is a set of independent variables determining the probability of the 
event. The model in terms of Y would then be written as: 
         (2) 
where Yi is a binary dependent variable; and Yi equals 1 when a farm household 
adopted GI certification and 0 otherwise, α is the unknown constant term and βk are 
regression coefficients of k independent variables to be estimated and ε is the error 
term. The parameter α and βk are typically estimated by the maximum likelihood 
(ML) method, which is preferred over the weighted least squares approach. The key 
is to find β that produces the logits and the conditional mean of Y given X values that 
have the greatest likelihood of producing the observed data (Pampel, 2000).                              
Empirical model specification 
The logit model of GI certification adoption (Yi) was specified as a function of all 
independent variables as follows:   
Yi = f (X1,…, X11) + u    (3) 
with X1 to X11 representing the 11 independent variables (Table 1) and u representing 
the random disturbance. Gender (X1) is a binary variable taking on the value of 1 if 
the household head is male and 0 if female. Gender is known to affect the decision-
making given the fact that males are more dominant, assertive, objective and 
realistic, while females are more affected by the environment, tend to rely more on 
information and dedicate more time to the decision process (Lizárraga et al., 2007). 
However, the expected sign of the effect of gender on the GI adoption is ambiguous. 
Nkamleu and Manyong (2005) found that a male household head has a highly 
significant and positive impact on the adoption of agroforestry practices. Similarly, 
Ouma et al. (2002) used the logit model to analyze the behavior of Kenya’s farmers 
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in adopting improved maize seed and found that gender has a significant relationship 
with the adoption of improved seeds. However, Doss and Morris (2001), for 
instance, found no significant difference in rates of modern seed variety adoption 
between male and female farmers in Ghana. Similarly, Chirwa (2005) stated that 
there is no significant difference between men and women plot owners with respect 
to fertilizer adoption. Given the fact that roles and responsibilities of gender are 
dynamic and respond to changing economic circumstances as discussed by Doss 
(2001), gender may or may not have an influence on the household’s decision-
making.  
Education (X2) is a continuous variable measured by years of schooling of the 
household head. It is seen as an important basis for human capital creation and is 
often used as a proxy to indicate the ability to acquire and process information (e.g. 
Scoones, 1998; Feder et al., 1985). In general, farmers with higher education tend to 
possess higher capability to analyze information and knowledge being beneficial to 
farming operation and necessary to successfully implement a new technology 
(Uematsu and Mishra, 2010). Better educated or more literate farmers have been 
found to be earlier adopters of new technologies (Feder et al., 1985; Rogers, 2003). 
A positive link between education and technology adoption has been also found by 
Kabede et al. (1990). It is hypothesized that education positively affects the 
technology adoption.  
Land size (X3) represents the total land size owned by the farm household measured 
in Rai and used for agricultural production. It is hypothesized to also impact 
positively on innovation and technology adoption. A positive relationship between 
land size or farm size and innovation adoption has been already reported by some 
empirical studies (e.g. Saka et al., 2005, Kebede et al., 1990; Rogers, 2003).  
The next variables are social capital variables: Member of cooperative (X4) is a 
binary variable measuring whether the farm household belongs to the cooperatives 
and takes on the value of 1 for membership and 0 otherwise. Participation (X5) is a 
binary variable and takes on the value of 1 if the farm household participated in 
meetings organized in the village and 0 if otherwise. Bargaining power (X6) is also a 
binary variable which takes on the value of 1 if the farm household could bargain the 
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price and 0 if otherwise. Information (X7) takes on the value of 1 if the farm 
household received information about GIs from local governmental bodies and 0 if 
otherwise. These four social capital variables (X4 to X7) are hypothesized to 
positively affect the adoption decision based on the following evidence: An 
important role of being member of associations or cooperatives for technology or 
innovation adoption has been reported by previous studies e.g. of Nkamleu and 
Manyong (2005) and Asfaw (2008). Members of organizations such as cooperatives 
are privileged in terms of receiving managerial as well as financial support. But 
membership also serves as a source of skills, knowledge and information (Mburu et 
al., 2007; Nwankwo et al., 2009). Likewise, participation explains the adoption 
behavior (Rogers, 2003). Early adopters are usually more socially involved than late 
adopters. With respect to the bargaining power, farmers in developing countries are 
typically in a weaker position than their buyers. However, participation in the quality 
assurance system, or the adoption of its certification system could increase their 
bargaining power. The work of Hobbs (2003), for instance, stated the positive effect 
of the participation in the GAP systems on increasing individual farmers’ bargaining 
power vis-à-vis larger retailers or processors, especially when these farmers are 
members of farmers associations or cooperatives. Thus, the bargaining power can be 
increased not only by the quality but also by the volume of the products (Lemeilleur, 
2011). Also the transfer of information via extension services by the government or 
via training courses which help overcoming the human capital constraints has been 
found to be crucial for the adoption decision (Longo, 1990; Karki and Bauer, 2004). 
Farmers with access to information through contacts with extension agencies will 
have more accurate information to do a cost-benefit analysis of such technologies or 
innovations (Buyinza and Wambede, 2008; Saka et al., 2005; Doss, 2006). In 
contrast, limited access to information due to a lack of well-functioning extension 
services negatively influences the decision making of farmers to adopt a new 
innovation (Zhao, 2005; Nguyen et al., 2007), since the farmers may be extremely 
uncertain about its profitability. However, observing the performance and procedures 
of relatives, neighbors, and friends having experimented with the innovation could be 
another alternative source for the farm households to access information in case the 
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extension service has failed to provide them with the necessary information about the 
new innovation (Feder et al., 1985).  
The last social capital variable is trust (X8) which is a binary variable indicating 
whether the farm households trust rice mills in giving correct information on rice 
quality in terms of moisture content. The rice moisture metering is done by the 
buyers, namely the rice mills and big agricultural cooperatives, without the farm 
households having the opportunity to control the measurement process and result. 
They have to accept the measurement result which determines the price. A trust-
based type of contractual arrangement between buyers and producers has been found 
to be vital (Dörr, 2009). This factor is hypothesized to have a positive influence on 
the adoption behavior of the farm households. 
The economic capital variable income (X9) is continuous representing the total 
annual income in Baht gained from all sources, namely (i) farm income from sales of 
livestock and crops including rice, and (ii) off-farm income from wage employment, 
from selling other valuable assets, and including pensions and remittances. Rogers 
(2003) and Asfaw (2008) found a strong relationship between wealth and 
innovativeness. Assuming to be a proxy for wealth, income is therefore hypothesized 
to have a positive effect on adoption behavior.  
Time to markets (X10) and transportation costs (X11) are continuous institutional 
variables. The time to markets measures the distance to the nearest market for buying 
or selling rice measured in hours, and the transportation costs represents the annual 
costs of transporting rice to the markets measured in per one unit of rice sold (Baht 
per ton). Negative relationships with the adoption decision are expected for time to 
markets and transportation costs. These hypotheses are based on the following 
evidence: The functioning of the GI system requires not only the availability of 
information about GIs, as discussed above, but also the functioning of GI markets 
and finally transparency of the monitoring process. The opportunity to adopt new 
technologies or innovations might sometimes be impeded by poorly developed 
institutions and infrastructure. This poor development of markets or institutions is 
characterized by a limited access to inputs and to markets (Vanclay and Lawrence, 
1994), as well as to capital and to information (Yesuf and Köhlin, 2008). It is also 
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characterized by high transaction costs arising from heavy search, monitoring and 
transportation costs, which particularly depend on the location of roads, markets and 
the road condition (Yesuf and Köhlin, 2008) and may affect the response of the 
potential adopter (Brown and Lentnek, 1973). A summary of all the variables is 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Definition of variables in the empirical model 
Variable  Description Values/measure 
 
Variable  
type 
Expected  
sign 
Dependent variable: 
  
    
GI certification adoption 
(Yi) 
Farm household adoption decision 1= yes; 0= no Binary  
     
Independent variables:     
Household-level factors:     
Human capital     
Gender (X1) Sex of household head  1= male; 0= female  Binary  ± 
Education (X2) Schooling of household head years Continuous  + 
Natural capital     
Land size (X3) Total land size for agricultural use Rai
1
  Continuous + 
Social capital     
Member of cooperative 
(X4) 
Household is a member of the 
cooperative 
1= yes; 0= no  Binary  + 
Participation  (X5) Household actively participated in 
meetings organized in the village 
1= yes; 0= no Binary  + 
Bargaining power (X6) Household could bargain the price 1= yes; 0= no Binary  + 
Information (X7) Household got information on GIs from 
local governmental bodies  
1= yes; 0=  no Binary  + 
Trust (X8)  Household trusted rice mills in giving 
correct information on rice quality 
1= yes; 0= no Binary  + 
Economic capital     
Income (X9) Total annual income Baht Continuous + 
Institutional factors:     
Time to markets (X10) Time to the nearest markets for rice sale hours Continuous - 
Transportation costs (X11) Transportation costs per unit sold Baht per ton Continuous  - 
Note: 
1
1 Rai = 0.16 ha. 
Source: own compilation 
 
4. Survey site and data collection  
In comparison with the industry sector which accounts for about 40 percent of GDP 
in 2008, agriculture accounts for only 8.8 percent of the GDP (National Economic 
and Social Development Board (NESDB), 2008). Nevertheless, agriculture is still an 
important sector for Thailand’s economy. Almost 15 million people are engaged in 
agriculture. This accounts for around 39 percent of the total labor force (NSO, 2009 
and 2010). About 53 percent (or 58 million Rai) of the country’s total agricultural 
87 
 
area is used for rice cultivation. Rice is not only a major staple food for domestic 
consumption, but it is also one of the most important export crops in Thailand, next 
to sugarcane, palm oil and natural rubber (NESDB, 2008). The country has long held 
a reputation as the world’s leading rice exporter (USDA, undated). It controls more 
than 30 percent of all milled rice exports and more than 50 percent of all broken rice 
exports (FAOSTAT, 2009). In 2008, about 10 million tons were exported. In 2009, 
this amount dropped to 8.6 million tons (Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE), 
2008-2009) mainly due to weak demand especially from the main importing and well 
stocked Asian countries and due to the relatively high price of white rice in Thailand 
propped up by government intervention as compared to e.g. Vietnam (Bangkok Post, 
2009). Overall, also the rice export value has gone up, namely from US$ 1.6 billion 
(with 44.48 Baht/1 US$) in 2001 to US$ 5 billion (with 34.34 Baht/ 1 US$) in 2009. 
For the export year 2009, almost 40 percent of the total rice export value stems solely 
from exporting Thai Jasmine rice, also called Thai Hom Mali rice, which brought 
foreign currency of around US$ 2 billion to the country (OAE, 2008-2009). From the 
total cultivated area for rice, almost 70 percent can be found in Northeastern 
Thailand with an average major rice production of about 10.4 million tons per year 
and an average second rice production of about 3 million tons per year (OAE, 2010). 
From the total labour force of around 15 million people being engaged in agriculture, 
around 7 million farmers or about 2.8 million rural households are from Northeastern 
Thailand. At the same time, the Northeast is the poorest part of Thailand with the 
lowest per capita monthly income of 6,272 Baht or around US$ 183 (with 34.34 
Baht/1 US$) (OAE, 2010; NSO, 2009). In 2009, the poverty incidence in the 
Northeast region amounts to around 14 percent, taking into account the poverty line 
of 1,473 Baht per capita per month (NESDB, 1988-2009).  
In order to study the behavior of Thai Jasmine rice farmers, a case study was 
conducted in 2009 in Northeastern Thailand. The distribution of Thai Jasmine rice 
certified farm households in the TKRH area is shown in Table 2. In order to avoid 
distortionary effects caused by other certification schemes, Surin province was 
excluded from the sample due to the presence of organic certification in the area. The 
two districts Kasetwisai and Rasrisalai with the highest ratio of GI certified farmers 
were purposively selected. Using the disproportionate stratified random sampling 
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technique, the total population for each district was stratified into two main groups: 
(1) GI group and (2) non-GI group. The total sample size is 370 farm households of 
which 142 farm households are GI certified and 228 farm households are not GI 
certified. A pilot study was a priori conducted in May 2008 in Kasetwisai District for 
pre-testing the questionnaire. In addition, it served to collect the list of the target 
population for sampling purpose. The main survey was then conducted from March 
to June 2009 using face-to-face interviews with a structured questionnaire. The 
questionnaire included sections about farm household characteristics, the production 
pattern, farm and non-farm income, perception about GIs, social capital such as 
cooperation, trust and network building, bargaining power, obstacles in the GI 
registration procedure, costs and benefits of certification, assets and expenditures for 
food and non-food consumption, shocks, borrowing and savings, and finally housing 
conditions of the farm households. 
Table 2: Certified GI households of all provinces in the TKRH area 
Province District 
No. of 
certified GI 
farmers 
Certified farmers of the 
district/certified farmers 
of the province (in %) 
Own sample 
    
  
No. of GI 
farmers 
No. of non-
GI farmers 
Roi Et 
Kasetwisai 330 59.35 85 169 
Patumrat 55 9.89 
Ponsai 58 10.43 
Suwannaphoom 113 20.32 
Total  556 100 
Surin 
Chumponburee 250 85.32 
Tatum 43 14.67 
Total 293 100 
Srisaket 
Rasrisalai 102 83.61 57 59 
Silalad 20 16.39   
Total 122 100 
Mahasarakam 
Payakkaphoompisai 90 100 
Total 90 100 
Yasothorn 
Mahachanachai 70 100 
Total 70 100 
  TOTAL                          1,131  142 228 
Source: own compilation based on data from DIP, 2007 
5. Results and discussion 
In this section, descriptive statistics first describe the background characteristics and 
distribution of variables among the sample population. A logit model is then used to 
examine associations between the dependent variable and the independent variables. 
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All analyses presented in this paper relied on the design-based approach, as design 
features were incorporated in the analysis due to the disproportionate stratified 
sampling technique
2
. 
5.1 Descriptive findings 
The characteristics of the sample households, their farms, their economic conditions 
and income profile are presented in Table 3. The statistics are the estimated means 
for the continuous variables and for their ratios. The last column represents the F 
statistic from the test of significance using adjusted Wald tests for comparing means 
of all continuous variables between GI and non-GI groups. 
 
Table 3: Characteristics and income profile of sample farm households 
Indicators Total GI Non-GI Test of
 
(N=370) (n=142) (n=228) Sig.  
Household and farm characteristics          
Age of household head (Years) 52.25 (10.28) 54.06 (35.95) 52.18 (8.19) 1.62 
Family size (Persons) 4.63 (1.38) 4.71 (5.24) 4.63 (1.09) 0.15 
Total owned land
a
 (Rai) 38.18 (29.45) 43.33 (110.16) 37.98 (23.39) 1.43 
Total land under rice (Rai) 37.56 (29.66) 42.83 (107.57) 37.36 (23.59) 1.52 
Total land under jasmine rice (Rai) 33.89 (29.61) 39.95 (108.23) 33.66 (23.54) 1.99 
Ratio of land under rice in total owned land (%) 85.66 (16.70) 90.48 (105.30)  85.48 (12.61) 3.51 
Ratio of land under jasmine rice in total owned land (%) 85.66 (16.70) 90.48 (105.30) 85.48 (12.61) 3.51 
Experience in rice cultivation (Years) 38.46 (10.81) 38.26 (41.65) 38.47 (8.57) 0.02 
Income profile          
Household total annual income (1,000 Baht) 388.20  (374.04) 393.80 (1738.53) 387.99 (293.07) 0.01 
Household total annual farm income (1,000 Baht) 134.87 (256.38) 143.05 (720.61) 134.56 (205.99) 0.06 
Household total annual non-farm income (1,000 Baht) 253.33 (267.08) 250.75 (1430.24) 253.43 (206.47) 0.00 
Ratio of rice income in total annual income (%) 25.84 (26)    40.13 (103.78)  25.30 (20.53) 13.33*** 
Ratio of rice income in total farm income (%) 71.13 (34.71)  82.92 (88.82)  70.69 (27.98)  7.04** 
Ratio of non-farm income in total annual income (%) 58.91 (33.81) 49.88 (111.59)  59.25 (27.07) 3.73  
Annual per capita household income (1,000 Baht) 89.14 (91.97) 87.59 (337.60) 86.20 (73.16) 0.01 
No. of households below poverty line 71 35 36 0.26 
Note: *  Significant at α=5%; ** significant at α=1%; *** highly significant at α=0.1%; Standard deviation is in 
parenthesis;  
 a  Including residential area 
Source: own calculation 
                                                             
2 Sampling weights are applied to each observation of the sample in order to correct for unequal 
probabilities of selection due to stratification and to obtain unbiased and consistent estimates of 
effects or associations (Deaton, 1997; Lee and Forthofer, 2006). All quantitative analyses in our study 
were performed using the survey (svy) methodology in the software package Stata (version 11). The 
survey methodology in Stata accounts for the effects of weights on significant tests and it also 
contains procedures using the Taylor Linearization Method for correctly estimating the variance when 
analyzing survey data with complex survey design. This method is one of the three most commonly 
used and available statistical approaches, besides the Balanced Repeated Replication (BRR) and the 
Jackknife to correctly estimate variance for regression models using survey data (Johnson and Elliott, 
1998; Sturgis, 2004; StataCorp, 2009). 
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The rice farmers in our sample are on average 52 years old and they have a very long 
experience in rice cultivation with 38 years. In general, the GI farm households have 
larger families and own more land, and have a higher total farm income than the non-
GI group. The weighted means of ratios of rice land in total owned land and jasmine 
rice land in total owned land reveal that almost all land (about 86 percent) in both 
groups is devoted to rice cultivation, namely to Jasmine rice cultivation. 
Accordingly, an average of 71 percent of the farm income is derived from rice 
cultivation. For the GI group, this share amounts to 83 percent, compared with 71 
percent for the non-GI group. Considering the total annual income, around 40 
percent is derived from rice cultivation for the GI group, compared with around 25 
percent of the non-GI group. The total annual income does not differ between the 
two groups, but the ratio of rice income in the total annual income and the ratio of 
rice income in total farm income. On average, around 59 percent of the farm 
households’ total annual income is derived from non-farm income, including salaries 
from public sector employment or remittances. In the non-GI group, 36 farm 
households (or 16 percent) were counted as poor with a total annual income falling 
below the regional poverty line, compared with 35 farm households (or 25 percent) 
in the GI group. 
Table 4 shows the descriptive and comparative statistics of variables included in the 
model. The figures present the estimated means for the continuous variables and 
proportions given in percentage for the binary variables. The test of significance has 
been carried out by using adjusted Wald tests for comparing continuous data, and 
Rao-Scott corrected tests
3
 for comparing categorical data between the two groups. 
On average, around 40 percent of the rice farmers in our sample are men. Comparing 
the mean values between the groups clearly indicates that the GI group has a higher 
number of male farmers with almost 60 percent compared to that of the non-GI 
group with only 38 percent. The means of the two groups are significantly different 
(p < 0.01). The average education level of the household heads in our sample is quite 
low with only around six years of schooling and 70 percent of them having at most 
                                                             
3 The Rao-Scott corrected test is a Pearson chi-square statistic with the Rao and Scott (1984) second-
order correction. After the Rao and Scott (1984) second-order correction, the Pearson chi-square 
statistic is converted into an F statistic (Lee and Forthofer, 2006; StataCorp (2009, p. 116).  
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primary education. The adjusted Wald test indicates a significant difference in the 
education level of the household head between both groups at the 5 percent 
significance level. On average, the GI group has relatively more land (around 43 Rai) 
available for agricultural use than the non-GI group (around 37 Rai), but the 
difference is not significant. 
Table 4:  Descriptive and comparative statistics of factors affecting GI 
certification adoption 
Variable  Mean (Std. dev.) 
or % for total 
sample 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
or % for GI 
group 
Mean (Std. dev.) 
or % for non-GI 
group 
Test  
of 
significance 
(N=370) (n=142) (n=228)   
Household-level factors:     
Human capital         
Gender (1=male) in % 38.54 59.87 37.74 10.41** 
Education (years) 5.27 (2.81) 6.21 (11.03) 5.23 (2.22) 5.42* 
Natural capital     
Land size (Rai) 36.88 (29.44) 42.60  (107.98) 36.66 (23.41) 1.79 
Social capital     
Member of cooperative (1=yes) in % 67.88 81.09  67.38  5.27* 
Participation (1=yes) in % 79.62 88.31 79.30 2.93 
Bargaining Power (1=yes) in % 0.00046 0.60 0.03  14.48*** 
Information (1=yes) in % 40.97 66.48 40 15.17*** 
Trust (1=yes) in % 8.3 10.35 8.22 0.26 
Economic capital     
Income (in thousand Baht) 388.20  (374.04) 393.80 (1738.53) 387.99 (293.07) 0.01 
Institutional factors:     
Time to markets (hours) 0.86 (0.65) 0.97 (2.69) 0.85 (0.51) 1.61 
Transportation costs (Baht per ton) 233.29 (430.97) 309.13 (2011.67) 230.42 (337.35) 1.08 
Note: * Significant at α=5%; ** significant at α=1%; *** highly significant at α=0.1%; Standard deviation is in parenthesis  
Source: own calculation 
The participation in cooperatives is relatively widespread among the sampled 
farmers. Close to 70 percent of farm households are members of cooperatives. 
Comparing between groups, we find that about 80 percent of the farm households in 
the GI group are members of the cooperative compared to the non-GI farmers with 
only 67 percent. This difference is significant at the 5 percent level as can be seen 
from the Rao-Scott corrected test. With respect to other social capital factors, it can 
be seen that a high proportion (almost 80 percent) of farm households participate in 
meetings organized in the village. The bargaining power has been found to be 
negligible for the sampled farmers. Almost all of them had to accept the rice price 
being fixed by the buyers, even though most of the GI farm households expect to 
receive a price premium when adopting GI certification. Nevertheless, the mean 
difference is highly significant at the 0.1 percent level. Regarding information, the 
result shows that around 40 percent of farm households had access to information 
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about GI from local governmental bodies. There is a significant difference between 
the groups. More GI farm households (66 percent) received information about GI 
from local governmental bodies than non-GI farm households (40 percent). When 
selling rice to the rice mills, a slightly higher percentage of the GI farm households 
(10 percent) than the non-GI farm households (8 percent) trusted rice mills in giving 
correct information on quality in terms of rice moisture content. This difference is, 
however, insignificant.  
In order to sell their rice, the rice farmers face the problem of long distance to rice 
markets. They are widely dispersed in the huge TKRH area spending on average 
close to 1 hour to reach the markets which are sometimes located in the district 
center. They often have to make detours to reach the rice markets due to the poor 
road conditions. The farmers’ costs of transporting the rice to the markets amount on 
average to 233 Baht per ton. While GI farmers pay around 309 Baht per ton, non-GI 
farmers pay only 230 Baht per ton.  
After the rice harvesting period, the farm households have the choice to sell rice to 
many different buyers such as retailers in local markets, agricultural cooperatives, 
middlemen, private rice mills, government and/or to very few certified GI rice buyers 
(Figure 3), however, a price premium for GI rice is only paid by certified GI buyers. 
Accessing GI rice markets by the GI farm households is thus associated with limited 
choices when they want to get a price premium and with relatively higher 
transportation costs since they must often travel longer distances to sell their GI rice 
to the certified GI buyers located in the district center. Thus, the GI farmers only sell 
their GI rice to the GI buying points if the price premium of 500 Baht per ton 
compensates for the higher transportation costs. Figure 3 confirms that while more 
than 40 percent of the GI farm households sell rice to the certified GI buyers, they 
also choose other options like middlemen, cooperatives or rice mills. Many non-GI 
farm households also sell their rice to the certified rice buyers, but compared with the 
GI farm households they sell more often to the government (20 percent) or to 
middlemen (25 percent) who usually come directly to the rice field or to the village 
to pick up the rice.  Selling rice to the government means that the farm households 
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participate in the rice price guarantee scheme
4
 of the government and store rice at 
home until the concessionaire, cooperative or private rice mills in the region come to 
their residence and take the rice. The farm households were promised that their rice 
will be bought at a certain price level which is normally slightly higher than the 
market price. 
Figure 3: Rice buyers in the TKRH area 
 
Source: own presentation 
As can be seen from figure 3, private rice mills are often not the preferred points of 
sale. This might be explained by the observation that rice mills are known for their 
strict rice quality controls, as opposed to middlemen or retailers. 
5.2 Logit model results 
The results of the logit model are presented in Table 5. A series of logistic regression 
diagnostics were applied for detecting interaction effects, correlations, 
multicollinearity and other specification errors. The specification link test was used 
to detect a specification error. Collinearity was assessed by the correlation matrix for 
                                                             
4 This price guarantee scheme has been now replaced by a rice pledging scheme introduced by the 
newly elected government in August 2011.  
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variables in which optional significance levels are calculated, based on survey-based 
variance estimates for the correlations. Additionally, measures of tolerance and 
variance inflation factors (VIF) were examined. To determine whether any of the 
adoption variables such as information or member of cooperative was endogenous in 
the model, a two-stage Hausman specification test was used (Hausman, 1978). The 
test failed to reject exogeneity at P < 0.05. The adjusted Wald test statistic is used to 
assess the model fit (Lee and Forthofer, 2006). For more statistical power, a 
goodness-of-fit test, i.e. F-adjusted mean residual test, of Archer and Lemeshow 
(2006) was used in our analysis. The test showed that there is no lack of fit of the 
selected logit model using survey sample data (see also Archer et al., 2007). Finally, 
we have evaluated the predictive accuracy of our fitted model by reporting the area 
under the corresponding receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves (AUC) 
(Cleves, 2002) measuring how well a parameter can distinguish between two groups. 
The AUC of 0.7469 reveals that our model correctly predicts around 75 percent of 
the cases. Table 5 also gives design effects of the regression coefficients. Design 
effects of all regression coefficients are less than 1 indicating that only very few 
cases would be needed to obtain the same measurement precision obtained with 
simple random sampling. This suggests that our complex design is statistically 
efficient for the given sample size (N = 370) as opposed to a simple random sample. 
The regression coefficients show that information, gender, and member of 
cooperatives, are as earlier expected, positively and significantly related to the 
logged odds of GI certification adoption at the significance level of 0.1 percent, 1 
percent and 5 percent, respectively. All other factors turn out to be insignificant. The 
marginal effects indicate the same trend as the parameter estimates. The model also 
predicts higher and more significant marginal effects of information, gender and 
member of cooperative on the GI certification adoption. The odds ratio of the 
information of 3.79 means that the odds of GI certification adoption are 3.79 times as 
large indicating that a one-unit increase in the variable (from 0 to 1) multiplies the 
odds of the GI certification adoption by 3.79, suggesting that receiving information 
about GI from local governmental bodies makes the GI certification adoption almost 
four times more probable. The importance of information for the adoption decision 
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has been also found by many other studies e.g. of Saka et al. (2005) and Doss (2006) 
as discussed in Section 3. 
Likewise, for gender, the odds ratio of 2.99 means that the odds of GI certification 
adoption are almost 3 times higher for male farmers than for female farmers. When 
the household heads are male, the GI certification adoption is thus made around 3 
times more probable. Our result supports the findings of Nkamleu and Manyong 
(2005). Finally, the odds ratio of 2.61 for member of cooperative indicates that the 
odds of the GI certification adoption for farm households being members of 
cooperatives are 2.61 times as large. This means that being a member of the 
cooperative makes the GI certification adoption 2.61 times more probable. An 
important role of being member of cooperatives has been also found to be significant 
for innovation adoption by other studies e.g. of Nkamleu and Manyong (2005) and 
Asfaw (2008). 
 
Table 5: Parameter estimates for GI adoption model and odds ratio 
Variable
a 
Coef. 
Linearized P-
Value 
Odds 
ratio 
dy/dx
b Design 
std. err. Effects 
Intercept
 
-6.5547 0.7582 0.000 NA NA 0.3156 
Gender 1.0936 0.3838 0.005 2.9850 0.0368** 0.2317 
Education 0.0694 0.0566 0.221 1.0719 0.0023 0.3099 
Land size 0.0051 0.0050 0.314 1.0051 0.0002 0.6259 
Member of cooperative 0.9577 0.4366 0.029 2.6057 0.0322* 0.2990 
Participation 0.6908 0.4719 0.144 1.9954 0.0233 0.2349 
Bargaining power 1.7938 1.5565 0.250 6.0122 0.0604 0.0631 
Income -0.0000 0.0000 0.469 0.9999 0.0000 0.2378 
Information 1.3336 0.3511 0.000 3.7945 0.0449*** 0.2671 
Time to markets 0.1148 0.2375 0.629 1.1216 0.0039 0.2370 
Transportation costs 0.0006 0.0003 0.095 1.0006 0.0000 0.2656 
Trust 0.4029 0.5588 0.471 1.4963 0.0136 0.2719 
Note.  a Dependent variable: certified GI (n1 = 142) and non-certified GI farm households (n2 = 228); N = 370. 
 b Stata reported the exact discrete change of the dummy independent variables from zero to one.5 
 * Significant at α=5%; ** significant at α=1%; *** highly significant at α=0.1% 
 NA = not applicable. 
Except p-value, all other statistics reported herein use 4 decimal places in order to maintain statistical 
precision. 
F-adjusted mean residual test to test a goodness-of-fit  F (9, 359)  = 0.676; 
Prob > F         = 0.731 
Area under the ROC curve       = 0.7469 
Source: own calculation 
                                                             
5 The calculating procedure of the marginal effects in Stata is discussed e.g. by Wooldridge (2009, pp. 
583-584). 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper explored the determinants which are likely to predict the behavior of farm 
households in adopting GI certification for Jasmine rice in the TKRH area in the 
Northeast of Thailand. A major finding of this study is that access to information 
mostly determines the probability of adoption of GI certification, followed by 
membership of cooperative and the personal variable gender. This finding is in line 
with previous adoption studies on certification in other agricultural sectors. How a GI 
system is successfully introduced and promoted in specific GI regions depends 
particularly on the information provided to the farm households and finally on the 
information sources. The cooperative serves as a crucial intermediary between the 
farm households and the government being the primary source of information about 
GI. Strengthening the role of the cooperatives may therefore promote the 
effectiveness of information dissemination.  
The descriptive data in the paper indicate that the limited marketing options of GI 
certified rice, characterized by high transportation costs and limited availability of 
certified buyers, may be a potential constraint to GI adoption. A value chain analysis 
could reveal to what extent the access of GI farm households to their points of sale 
can be improved. Future research is also still needed to analyze to what extent GI 
certification affects the welfare of the farm households in the TKRH area; possible 
benefits such as price premia paid for GI Jasmine rice on the one hand and costs of 
certification on the other hand need to be considered. Another area that merits further 
research is the issue how the decision-making processes within households affect the 
GI certification adoption. 
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Abstract: This study sheds light on the impact of adopting Geographical Indication 
(GI) certification on household welfare. It uses data obtained from a cross-sectional 
survey of 541 Jasmine rice households in Northeastern Thailand. Given the “self-
selection into treatment” problem, a non-parametric propensity score matching 
(PSM) analysis is applied to assess the causal effect of GI certification on farm 
households’ welfare. It evaluates whether adopting GI certification causes farm 
households to improve their welfare in terms of increased consumption expenditures 
and decrease their propensity to fall below the poverty line. The study finds a 
significant and positive effect of GI certification adoption on household welfare and 
poverty reduction in rural Thailand.  
 
Keywords:  Geographical Indication, Rural Livelihoods, Poverty, Propensity 
Score Matching, Thailand 
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1. Introduction 
The reduction of poverty is one of the primary objectives in economic development. 
Thus, it is necessary to understand the effects of specific policies on household 
welfare (Glewwe, 1991). In the development discourse, the two concepts of rural 
development and rural livelihoods, which are related to each other, exist. Rural 
development aims at improving household welfare or alleviating poverty in rural 
areas (Toborn, 2003). Top-down or supply-driven approaches in rural development 
projects have been found to have insignificant impacts on poverty reduction. 
Participatory or bottom-up approaches have been promoted instead (ADB, 2004). 
The concept of rural livelihoods is regarded as an entry point for participatory 
approaches emphasizing the local perspectives (Scoones, 2009). However, rural 
livelihoods are complex and dynamic. Based on disposable livelihood resources, 
rural people pursue several livelihood strategies such as agricultural intensification 
and extensification, migration and livelihood diversification, i.e. a combination of a 
portfolio of activities in agriculture, wage employment, farm labor, or small-scale 
enterprises (Scoones, 1998 and 2009; Hussein & Nelson, 1998).  
In Thailand, rural livelihoods rely on cash and subsistence income from a number of 
sources, namely crop production, livestock production, husbandry, fisheries, 
agricultural services, forestry, wage employment, small-scale enterprises, and 
remittances. The industry sector plays a key role for both rural and urban livelihoods 
contributing around 36% to the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while 
agriculture accounts for only 12% of the GDP (Office of Agricultural Economics 
(OAE), 2011). Nevertheless, agriculture is regarded as a basis of rural livelihoods 
and is the predominant economic activity in many rural regions of Thailand in 
particular the Northeast. It plays a crucial role as an engine of rural growth, since it 
employs a large share of the rural labor force (Bresciani & Valdés, 2007; Cervantes-
Godoy & Dewbre, 2010). Around 13.5 million people are engaged in agriculture 
accounting for approximately 35% of the total labor force (National Statistical Office 
(NSO), 2012). These rural households engaged in agriculture are mostly poor. 
According to the poverty incidence, the Northeast is the poorest part of the country 
with the highest headcount ratio of around 14% and a national headcount ratio of 8% 
(NSO, 2010).  In this region, besides husbandry and wage employment, rice 
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cultivation is one of the most important livelihood activities, with almost 70% of the 
total agricultural land being used for rice cultivation (OEA, 2011).  
National governments in the past have implemented several policies with the purpose 
to combat poverty (Siriprachai, 2009). Thailand has been very successful in reducing 
poverty from around 22 million in 1988 to only 5.1 million poor in 2010 (National 
Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), 2011). This success is 
considered to be a result of economic growth (D’Silva & Bysouth, 1992; Jitsuchon, 
2006; Cervantes-Godoy & Dewbre, 2010). However, poverty remains high in rural 
areas accounting for around 4.5 million poor or 90% of the total poor compared to 
less than one million poor in urban areas (Siriprachai, 2009; NESDB, 2011). In the 
Northeast, poverty is the highest with almost 3 million poor or almost 60% of the 
total poor (NESDB, 2011).      
Given the importance of rice cultivation for rural livelihoods in the Northeast, the 
release of the Act on Geographical Indications (GIs) Protection in 2003 which can be 
also applied to rice, provides an interesting case study in Thailand. GIs, a kind of 
new intellectual property right, are “indications which identify a good as originating 
in the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given 
quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its 
geographical origin” (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS), Annex 1C, article 22(1)). They identify the specific geographical 
origin of a product and usually consist of the name of the place of origin 
(Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 2002). Thus, the GI Jasmine rice called 
Thung Kula Rong-Hai Thai Hom Mali Rice (TKR) originates from the respective 
Thung Kula Rong-Hai (TKRH) area in Northeastern Thailand. It is regarded as the 
most well-known Jasmine rice being mainly exported to the European Union (EU).  
In 2008, there were totally 1,131 TKR rice farm households being GI certified by 
Thailand’s Department of Intellectual Property (DIP). These TKR farm households 
account for only around 1.3% of the total TKRH farm households (Ngokkuen & 
Grote, 2012). The question arises whether GI certification adoption has had an 
impact on the livelihoods of the TKR farm households being GI certified as 
compared to the TKR farm households not being GI certified. A positive impact 
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would suggest a stronger promotion of GI certification adoption in the region in 
order to reduce rural poverty.  
A Propensity Score Matching (PSM) method is applied to evaluate the potential 
impact of GI certification adoption on household welfare and rural poverty. The rest 
of the paper is divided into four sections: (i) the literature review and conceptual 
framework, (ii) the methodology and data collection, (iii) results, and (vi) the 
conclusion and recommendation. 
2. Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
The literature can be categorized into three different strands. First, there are a number 
of theoretical and empirical papers on the GI adoption process. A summary of that 
literature has been provided by Ngokkuen and Grote (2012). Second, research 
focuses on the impacts of GI adoption. And third, there are a number of policy papers 
discussing the enhanced protection of GIs beyond wines and spirits under TRIPS 
(e.g. Addor & Grazioli, 2002; Caboli, 2006; Jain, 2009). This paper focuses on the 
second strand of the literature.  
2.1 GIs and Their Impacts 
Welfare impacts of GIs 
There are a number of theoretical and empirical papers which investigated the 
welfare implications of GIs (Grote, 2009). A theoretical study of Zago and Pick 
(2004) considered the welfare impacts of labeling policies of agricultural products 
with specific characteristics on producers and consumers. They found that producers 
of high-quality goods are better off, while producers of low-quality goods are worse 
off. However, their findings showed that when high-quality producers can exercise 
market power, there is a negative effect on consumers. With high administrative 
regulation costs and low quality differences, the total welfare impact of these 
labeling policies can be negative. Some important empirical studies explored the 
implications of GI certification for consumer and producer welfare.  
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The study of Lence, Marette, Hayes and Foster (2007) highlighted that stronger 
intellectual property right protection for producer organizations may enhance welfare 
even after a differentiated product has been developed. By analyzing market and 
welfare effects of alternative producer organizations, discussing circumstances under 
which they will evolve, and describing implications for the ongoing debate between 
the EU and the United States (US) on the GI protection expansion, Lence et al. 
(2007) also stated that new Geographically Differentiated Agricultural Products 
(GDAPs) would enhance both producer and consumer surpluses in the US.  
Using the equilibrium displacement model for markets segmented by regional-origin 
labeling with quality, Anders, Thompson and Herrmann (2009) investigated the role 
of governmental support levels on farmers’ welfare. They found that welfare 
implications for producers depend crucially on costs of participation including 
quality control and on the co-financing mechanism between the government and 
producers. 
Menapace and Moschini (2011) developed a reputation model to assess the role of 
certification for agricultural and food products with GIs in a context in which firms 
already have access to private trademarks to establish their reputation for quality. 
Assuming that all factors of production are in perfectly elastic supply, their model 
indicated that producers are either unaffected or negatively affected by the 
introduction of a GI certification scheme. However, if this assumption is relaxed, it is 
possible to envision benefits to GI producers that are not accounted for in their 
model. The welfare gains that arise from GI certification also accrue to consumers, 
especially those with a taste for higher qualities. Considering the features of two 
major forms of GI certification schemes, i.e. the EU-style sui generis system and the 
US-style certification mark approach, they showed that a sui generis scheme 
discloses more information than a certification mark scheme and it is generally 
preferable to a certification mark scheme.   
Likewise, Mérel and Sexton (2011) investigated the choice of quality by producer 
organizations in charge of defining product specifications for GIs. They found that 
by providing a credible certification mechanism to establish product quality, the GI 
framework has a clear potential to improve welfare. Individual producers can signal 
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the quality of their product, and consumers can receive correct information on 
product quality.  
Moschini, Menapace and Pick (2008) assessed the economics of GIs within a vertical 
product differentiation framework being consistent with the competitive structure of 
agriculture.  Assuming that certification costs are needed for GIs to serve as 
(collective) credible quality certification devices, and production of high-quality 
product is endogenously determined, they found that GIs can support a competitive 
provision of quality and lead to clear welfare gains, mainly for consumers. For 
producers, they concluded that there may be some benefit for them if the production 
of the high-quality products draws on scarce factors that they own. 
Likewise, Kolady et al. (2011) in their comparison study of Darjeeling and Oolong 
teas showed that the benefits sharing from a GI going to producers/landowners 
increases with a less elastic supply of land or with more elastic demand for output, or 
with increased elasticity of substitution between land and other inputs, all of which 
increase the derived demand for land. And in the extreme case, when the supply of 
land is fixed or perfectly inelastic, all benefits from a GI go to landowners. They 
suggested that countries must select their GIs very carefully as the confluence of 
product familiarity in international markets and land ownerships patterns which are 
needed for the generation and widespread distribution of benefits will be rare events.  
Taking Basmati from India as a case study, Jena and Grote (2012) used the Heckman 
selection model to evaluate the impact of traditional GI-like Basmati rice cultivation 
in Uttarakhand State of Northern India. Using net rice income as an indicator for the 
rural livelihoods, they found that Basmati rice cultivation has a positive and 
significant impact on the rural livelihoods. Their results imply a significant and 
important role of GI-like certification for livelihood outcomes.  
GI Impact on Rural Development 
Further papers focused on the impacts of GI adoption on rural development. A brief 
overview of such papers is provided for example by Jena and Grote (2011). These 
papers relate the concept of rural development directly to the concept of rural 
livelihoods. By using a case study, Tregear, Arfini, Belletti and Marescotti (2007) 
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examined the role of product qualification for regional foods in rural development. 
Their overall results suggested that the product qualification is a means by which 
local actors can attract revenues from non-local actors and institutions. Callois 
(2004) applied a microeconomic model with the co-operation of farmers for the 
production of a differentiated agricultural good. He found that there is a trade-off 
between the number of differentiated farmers and their individual income. The rise in 
some farmers’ income does not benefit the rural region as a whole. This income rise, 
on the contrary, benefits urban workers who get a higher wage and can improve their 
utility while consuming new products.  
In sum, quantitative studies on evaluating the potential impact of GIs on rural 
livelihoods, on poverty reduction and on rural development are still scarce. This 
study contributes to filling this knowledge gap by taking data of Jasmine rice farm 
households to evaluate the impact of GI certification on the two related livelihood 
outcomes, i.e. household welfare improvement and poverty reduction. The next 
subsection explains how GI certification adoption can be connected to the framework 
of rural livelihoods. 
2.2 Conceptual Framework  
This study is based on the rural livelihood framework conceptualized by Chambers 
and Conway (1991) and later Scoones (1998) to understand the livelihoods of people 
in rural areas. According to Chambers & Conway (1991, p.6), a livelihood 
“comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living”. 
Rural livelihoods can be achieved when rural households have the access to 
livelihood resources, i.e. natural, physical, economic, human and social capital. 
These assets or capital resources are combined with livelihood strategies like 
agricultural intensification and extensification, diversification or migration the rural 
households pursue in order to achieve the livelihood outcomes which again can 
influence the resources of the rural households (Scoones, 1998). The livelihood “is 
sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or 
enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base” 
(Scoones, 1998, p. 5). 
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 Adopting GI certification can be pursued as a useful livelihood strategy for rural 
households to achieve the desired livelihood outcomes, i.e. household welfare 
improvement and rural poverty reduction. Figure 1 demonstrates the role of GIs in 
improving household welfare. Based on Strengmann-Kuhn’s (2000) definition of 
household welfare and Scoones’s (1998) rural livelihood resources classification in 
his rural livelihoods framework, the household welfare is produced by the process 
presented in Figure 1. The household uses disposable resources to derive monetary 
income. Added to this are any monetary transfers the household receives from the 
government or other households; substracted are any private transfers given to other 
households or taxes paid to the government. The disposable money income is the 
result being used for consumption and saving. Besides buying goods, it is also 
possible to receive goods from home production or from other households or the 
government. All these goods together determine the household welfare and it is 
possible to measure welfare and poverty in all stages of this welfare production 
process (Strengmann-Khun, 2000).  
Institutional aspects related to GIs included in the rural livelihood context involve 
key governance issues at two different levels: (i) micro level, and (ii) community and 
macro levels. At the micro level, it requires the active participation and involvement 
of the rural households in claiming and exercising their right to apply for GI club 
membership. At the community and macro levels, it involves the role of local 
governmental bodies, cooperatives and a GI network like GI association in 
facilitating an effective and reachable GI registration system as well as in providing 
farm households information on GIs. An active participation of a private sector 
directly involved in the GI value chain is also crucial in a GI control system. A 
competent authority is required to govern the GI control system, i.e. the DIP under 
Thailand’s Ministry of Commerce. Moreover, a legal framework of GI protection 
must be provided. A sui generis GI Act, i.e. a specific Act on GI protection, gives the 
direction how to implement the GI registration as well as the GI certification at the 
local and national levels. Finally, in order for GI households to be able to sell GI 
products, markets for GI certified products must be available. 
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Figure 1. GI Role for Household Welfare 
 
Source: own presentation based on Scoones (1998) and Strengmann-Kuhn (2000)  
The availability of information on quality is assured by the GI certification, 
visualized by the GI label. A credible certification mechanism is needed in order to 
ensure product quality. The farmers’ welfare depends also crucially on the level of 
government supports. If the costs of participation and quality control are not too high 
and the co-financing mechanism between the government and the producers is 
clearly set, the household welfare is expected to be positive. The efficiency of the 
markets for GIs also depends on other factors such as the mobility of GI goods and 
the number of buyers and sellers. As a new kind of intellectual property right, 
creating a recognized image of a GI product is thus the major task of the government. 
3. Methodology and Data Collection  
3.1 Methodology 
Measurement of Household Welfare and Poverty  
This study uses the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) (Foster, Greer & Thorbecke, 
1884) measure to compare farm households with an exogenously defined poverty 
line (measured by consumption expenditures) and these households are categorized 
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as poor or non-poor if their well-being is below or above the poverty line. The FGT 
class of poverty measure is decomposable across subgroups, i.e. GI households and 
non-GI households and can be written as: 
   
 
 
∑ (
    
 
)  
 
   
       
where the parameter α reflects poverty aversion. If α = 0, P0 is equal to the poverty 
headcount index, i.e. the proportion of households whose well-being level (income or 
consumption expenditure) is below the poverty line. This study uses the headcount 
index since it gives a simple-to-understand first look at the incidence of poverty 
(Shimeles & Thoenen, 2005) in the study area. 
Individual households are treated as the units whose welfare is measured since an 
individual basis for measurement is conceptually clearer (Deaton, 1997). We use the 
consumption expenditure data to measure the economic welfare of individual 
households (Figure 1) adjusted by the modified consumption unit scale (adult 
equivalent) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD, 2009) in order to capture age differences, and economies of scale in 
consumption (Haughton & Khandker, 2009).  
Accordingly, household welfare is treated as a function of household characteristics, 
and whether that household adopts GI certification. The household consumption 
expenditure (log) equation per adult equivalent and the poverty status equation of the 
household can be written in (2) as: 
Y = α + βX + βA + ε      (2) 
where Y is the monthly consumption expenditure of a household (in logarithm) and 
the household is regarded as poor when its consumption expenditure is below the 
regional and national poverty line; accordingly, for the poverty status equation, Y 
equals 1 when its consumption expenditure is below the regional and national 
poverty line and 0 otherwise; X is a vector of covariates; A is a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 for households that adopted GI certification and 0 otherwise; α is 
the intercept; β are the estimated coefficients and ε is the error term. 
(1) 
117 
 
To evaluate the potential effects of GI certification adoption on household welfare 
and poverty reduction, we use the PSM method. 
Impact Evaluation Strategy: Propensity Score Matching Method 
The impact of GI certification on those households who adopted and those who did 
not adopt can be written in (3) and (4), respectively, as follows: 
ATT = ATE│A = 1 = E(Y1i│Ai = 1) - E(Y0i│Ai = 1)            (3) 
ATU= ATE│A = 0 = E(Y1i│Ai = 0) - E(Y0i│Ai = 0)            (4) 
where E(Y1i│ Ai = 1) is the observed average outcome of the GI certification 
adoption of GI households; E(Y0i│ Ai = 1) is the average outcome that the GI 
households would have gained if they had not adopted the GI certification; E(Y1i│ Ai 
= 0) is the average outcome that non-GI households would have obtained if they had 
adopted the GI certification; and E(Y0i│ Ai = 0) is the observed average outcome that 
the non-GI households have gained. 
A general issue is that the treated individual households may not be random of the 
population, but they may have received the treatment on the basis of criteria or 
characteristics that also influence their outcomes (Sianesi, 2001). As described in 
Ngokkuen & Grote (2011, p.173), TKR households will be “selected” to be GI 
households by the DIP once all their formalities are fulfilled. Moreover, the 
voluntary nature of GI adoption, i.e. the individual households decide to adopt the GI 
certification by themselves given the information they have, may be related to the 
benefits of the GI adoption. Thus, we only observe outcomes for a non-random 
subsample of all households assigned to treatment (Rosenbaum, 2002). This 
introduces the potential for selection bias, i.e. “self-selection into treatment” 
(Wooldridge, 2002). A fundamental problem in estimating the causal effect - as 
stated by Holland (1986) - is the missing data so that we are not able to estimate the 
unobserved counterfactual E(Y0i│ Ai = 1) in (3) and E(Y1i│Ai = 0) in (4). Instead, 
we rely on a group of control households, i.e. non-GI households. Directly inferring 
ATT by substracting the observed E(Y0i│ Ai = 0) from the observed E(Y1i│ Ai = 1) 
in a non-random assignment in such observational study could thus be misleading, 
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since treatment and control groups generally differ systematically from each other 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). The treatment effect estimation may be biased by the 
existence of confounding factors (Becker & Ichino, 2002).  
To solve the problem of such threats to internal validity as the selection bias and to 
increase precision in observational studies, several methods can be considered. 
Multivariate analysis of GI certification impact can be used to control for the 
difference in observable characteristics. However, the OLS estimates of the GI 
certification impact using cross-sectional data can be seriously affected by omitted 
variable bias and bias due to selection on unobservables (i.e. correlation between the 
participation decision and unobserved household characteristics, which affects 
outcome variables). If we argued that OLS estimates are biased due to selection on 
unobservables, we would treat the GI adoption variable as endogenous and use an 
instrumental variables estimator (IV). But again, the exclusion restriction condition 
that the IV is independent of outcomes given observable controls is very difficult to 
hold. In our study, we face the problem of weak instruments and non-compliance that 
the control of the treatment assignment is imperfect.  
Thus, the non-parametric PSM method is regarded as one of the best alternatives to 
estimate the causal effects based on counterfactual approach, particularly when using 
cross-sectional data (Bandyopadhyay, Humavindu, Shyamsundar & Wang, 2004). 
PSM is an alternative to correct the estimation of the treatment effect controlling for 
the existence of these confounding factors. The treatment effect estimation correction 
is based on the idea that the bias is reduced when the outcomes comparison is 
performed using treated and control subjects which are as similar as possible (Becker 
& Ichino, 2002). Since matching subjects on an n-dimensional vector of 
characteristics are typically not feasible for large n, the propensity score, P(X), can be 
used to group treated and control subjects so that the direct comparisons are possible 
and meaningful (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Becker & Ichino, 2002). P(X) is the 
probability of GI certification adoption conditional on some observed covariates X as 
in (5): 
P(X) = Pr (A=1│X)      (5) 
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Using PSM method, two specific assumptions must be met to produce valid 
matching estimator, i.e. (i) the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA)
1
; and (ii) 
the common support or overlap condition. According to Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983), 
if the CIA holds, then it will also hold when one conditions on the P(X) instead of on 
X itself.  Given P(X), the CIA implies that given observable control variables, 
assignment to treatment is then unconfounded, i.e. random and independent of (or 
uncorrelated with) the outcome, i.e. Y0 or Y1 for each household as written in (6) as 
follows:  
(Y0,Y1)  ⊥ A│ P(X)      (6) 
The exact matching on P(X), i.e. the balancing property is satisfied, implying that the 
covariates for the resulting matched control and treated units must have the same 
distribution (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1985; Becker & Ichino, 2002; DiPrete & Gangl, 
2004). The CIA thus helps creating the condition of a randomized experiment, i.e. 
finding the missing counterfactual that is similar in all relevant observed 
characteristics to treated units, in order to evaluate a causal effect as in a controlled 
experiment (Mendola, 2007; Heinrich, Maffioli & Vázquez, 2010). It also ensures 
that although treated and untreated groups differ, these differences may be accounted 
for in order to reduce the selection bias (Heinrich, Maffioli & Vázquez, 2010). PSM 
therefore eliminates the bias in estimated treatment effects due to observable 
heterogeneity (Jalan & Ravallion, 2003; Solivas, Ramirez & Manalo, 2007). It thus 
provides an estimate of the impact of a treatment variable on an outcome variable 
that is largely free of bias arising from association between status and observable 
variables (Solivas, Ramirez & Manalo, 2007). 
As shown by Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983), the exposure to treatment is random 
within the cells defined by the values of P(X), if it is random within cells defined by 
X. The ATT can then be estimated as follows: 
ATT = E{E[Y1i│Ai = 1, P(Xi)] − E[Y0i│Ai = 0, P(Xi)]│Ai = 1} (7) 
The common support or overlap condition can be written in (8) as follows: 
                                                             
1 It is also known as the ignorability of treatment assumption (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) or selection 
on observables (Heckman & Robb, 1985) or unconfoundedness (Becker & Ichino, 2002). 
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0 < Pr (A=1│X) < 1, for all X         (8) 
This condition implies that for each value of X, there is a positive probability of 
being both treated and untreated. It ensures that each treated household can be 
matched with an untreated household, i.e. households with the same X values have a 
positive probability of being both GI and non-GI households. The condition also 
ensures that there is sufficient overlap in the characteristics of the treated and 
untreated households to find adequate matches. Given this condition, the calculation 
of the difference in mean outcomes for each value of X, for each possible value of 
the vector of covariates X, is thus possible (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2005). 
PSM Impact Evaluation Procedures 
The procedure of estimating the impact of GI certification adoption involves four 
main steps: 
First, a logit model is specified to derive the propensity scores which capture 
similarities. The dependent variable equals 1 if the household adopted GI 
certification and 0 otherwise. Different ranges of households' ex-ante characteristics 
have been included as regressors. Since the logit is used to predict the propensity 
scores, the log odds of the propensity score are a linear combination of the 
independent variables. According to the common support condition, for a GI 
household, there should be a positive probability of finding a match from the non-GI 
group based on the propensity score. 
Second, once the propensity score is estimated, each observation of the treated group 
(GI households) is matched with control group observations (non-GI households) 
based on their propensity score. To obtain the matched samples, we use three 
matching algorithms: the Nearest Neighbor Matching (NNM) (with five neighbors), 
the Kernel Matching (KM), and the Radius Matching (RM). By changing the 
matching algorithms, the robustness of the estimations is tested increasing the 
reliability of the results (Becker & Ichino, 2002; Heinrich, Maffioli & Vázquez, 
2010). 
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 According to the NNM, the propensity score is used to match each GI household 
with its five closest neighbors, i.e. non-GI households, without replacement. 
Estimates of the GI certification adoption effects, the ATT, are then computed as the 
average difference of households’ well-being indicators between each pair of 
matched households. The KM estimator is a nonparametric matching estimator 
following the same steps as the NNM but the matched household is identified as the 
weighted average of all non-GI households within a certain propensity score 
distance, with weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between the 
propensity scores of treated and controls (Becker & Ichino, 2002) (the bandwith is 
0.06). The KM compares the outcome of each treated household with a weighted 
average of the outcomes of all the untreated households, with the highest weight 
being placed on those with scores closest to the treated household (Heinrich, Maffioli 
& Vázquez, 2010). With the RM, each treated household is matched only with the 
control households whose propensity score falls into a predefined neighborhood of 
the propensity score of the treated household (Becker & Ichino, 2002). The RM 
specifies a capiler (in our study 0.1), i.e. a maximum propensity score distance by 
which a match can be made, in order to avoid the risk of poor matches (Heinrich, 
Maffioli & Vázquez, 2010). 
After matching, we perform t-tests and Pearson chi-square tests in order to see 
whether the balancing property is satisfied, i.e. whether or not the means of each 
characteristic differ between treated and control households. Balancing tests have the 
objective to verify that treatment is independent of unit characteristics after 
conditioning on observed characteristics as estimated in the propensity model as in 
(6) (Heinrich, Maffioli & Vázquez, 2010). That means that after conditioning on 
P(X), there should be no other variable that could be added to the conditioning set of 
the PSM models that would improve the estimation. Moreover, there should be no 
statistically significant differences between covariate means of the GI and non-GI 
groups. We attempted to address potential concerns over unobserved bias by 
including as many theoretically and empirically relevant covariates as possible in the 
propensity score model. The output of t-tests in Stata gives the percentage reduction 
in bias to assess how well the matching improves balance between the GI and non-GI 
groups. 
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Third, after propensity scores have been estimated and matching algorithms have 
been chosen, the impact of GI certification adoption as in (7) is calculated by 
averaging the differences in outcomes between each treated household and its 
neighbors. A significant difference between the mean consumption expenditure per 
adult equivalent (log) and poverty incidence at the national level and in the Northeast 
Region of the two matched groups indicates the existence of GI adoption effects on 
household welfare and poverty alleviation, respectively. The estimated standard 
errors provide an indicator of the importance of sampling error in the estimates and 
make the interpretation of the results possible (Heinrich, Maffioli & Vázquez, 2010). 
Due to the critique on the failure of the bootstrap for matching estimators (see e.g. in 
Abadie & Imbens, 2006), this study thus does not use bootstrapping methods for 
inference. However, the bootstrap for matching estimators has been done for 
rechecking the calculations of the standard errors.  
Fourth, based on the selection on observables assumption (or the CIA) as in (6), this 
study attempts to address potential concerns over unobserved bias by including as 
many theoretically relevant and empirically proven covariates as possible in the PSM 
models. Furthermore, in order to evaluate the extent to which the treatment effects 
obtained are robust to the possibility of hidden bias from unmeasured variables 
(selection on unobservables), we conduct Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analyses 
(Becker & Caliendo, 2007). 
3.2 Survey Area and Data Collection 
This study was conducted in the Thung Kula Rong-Hai (TKRH) area in Northeastern 
Thailand. The TKRH area is a huge area covering 12 districts of five provinces: Roi 
Et, Surin, Srisaket, Mahasarakam, and Yasothorn with the total land size of 
approximately 337,000 ha. These five provinces of the TKRH area are among the ten 
provinces with the lowest Gross Provincial Product (GPP) per capita. The economy 
in the region is oriented towards agricultural production and many small-scale 
industries. There is a lack of investment in non-agricultural production, in particular 
in manufacturing and services, and the population in this region is increasing 
(NESDB, 2011).  
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As a case study, a cross-sectional survey was conducted in two districts of the TKRH 
area, i.e. Kasetwisai and Rasrisalai districts. Before the actual data collection, a pilot 
study was a priori conducted in May 2008 in Kasetwisai district in order to pre-test 
the questionnaire and collect household lists for the sampling purpose. The total 
population of each district was stratified into two main groups: (1) GI group and (2) 
non-GI group. Farm households in the GI group are certified Jasmine rice farm 
households. Taking a representative sample of 541 farm households, the choice-
based sampling technique was used to get a larger number of observations on treated 
farm households. Accordingly, we disproportionately oversampled the GI groups and 
undersampled the non-GI group. The total sample size of 541 farm households 
includes 180 GI certified farm households and 361 non-GI farm households. 
The field survey was conducted from March to June 2009 using face-to-face 
interviews with a structured questionnaire including sections on farm household 
characteristics, the production pattern, farm and non-farm income, perception about 
GIs, social capital such as cooperation, trust and network building, bargaining power, 
obstacles in the GI registration procedure, costs and benefits of certification, assets, 
expenditures on food and non-food consumption, shocks, borrowing and savings, and 
finally housing conditions of the farm households.  
4. Results  
4.1 Sample Households’ Characteristics 
Table 1 describes characteristics of the sample households that influence the GI 
adoption and well-being classified according to five types of livelihood resources, 
institutional factors and poverty status. It presents the results of the adjusted Wald 
tests for comparing continuous variables, and of the Rao-Scott corrected tests for 
comparing categorical variables between GI and non-GI groups.
2
 Some of these 
characteristics are the explanatory variables of the estimated models we present 
further on.  
                                                             
2 Sampling weights are applied to each observation of the sample in order to correct for unequal 
probabilities of selection due to stratification (i.e. choice-based sampling) (Deaton, 1997; Lee & 
Forthofer, 2006). The Rao-Scott corrected test is a Pearson chi-square statistic with the Rao & Scott 
(1984) second-order correction. The Pearson chi-square statistic is converted into an F statistic after 
the Rao & Scott (1984) second-order correction (Lee & Forthofer, 2006; Statacorp, 2009, p. 116). 
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Results of Table 1 show that the two groups can be distinguished in terms of 
household characteristics such as land size. The land sizes for total agricultural 
production as well as for Jasmine rice cultivation are significantly higher for the GI 
group. Similarly, the two groups are distinguishable in terms of physical capital. The 
GI group owns more productive assets and transportation vehicles than the non-GI 
group, but no statistically significant difference is observable in the holding of 
communication devices like mobile phone, radio, computer or TV. 
Likewise, the two household groups cannot be distinguished in terms of income, rice 
yield and livestock assets. With respect to the level of education, the household heads 
in the GI groups have significantly more years of schooling than those in the non-GI 
groups. All other human capital variables, i.e. age and gender of the household 
heads, household size, experience in rice cultivation and dependency ratio, and 
institutional factors, i.e. time to markets and transportation costs, do not differ 
between the two groups.  
GI and non-GI groups are very distinct in terms of social capital. The number of GI 
households with cooperative membership is significantly higher than the number of 
non-GI households. The GI households are also more likely to have better access to 
information on GIs and to participate more in village meetings. Similarly, their 
bargaining power in determining the rice price seems to be higher. The GI 
households are also more likely to follow the GAP than the non-GI households, 
while no significant difference is observable in the trust level with respect to rice 
mills and in the rice seeds group membership for the two groups. 
The GI group is significantly distinguishable in terms of welfare measured in 
consumption expenditures and poverty incidence (p-values in bold). Means of 
consumption expenditures both in total and per adult equivalent and the poverty 
status both at the national and Northeast regional levels of the GI group are 
significantly different from those of the non-GI group. However, since GI 
certification adoption is endogenous, the simple comparison between the means of 
these outcome variables for the two groups has no causal interpretation. Whether 
these differences in welfare and poverty status remain unchanged after controlling 
for all confounding factors will be discussed in the section on the PSM results. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics: Weighted Mean of Variables by Status of GI 
Adoption  
Variables 
GI Households Non-GI Households Test of 
significance
 
(N= 180) (N= 361) 
Natural capital       
Total own land (Rai) 40.95 (104.17) 34.93 (23.70) 0.13 
Total land under all crops (Rai) 40.32 (101.97) 33.64 (23.65) 0.09* 
Total land under Jasmine rice (Rai) 37.72 (101.18) 28.96 (23.07) 0.03** 
Physical capital       
Value of productive assets (in 1,000 Baht) 113.16 (717.58) 58.58 (134.05) 0.04** 
Own transportation vehicle (yes = 1) in % 35.35 22.33 0.02** 
Own communication devices (yes = 1) in % 36.96 33.88 0.61 
Economic/Financial capital       
Total annual income (in 1,000 Baht) 740.89 (3,204.35) 696.78 (569,91) 0.69 
Total annual farm income (in 1,000 Baht) 134.03 (671.80) 132.88 (214.44) 0.97 
Total annual non-farm income (in 1,000 Baht) 240.34 (132.97) 234.42 (242.14) 0.90 
Rice yield (ton/Rai) 0.23 (0.51) 0.22 (0.13) 0.60 
Value of livestocks and aquaculture (in 1,000 Baht) 62.38 (353.30) 68.02 (87.27) 0.68 
Total annual consumption expenditures (in 1,000 Baht) 95.62 (251.80) 78.13 (41.77) 0.04** 
Monthly consumption expenditure per adult equivalent (Baht) 2,992 (7,298) 2,498 (1,329) 0.05** 
Human capital       
Age of household head (Years) 56.03 (29.88) 55.94 (8.30) 0.94 
Gender of household head (male = 1) 87.84 82.87 0.23 
Household size (Persons) 4.72 (4.97) 4.60 (1.14) 0.53 
Education level of household head (Years) 6.15 (10.59) 5.33 (2.37) 0.04** 
Experience in rice cultivation (Years) 38.20 (40) 37.25 (9.35) 0.52 
Dependency ratio (%) 37.04 (140) 37.13 (49.27) 0.99 
Social capital       
Member of cooperative (yes = 1) in % 81.16 65.25 0.0029* 
Participation in village meetings (yes = 1) in % 89.46 78.95 0.02** 
Bargaining power (yes = 1) in % 1.9 0.36 0.03** 
Access to information on GI (yes = 1) in % 66.13 38.5 0.000**** 
Trust in rice mills yes = 1) in % 9.54 7.29 0.52 
Member in rice seeds group (yes = 1) in % 14.26 11.82 0.55 
Followed Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) (yes = 1) in % 52.44 24.26 0.000**** 
Institutional factors       
Time to markets (hours) 0.97 (2.46) 0.92 (0.51) 0.58 
Transportation costs (Baht) 302.84 (1,927) 201.41 (323.83) 0.14 
Poverty status       
Poor (using national poverty line) (yes = 1) in % 20.91 34.43 0.014** 
Poor (using poverty line of Northeast region (yes = 1) in % 18.43 30.54 0.02** 
Notes: * significant at α = 10%; ** significant at α = 5%; *** significant at α = 1%; **** highly significant at α = 0.1% 
Standard deviation is in parenthesis; P-values are given in the column test of significance. 
Source: Own calculations 
4.2 Results of PSM Procedures 
Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates from the propensity score model.
3
 The 
results inTable 2 indicate that GI households headed by young household heads are 
more likely to pursue this newly introduced livelihood strategy based on the 
information about GI they got from the governmental bodies. The significant result 
                                                             
3 In the literature, it is still unclear how to accommodate sampling weights in the context of matching. 
However, the selection and matching procedures can still be implemented using propensity scores fit 
on choice-based samples with misspecified weights. This is because only a monotonic transformation 
of the propensity score is required when implementing both matching and classical selection models. 
In the choice-based samples, odds ratio of the propensity score estimated with misspecified weights is 
monotonically related to the odds ratio of the true propensity scores (Todd, 2006; Heckman & Todd, 
2009). Froelich (2007) stated that the PSM can be used to estimate both the adjusted means and their 
distributions even with non-iid sampling. Hence, the analysis was run with and without the sampling 
weights providing conclusive results. 
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on age squared indicates that the relationship between age and the logit is non-linear. 
Thus, with increasing age, the household heads are less likely to adopt GI 
certification. The social capital also significantly determines the participation in the 
GI system of the TKR households in particular those who are members of the 
agricultural cooperatives and often participate in the village meetings. 
 
Table 2. Propensity Score Model Coefficient Estimates 
Notes: A separate set of logit regressions was computed adjusted for sampling weights. However, the 
use of sampling weights led to very minor changes, i.e. slightly lower significance levels for few 
coefficients when sampling weights were applied and all significant coefficients are the same as the 
ones from the logit regression without the sampling weights. The results in this table do not consider 
sampling weights.   
Source: Own calculations 
 
 
Variables Coefficient z P>│z│ 
Age of household head -0.043850 -2.02 0.043 
Age of household head squared 0.000683 3.27 0.001 
Gender of household head 0.067283 0.23 0.820 
Education of household head 0.015233 0.45 0.654 
Experience 0.000706 0.06 0.951 
Household size 0.090968 1.19 0.233 
Dependency ratio -0.002190 -0.95 0.343 
Off-farm employment 0.203032 0.83 0.408 
Log yield  -0.441571 -0.52 0.600 
Good Agricutural Practice (GAP) -0.286837 -2.08 0.037 
Rice seeds group member -0.364547 -1.28 0.202 
Information 0.994815 4.20 0.000 
Membership of cooperative 1.3986 5.75 0.000 
Participation in village meetings 0.882201 2.45 0.014 
Log time to markets 0.202998 1.18 0.239 
Constant -2.61228 -2.39 0.017 
Observations (Common support) 505 (503) 
GI = 1 169 (169) 
GI = 0 336 (334) 
Log likelihood -269.68 
LR Chi2 104.43 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.1622 
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Table 3. Balancing Tests of PSM: Difference in Ex-Ante Variables 
 
 Panel A: Mean tests and bias reduction 
Variable Sample 
Mean Mean 
test* 
P-Value % Bias 
% Bias 
reduction Treated Control 
Propensity score 
Unmatched 
0.47 
0.27 11.41 0.000 105.2  
Matched 0.47 0.06 0.952 0.7 99.3 
Age of household head 
Unmatched 
56.37 
54.77 1.61 0.109 15.3 
 
Matched 56.91 -0.51 0.608 -5.2 66.0 
Age of household head squared 
Unmatched 
3133.4 
2747 3.50 0.001 32.6 
 
Matched 3141.8 -0.07 0.947 -0.7 97.8 
Gender of household head 
Unmatched 
0.86 
0.80 1.83 0.068 17.7 
 
Matched 0.83 0.82 0.415 8.5 51.8 
Education of household head 
Unmatched 
6.43 
6.11 1.02 0.309 9.6 
 
Matched 6.44 -0.02 0.988 -0.2 98.2 
Experience 
Unmatched 
37.02 
34.34 2.26 0.024 21.1 
 
Matched 38.04 -0.76 0.450 -8.0 62.2 
Household size 
Unmatched 
4.80 
4.65 1.13 0.259 10.5 
 
Matched 4.78 0.16 0.875 1.8 83.3 
Dependency ratio 
Unmatched 
41.67 
39.94 0.37 0.714 3.5 
 
Matched 41.52 0.03 0.977 0.3 91.0 
Off-Farm employment 
Unmatched 
1.31 
1.26 1.15 0.251 10.7 
 
Matched 1.30 0.35 0.724 3.9 63.6 
Log yield 
Unmatched 
0.23 
0.24 -0.61 0.543 -5.7 
 
Matched 0.23 -0.03 0.979 -0.3 95.1 
Good Agricutural Practice (GAP) 
Unmatched 
1.66 
1.98 -4.07 0.000 -38.7 
 
Matched 1.61 0.52 0.603 5.3 86.2 
Rice seeds group member 
Unmatched 
0.18 
0.18 -0.03 0.977 -0.3 
 
Matched 0.16 0.41 0.686 4.3 -1468.0 
Information 
Unmatched 
0.69 
0.45 5.36 0.000 51.1 
 
Matched 0.69 0.09 0.925 1.0 98.1 
Membership of cooperative 
Unmatched 
0.82 
0.53 6.60 0.000 64.7 
 
Matched 0.82 0.00 1.000 0.0 100.0 
Participation 
Unmatched 
0.92 
0.86 2.07 0.039 20.3 
 
Matched 0.93 -0.29 0.770 -2.7 86.8 
Log time to markets 
Unmatched 
-0.26 
-0.32 0.96 0.337 9.0 
 
Matched -0.27 0.07 0.947 0.8 91.4 
Panel B: Pseudo R2 before and after Matching 
Matching algorithm Sample Pseudo R2 
Nearest Neighbor Matching (NNM) 
Unmatched 0.168 
Matched 0.008 
Kernel Matching (KM) 
Unmatched 0.168 
Matched 0.006 
Radius Matching (RM) 
Unmatched 0.168 
Matched 0.007 
Note: * t-tests for continuous variables and Pearson chi-square tests for categorical variables. 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Table 3 presents results of balancing tests of ex-ante variables. Panel A shows the 
paired t and chi-square statistics on the differences in the variable means between GI 
households and the matched sample of non-GI households. In addition, the table also 
displays the percentage reduction in bias from the unmatched to the matched sample. 
The matched sample was processed using the NNM, the KM and the RM methods 
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with the psmatch2 program for Stata. Observations outside the common support were 
discarded. Of the 505 observations, 2 observations from the non-GI group were 
discarded for the three algorithms leaving a sample size of 503 observations. 
In Panel A of Table 3, results of the t-tests and Pearson chi-square tests show that the 
conditioning variables are well balanced. Matching works well regarding the 
pretreatment variables such as gender, experience, Good Agricultural Practice 
(GAP), information, member of cooperative and participation that differed 
considerably between the GI and non-GI groups before matching. The balance 
between the GI and non-GI groups is improved by around 50 percent using all three 
matching estimators for the unmatched sample for 7 of 15 variables. The average 
reduction bias is 90 percent. All three algorithms reduce bias and are preferable to 
the unmatched sample. 
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of the propensity score before and after matching. 
It shows that the model specification is able to balance the ex-ante variables across 
the GI households and their matches. As shown in Table 3, the matching procedure 
reduced bias in the propensity score, i.e. probability of adopting the GI certification 
scheme, by 95 percent. 
Figure 3.  Distribution of Propensity Scores for GI and Non-GI Farm 
Households 
 
Source: Own calculations 
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The second balancing test re-estimates the propensity score on the matched sample 
and compares the pseudo-R
2
 before and after matching (Sianesi, 2001). The pseudo-
R
2
 indicates how well the regressors explain the probability of adopting GI 
certification. After matching there should be no systematic differences in the 
distribution of covariates between both groups. Hence, the pseudo-R
2
 should be fairly 
low after matching (See e.g. in Heinrich, Maffioli & Vázquez, 2010). The pseudo-R
2
 
in Panel B in Table 3 approaches zero for all algorithms after matching. The study 
demonstrates the substantial overlap (common support) in propensity scores between 
the treated and control households. Furthermore, with the large sample size of 505 
households, the large sample requirement of Shadish et al. (2002) is also satisfied.  
Table 4 gives the results of matching estimates how GI certification adoption 
affected the households’ welfare (log consumption expenditure per adult equivalent) 
and poverty reduction (household poverty (national) and household poverty 
(Northeast)).
4
 The results show that estimates of the 5-NNM, the KM and the RM for 
log expenditure per adult equivalent are 0.15, 0.13 and 0.11, respectively which are 
significant at 5% (for NNM) and 10%, respectively. This suggests that the welfare of 
households adopting GI certification is significantly higher than the ones not 
adopting the GI certification.  
Table 4 also demonstrates the impact estimates of the three matching estimators for 
poverty reduction outcomes and shows that they are almost the same, i.e. either 0.11 
or 0.12 which are significant at 5%. This suggests that GI certification adoption has a 
positive and significant effect on poverty reduction. It is apparent that the incidence 
of poverty (poverty headcount) is lower among GI farm households than non-GI 
farm households when taking the poverty line both at the national and the Northeast 
Regional level into consideration. 
 
                                                             
4
 The results reported in this table do not consider sampling weights. With stratified sampling, the 
propensity score estimator generally must take account of the sampling weights. However, under 
certain conditions on the stratification scheme, sampling weights can be neglected for the propensity 
score, but need to be accounted for in the weighted matching estimator. In the presence of choice-
based sampling, however, the sampling weights can be neglected in any case (Froelich, 2007). 
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Table 4.  GI Adoption Effect on Households’ Welfare and Poverty Matching  
Estimates 
 
Estimates 
Matching estimators 
NNM (5) KM RM 
Log consumption expenditure per adult equivalent 0.15** 0.13* 0.11* 
  (1.98) (1.82) (1.67) 
Household poverty (national) -0.12** -0.12** -0.11** 
  (2.27) (2.42) (2.21) 
Household poverty (Northeast) -0.11** -0.12** -0.11** 
  (2.24) (2.42) (2.38) 
Balancing property satisfied yes Yes yes 
Common support imposed yes Yes yes 
        
Observation total 505 505 505 
Treated 169 169 169 
Controls 334 334 334 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; * Significant at α = 10%; ** Significant at α = 5%; *** Significant at α = 1%. 
Source: Own calculations 
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
The impact evaluation of GI certification adoption needs to answer the question 
whether the apparent effect of GI adoption on the households’ welfare and poverty 
indicators compared to the control household group is due to the GI certified status 
or some unobserved characteristics of GI farm households compared to the non-GI 
farm households. PSM can only control for observables but it cannot control for 
unobservables (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2005 and 2008). Thus, it is recommended that 
sensitivity analyses should be used to check whether it is to inform discussions of 
hidden bias due to unobserved covariates. This should be especially done in an 
observational study in which the treatment and control groups look the same in terms 
of observed covariates and in consequential way in terms of unmeasured covariates 
(Lin, Psaty & Kronmal, 1998; Rosenbaum, 2002 and 2010). As stated in the 
literature e.g. of Ichino, Mealli & Nannicini (2008), sensitivity tests should always 
complement the presentation of matching estimates.  
The sensitivity analysis using the Rosenbaum bounds approach is based on the basic 
question whether unobserved heterogeneity (hidden bias) between the treatment and 
control cases can alter inference about treatment effects and what happens when 
there are deviations from the underlying identifying CIA. This approach does not test 
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the CIA itself, instead it provides evidence on the degree to which any significant 
results hinge on this untestable assumption (Becker & Caliendo, 2007). This 
approach can be implemented by using the Stata’s commands rbounds and 
mhbounds. Rosenbaum (2002) suggested to imagine a number Γ which captures the 
required degree of association of an unobserved characteristic with the treatment. Γ 
is the odds ratio, i.e. the ratio of odds, that the treated units have this unobserved 
characteristic to the odds that the control have this characteristic (Rosenbaum, 2002, 
p. 106). 
Rbounds tests the sensitivity for the continuous outcome variable: log consumption 
expenditure per adult equivalent. For the increase in the log consumption expenditure 
per adult equivalent, the sensitivity analysis procedure is based on the Wilcoxon’s 
sign rank test and the Hodges-Lehmann point estimate for the sign rank test. 
Mhbounds focuses on the two binary outcomes variables: poverty (national) and 
poverty (Northeast). The procedure calculates Mantel-Haenszel (MH) test statistics 
that give bound estimates of significance levels at a given level of a hidden bias of 
size Γ under the assumption of either systematic under- or overestimation of 
treatment effects. The assumption of overestimation of treatment effects is relevant 
when the expected treatment effect is positive, i.e. poverty reduction due to GI 
certification adoption. Several values of Γ are considered. A study is sensitive if 
values of Γ are close to 1 leading to inferences that are very different from those 
obtained assuming the study is free of hidden bias (Γ = 1). A study is then insensitive 
if extreme values of Γ are required to alter the inference (Rosenbaum, 2002). 
Sensitivity analysis was conducted on all the outcome variables presented in Table 5; 
testing the sensitivity of all impact estimates. 
The second column in Table 5 gives the results of the sensitivity analysis for the 
significance levels from Wilcoxon’s signed test of log consumption expenditure per 
adult equivalent. The range of possible significance levels for various values of Γ is 
presented. The upper bounds on the significance levels for Γ = 1, 1.10, 1.20 and 1.30 
are 0.01, 0.04, 0.09 and 0.20, respectively. The study is insensitive to a bias that 
would change the odds of exposure to GI adoption by up to 20 percent implying that 
the hidden bias is not likely to explain the observed association between exposure to 
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GI adoption and increased household welfare. However, when Γ = 1.3 or more, the 
study is sensitive to a bias that would change the odds of GI adoption by 30 percent 
or more. This means that such an unobserved confounding variable, i.e. unobserved 
characteristics that account for GI adoption and/or its welfare impact, exists. The 
household welfare impact estimate thus overstated and should be treated with 
caution. 
Table 5. Rosenbaum Bounds Sensitivity Analysis Tests for Hidden Bias 
Gamma 
(Γ) 
Outcome variables 
Log consumption expenditure  Poverty  Poverty  
per adult equivalent (national) (Northeast) 
p-critical QMH+ PMH+ QMH+ PMH+ 
1 0.01062 1.8650 0.03109 1.5917 0.05573 
1.10 0.0385 2.2483 0.01228 1.9530 0.02541 
1.20 0.0996 2.5982 0.00468 2.2829 0.01122 
1.30 0.2004 2.9220 0.00174 2.5884 0.00482 
1.40 0.3334 3.2237 0.00063 2.8732 0.00203 
1.50 0.4802 3.5064 0.00022 3.1402 0.00084 
1.60 0.6204 3.7726 0.00008 3.3917 0.00035 
1.70 0.7394 4.0243 0.00003 3.6295 0.00014 
1.80 0.8309 4.2631 0.00001 3.8554 0.00006 
1.90 0.8957 4.4905 <0.00001 4.0705 0.00002 
2 0.9386 4.7076 <0.00001 4.276 <0.00001 
Notes: The reported p-critical values are the upper bounds on the significance levels resulting from 
the Wilcoxon’s sign test. The results of the Hodges-Lehmann point estimate for the sign rank test are 
not reported here. They can be obtained from the author upon request. QMH+ is the reported Mantel-
Haenszel (MH) statistics under the assumption of overestimation of the treatment effects. The 
corresponding p-value is reported as PMH+. Given the positive estimated treatment effect, the bounds 
under the assumption that we have underestimated the true treatment effect (QMH-) are less interesting. 
Source: Own calculations 
Consequently, we can argue that the observed impact of GI certification adoption on 
household welfare is not significantly different from zero, and the association 
between GI adoption exposure and a higher level of household welfare may well be 
due to unobservables. However, this sensitivity result presented here is considered as 
a worst-case scenario. It does not mean that with a critical value of 1.3 an unobserved 
heterogeneity really exists and does not prove that GI certification adoption has no 
positive effect on the household welfare. It only states that the confidence interval for 
the effect would be zero if an unobserved variable caused the odds ratio of GI 
adoption to differ between GI and non-GI groups by a factor of 1.3. The Rosenbaum 
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bounds are quite conservative, i.e. they are valid regardless of the strength of the 
effect of the treatment on the outcome. Furthermore, they assume that the 
unobserved or confounding variable has a far stronger effect on the outcome variable 
than we might a priori predict. Nonetheless, these sensitivity tests convey important 
information about the level of uncertainty contained in matching estimators and 
allow the quantification of selection on unobservables (DiPrete & Gangl, 2004). 
Based on this sensitivity result for welfare impact estimate, even though PSM fails to 
account for unobservables which are quite likely to exist, it can still be used to 
estimate even if selection is on unobservables, as shown in some literature e.g. 
Froelich (2007). Thus, we can still conclude that the ATT estimate for household 
welfare is a pure effect of GI certification adoption. 
The last two columns of Table 5 report the sensitivity analysis for Mantel-Haenszel 
(MH) statistics under the assumption of overestimation of the treatment effects 
(QMH+) and corresponding p-value (PMH+). The results show that to explain away the 
observed association between poverty alleviation and GI adoption, a hidden bias or 
unobserved covariate would need to increase the odds of adoption by extreme values 
of Γ meaning that the association cannot be attributed to small hidded biases and the 
study is then insensitive. Thus, the positive and significant effects of GI certification 
adoption on the poverty reduction obtained are robust to the possibility of hidden 
bias from unmeasured variables.  
5. Conclusion and Policy Recommendation 
This paper evaluates the impact of the GI certification adoption on rural household 
welfare and rural poverty. A positive and significant effect of GI certification 
adoption on the household welfare and poverty alleviation has been found when 
conducting the Propensity Score Matching analysis. Given a conservative nature of 
the Rosenbaum bounds and their strong assumption of the effect of a confounding 
variable on the outcome variable, we can still conclude that the positive household 
welfare is a pure effect of the GI certification adoption.  
Using cross-sectional data in analyzing poverty, this study can only observe how the 
poverty incidence has been changed due to GI introduction. Without longitudinal 
data, we cannot study the dynamic impact of implementing the GI system for rural 
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livelihoods. Nevertheless, this study provides a snap shot of poverty reduction and 
the welfare improvement of Jasmine rice farm households in the TKRH area. The 
positive effect of GI can only last longer given the active and sustainable 
participation of all stakeholders in the GI product value chain. This suggests the 
challenge for the local and national policy makers and policy implementers to create 
transparency and a persuasive atmosphere among all stakeholders. The motivation of 
collective action and increase of the participation level within the GI value chain are 
also crucial, particularly for those TKR farm households who are unassertive to 
participate in this value-added process using a GI label. A long lasting positive 
impact of GI certification adoption on households’ well-being and poverty reduction 
in rural communities depends on the awareness and the rate of adoption of the TKR 
farm households to make use of their embedded right to apply for GI certification. 
Hence, the GI registration system should be sustainable, well-functioning and for the 
producers reachable in order to facilitate the registration process for GI certification 
to the TKR farm households. 
Acknowledgment 
The authors are grateful for financial support from the Royal Thai Government and 
granted funds for field surveys from PEGNet (Poverty reduction, Equity and Growth 
Network) at the Kiel Institute of World Economy, Germany. We would also like to 
thank Sabine Liebenehm, Mulubrhan Reda Amare and Eko Ruddy Cahyadi for very 
valuable discussions.  
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 3
rd
 International Journal of Arts 
and Sciences’ (IJAS) International Conference for Academic Disciplines hosted by 
Harvard University, 27-31 May 2012, Cambridge, USA. The authors would like to 
thank the participants of the conference for their comments. 
  
135 
 
References 
Abadie, A. & Imbens, G. (2004). Large sample properties of matching estimators for 
average treatment effects. Discussion Paper Series No. 4304. Retrieved April 
17, 2012, from http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/aabadie/sme.pdf 
Abadie, A. & Imbens, G. (2006). On the failure of the bootsrap for matching 
estimators. Technical Working Paper Series No. 325. Retrieved April 17, 2012, 
from http://www.nber.org/papers/T0325 
ADB (2004). Effectiveness of participatory approaches: Do the new approaches offer 
an effective solution to the conventional problems in rural development 
projects? Special Evaluation Study No. SST: REG 2005-01. Retrieved April 
30, 2012, from http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/ses-effectiveness.pdf 
Addor, F. & Grazioli, A. (2002). Geographical indications beyond wines and spirits. 
A roadmap for a better protection for geographical indications in the 
WTO/TRIPS agreement. The Journal of World Intellectual Property, 5(6), 
865-897. 
Akerlof, G.A. (1970). The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market 
mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500. 
Anders, S., Thompson, S. & Herrmann, R. (2009). Market segmented by regional 
origin labelling with quality control. Applied Economics, 41(3), 311-321. 
Bandyopadhyay, S., Humavindu, M.N., Shyamsundar, P. & Wang, L. (2004). Do 
households gain from community-based natural resource management? An 
evaluation of community conservancies in Namibia. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 3337. Retrieved February 14, 2012, from 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2004/ 
07/23/000112742_20040723114704/additional/102502322_20041117174004.p
df 
136 
 
Barcala, M.F., González-Díaz, M. & Raynaud, E. (2009). The governande of quality: 
The case of fresh meat. Retrieved December 01, 2011, from 
http://economix.fr/pdf/colloques/2009_Florence/Gonzalez-diaz-et-al.pdf  
Becker, S.O. & Ichino, A. (2002). Estimation of average treatment effects based on 
propensity scores. The Stata Journal, 2(4), 358-377. Retrieved from 
http://www.stata-journal.com/sjpdf.html?articlenum=st0026 
Becker, S.O. & Caliendo, M. (2007). Sensitivity analysis for average treatment 
effects. The Stata Journal, 7(1), 71-83. Retrieved from http://www.stata-
journal.com/sjpdf.html?articlenum=st0121 
Bresciani, F. & Valdés, A. (2007). Beyond food production: The role of agriculture 
in poverty reduction. Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.   
Caliendo, M. & Kopenig, S. (2005). Some practical guidance for the implementation 
of propensity score matching. Discussion Paper Series No. 1588. Retrieved 
April 17, 2012, from http://ftp.iza.org/dp1588.pdf 
Cañada, J.S. & Vázquez, A.M. (2005). Quality certification, institutions and 
innovation in local agro-food systems: Protected designations of origin of olive 
oil in Spain. Journal of Rural Studies, 21, 475-486. 
Calboli, I. (2006). Expending the protection of geographical indications of origin 
under TRIPS: Old debate or new opportunity? Research Paper No.06-19, 
Marquette University Law School.  Retrieved December 01, 2012, from 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=893193  
Callois, JM. (2004): Can Quality Labels Trigger Rural Development? A 
Microeconomic Model With Co-Operation for the Production of a 
Differentiated Agricultural Good. Working Papr No. 2004/6. Centre 
d’Economie et Sociologie appliquées à l’ Agriculture et aux Espaces Ruraux. 
Cervantes-Godoy, D. & Dewbre, J. (2010). Economic importance of agriculture for 
poverty reduction. OECD Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Working Papers, 
No. 23, OECD Publishing. doi: 10.1787/5kmmv9s20944-en 
137 
 
Chambers, R. & Conway, G.R. (1991). Sustainabl rural livelihoods: Practical 
concepts for the 21
st
 century. IDS Discussion Paper No. 296. Retrieved April 
17, 2012, from http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/ 
123456789/775/ Dp296.pdf 
Commssion on Intellectual Property Rights, (2002). Integrating intellectual property 
rights and development policy. Report of the Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, September 2002, London. Retrieved May 4, 2012, from 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ciprfullfinal.pdf 
Deaton, A. (1997). The analysis of household surveys. A microeconometric approach 
to development policy. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
DiPrete, T.A. & Gangl, M. (2004). Assessing bias in the estimation of causal effects: 
Rosenbaum bounds on matching estimators and instrumental variables 
estimation with imperfect instruments. Sociological Methodology, 34(1), 271-
310. 
doi: 10.1111/j.0081-1750.2004.00154.x  
D’Silva, E. & Bysouth, K. (1992). Poverty alleviation through agricultural projects. 
Report on a seminar held jointly by the Asian Development Bank, the Centre 
on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and the Pacific, and the Economic 
Development Institute of the World Bank. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
Foster, J., Greer, J. & Thorbecke, E. (1884). A class of decomposable poverty 
measures. Econometrica, 52(3), 761-766. 
Froelich, M. (2007). Propensity score matching without conditional independence 
assumption – with an application to the gender wage gap in the UK. 
Econometrics Journal, 10, 359-407.  
 doi: 10.1111/j.1368-423X.2007.00212.x 
Gieryn, T.F. (1999). Cultural boundaries of science. Credibility on the line. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
138 
 
Glewwe, P. (1991). Investigating the determinants of household welfare in Côte 
ďIvoire. Journal of Development Economics, 35, 307-337. Retrieved from 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/030438789190053X 
Grote, U. (2009): Environmental Labeling, Protected Geographical Indications, and 
the Interests of Developing Countries. The Estey Centre Journal of 
International Law and Trade Policy 10(1), 94-110.  
Haughton, J. & Khandker, S.R. (2009). Handbook on poverty and inequality. 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
Heckman, J.J. & Robb, R. Jr. (1985). Alternative methods for evaluating the impact 
of interventions. An overview. Journal of  Econometrics, 30, 239-267. 
Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/03044076859 
01393 
Heinrich, C., Maffioli, A. & Vázquez, G. (2010). A primer for apply propensity-
score matching. Impact-Evaluation Guidelines Technical Notes No. IDB-TN-
161. Retrieved April 17, 2012, from http://www.iadb.org/document.cfm?id= 
35320229. 
Heckman, J.J. & Todd, P.E. (2009). A note on adapting propensity sore matching 
and selection models to choice based samples. Retrieved March 17, 2012, from 
http://ftp.iza.org/dp4304.pdf 
Holland, P.W. (1986). Statistics and causal inference. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 81(396), 945-960. Retrieved from 
http://www.jastor.org/stable/2289064 
Hussein, K. & Nelson, J. (1998). Sustainble livelihoods and livelihood 
diversification, IDS Working Paper No. 69. Retrieved May 4, 2012, from 
http://www.padniger.net/Documents%20and%20Reports/Biblio/sustlivelihood.
pdf 
139 
 
Ichino, A. Mealli, F. & Nannicini, T. (2008). From temporary help jobs to permanent 
employment: What can we learn from matching estimators and their 
sensitivity? Journal of Applied Econometrics, 23, 305-327. 
Jain, S. (2009). Effects of the extension of geographical indications: A South Asian 
perspective. Asia-Pacific Development Journal, 16(2), 65-86. 
Jalan, J. & Ravallion, M. (2003). Does piped water reduce diarrhea for children in 
rural India? Journal of Econometrics, 112, 153–173. 
Jena, P.R. & Grote, U. (2012). Impact evaluation of traditional Basmati rice 
cultivation in Uttarakhand State of Northern India: What implications does it 
hold for Geographical Indications? World Development, Vol. 40, No. 9, pp. 
1895–1907. 
Jena, P.R. & Grote, U. (2010): Changing Institutions to Protect Regional Heritage: A 
Case for Geographical Indications in the Indian Agrifood Sector. Development 
Policy Review, 28 (2), pp. 217-236. 
Jitsuchon, S. (2006). Sources and pro-poorness of Thailand’s economic growth. 
Thammasat Economic Journal, 24(3), 68-105. Retrieved from 
http://www.eaber.org/sites/default/files/documents/TDRI_Jitsuchon_2006.pdf 
Kolany, D.E., Lesser, W.H., & Ye, C. (2011). The Economic Effects of Geographical 
Indications on Developing Country Producers: A Comparison of Darjeeling 
and Oolong teas. The WIPO Journal, 2(2), 157-172. 
Lee, E.S. & Forthofer, R.N. (2006): Analyzing Complex Survey Data (2nd ed.). A 
SAGE University Paper Series on Quantitative Applications in the Social 
Sciences. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA, USA. 
Lence, S.H., Marette, S., Hayes, D.J. & Foster, W. (2007). Collective marketing 
arrangements for geographically differentiated agricultural products: Welfare 
impacts and policy implications. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
89(4), 947-963. 
140 
 
Lin, D.Y., Psaty, B.M. & Kronmal, R.A. (1998). Assessing the sensitivity of 
regression results to unmeasured confounders in observational studies. 
Biometrics, 54, 948-963. Retrieved from http://www.jastor.org/stable/2533848. 
Maddala, G. S. (1983). Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Economics. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 257-91. 
Marette, S., Crespi, J.M. & Schiavina, A. (1999). The role of common labelling in a 
context of asymmetric information. European Review of Agricultural 
Economics, 26(2), 167-178. 
Menapace, L., Colson, G. & Grebitus, C. (2011). Consumers’ preferences for 
geographical origin labels: Evidence for Canadian Olive oil market. European 
Review of Agricultural Economics, 38(2), 193-212. 
Menapace, L. & Moschini, G. C. (2011). Quality certification by geographical 
indications, trademarks and firm reputation. European Review of Agricultural 
Economics, 1-28. 
doi: 10.1093/erae/jbr053 
Mendola, M. (2007). Agricultural technology adoption and poverty reduction: A 
propensity-score matching analysis for rural Bangladesh. Food Policy, 32, 
372–393. 
Mérel, P. and Sexton, R.J. (2011). Will geographical indications supply excessive 
quality? European Review of Agricultural Economics, 1-21. 
 doi: 10.1093/erae/jbr056 
Moschini, G. L., Menapace, L. & Pick, D. (2008). Geographical indications and the 
competitive provision of quality in agricultural markets. American Journal of 
Agicultural Economics, 90(3), 794-812. 
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) (2011). Poverty 
statistics from 1988 to 2010 (2531-2553), Bangkok, Thailand. 
141 
 
Ngokkuen, C. & Grote, U. (2011). The Prediction of Household Behavior in 
Adopting Geographical Indication Certification for Jasmine Rice from 
Northeastern Thailand. The GSTF Business Review (GBR), 1(1) (August 2011), 
173-178. 
 doi: 10.5176_2010-4804_1.1.27 
Ngokkuen, C. & Grote, U. (2012). Geographical indication for Jasmine rice: 
Applying a logit model to predict adoption behavior of Thai farm households. 
Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture, 51(2), 157-185. 
National Statistical Office. (2010). Poverty information 1988-2010. Bangkok, 
Thailand. 
National Statistical Office. (2012). Labor statistics in February 2012. Bangkok, 
Thailand. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2009). What 
are equivalence scale? Retrieved May 23, 2012, from http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/61/52/35411111.pdf 
Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE) (2011). Fundamental agricultural data in 
2011. Bangkok, Thailand. 
Rao, J.N.K. & Scott, A.J. (1984). On chi-squared tests for multiway contingency 
tables with cell proportions estimated from survey data. The Annals of 
Statistics, 12(1), 46-60. 
Rosenbaum, P.R. (2010). Design of observational studies. New York: Springer. 
Rosenbaum, P.R. (2002). Observational studies. New York: Springer. 
Rosenbaum, P.R. & Rubin, D. (1983). The central role of the propensity score in 
observational studies for causal effects. Biometrika, 70(1), 41-55. Retrieved 1 
June 2012 from http://www.jastor.org/stable/2335942 
Raynaud, E. (2002). Governance of the agri-food chains as a vector of credibility for 
quality signilization in Europe. Paper Prepared for Presentation at the X
th
 
142 
 
EAAE Congress “Exploring Diversity in the European Agri-Food System” 
held on August 28-31, 2002, Zaragoza, Spain.  
Schmalensee, R. (1978). A model of advertising and product quality. The Journal of 
Political Economy, 86(3), 485-503. 
Scoones, i. (1998). Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: A Framework for Analysis. IDS 
Working Paper No. 72. Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 
Brighton, UK. 
Scoones, I. (2009). Livelihoods perspectives and rural development. Journal of 
Peasant Studies, 36(1).   
doi: 10.1080/03066150902820503 
Shimeles, A. & Thoenen, R. (2005). Poverty profiles. A methodogical note on 
measuring poverty. Working Paper No. ESPD/NRP/04/05. Retrieved May 19, 
2012, from www.uneca.org/espd/publications/poverty_profiles_a_ 
methodological_note_ on_measuring_pove.pdf 
Sianesi, B. (2001). An evaluation of the active labour market programmes in 
Sweden. Working Paper No. 5. Retrieved February 14, 2012, from 
http://www.ifau.se/upload/pdf/se/2001/wp01-5.pdf 
Siriprachai, S. (2009). The Thai economy: Structural changes and challenges ahead. 
Thammasat Economic Journal, 27(1), 148-229.  Retrieved from 
http://www.econ.tu.ac.th/doc/article/fulltext/209.pdf 
Solivas, E. S., Ramirez, G.M. & Manalo, A. (2007, October). The propensity score 
matching for correcting sample selection bias. Paper presented at the 10
th
 
National Convention on Statistics (NCS), Mandaluyong City. 
StataCorp (2009): Stata: Release 11. Statistical Software. College Station, TX: 
StataCorp LP. 
Stigler, G.J. (1961). The economics of information. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 69(3), 213-225. 
143 
 
Strengmann-Khun, W. (2000). Theoretical definition and empirical measurement of 
welfare and poverty: A microeconomic approach. Paper presented at the 26th 
General Conference of the International Association for Research on Income 
and Wealth (IARIW), 27 August to 2 September 2000, Cracow, Poland. 
Retrieved December 5, 2007, from SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=345022. 
Teuber, R. (2009). Café de Marcala – Honduras’ GI approach to achieving reputation 
in the coffee market. Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade 
Policy, 10(1), 131-148. 
Toborn, J. (2003). Rural livelihoods. Current Issues in International Rural 
Development Published by the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences. 
Retrieved April 17, 2012, from http://www.slu.se/Documents/externwebben/ 
overgripande-slu-dokument/popvet-dok/currents/curr3132.pdf 
Todd, P.E. (2006). Evaluating social programs with endogenous program placement 
and selection of the treated. Retrieved March 17, 2012 from 
http://athena.sas.upenn.edu/~petra/bergen/hae.pdf 
Tregear, A., Arfini, F., Belletti, G. & Marescotti, A. (2007). Regional foods and rural 
development: The role of product qualification. Journal of Rural Studies, 23, 
12-22.  
 doi: 10.1016/j.jrurstud.2006.09.010 
Verhaegem, I. & Van Huylenbroeck, G. (2001). Costs and benefits for farmers 
participating in innovative marketing channels for qualitym food products. 
Journal of  Rural Studies, 17, 443-456. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. 
Massachusetts: MIT Press 
Zago, A.M. & Pick, D. (2004). Labeling policies in food markets: Private incentives, 
public intervention and welfare effects. Journal of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics, 29(1), 150-165. 
144 
 
Geographical Indication Protection and Rural Livelihoods:  
Some Insights from Asia 
 
Pradyot R. Jena, Chuthaporn Ngokkuen, Ulrike Grote 
 
Abstract 
This paper synthesizes the results from two empirical case studies undertaken in 
India and Thailand regarding the welfare impacts of geographical indications (GIs). 
Our findings support a positive effect of GI protection on the livelihoods of farm 
households in rural communities. GI adoption increases well-being of rural farm 
households and reduces rural poverty. Our findings also support a call for stronger 
intellectual property rights protection. GI protection is essential for rural livelihoods 
not only in terms of its economic prominence, but it also preserves the traditional 
knowledge embedded in a GI good as well as the traditional heritage of the locality 
that produces the good. 
  
Keywords: Geographical indication, impact evaluation, Basmati rice, Jasmine rice, 
propensity score matching, Heckman selection model 
 
I. Introduction 
The emergence of geographical indications (GIs) in the last decade as collective 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) to protect traditional goods such as agricultural 
goods, handicrafts and hand-made textiles has implications for both consumers and 
producers of such goods. Consumers of GI goods benefit from the quality assurance 
provided by the GI protection that helps them overcome the asymmetric information 
problem. The goods that have successfully qualified for GI protection carry a GI logo 
when they are marketed. These GI symbols act as a quality and origin signal to the 
consumers who in absence of such logo would have incurred significant transaction 
costs for quality assurance (Rangnekar, 2004; Jena and Grote, 2010). Saving these 
transaction cost creates an incentive for the consumers to pay a price premium for the 
GI good (Stigler, 1961), which again creates an incentive for the producers to 
produce the GI good. Apart from the price premium benefit for producers, producers 
also benefit from the limited supply that is ensured by GI protection. By successfully 
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delimiting the geographical boundary of the production of a good, GI protection 
effectively controls the supply which in turn raises the price of the good and creates 
economic benefits for the producer. Furthermore, GI protection preserves the 
traditional heritage of the locality that produce a GI good which has positive 
externalities both in the short and long run. 
  
The focus in the current paper is to measure the likely benefits of GI protection for 
the producers. Our paper makes use of two empirical case studies to provide some 
insights regarding the welfare impacts of GI protection for smallholder farmers. The 
case studies are based on Basmati rice from India and Jasmine rice from Thailand. 
While the first case study refers to a potential likely GI, the second one focuses on an 
established GI. Basmati is not yet a legal GI in its country of origin(s) i.e. both India 
and Pakistan on account of reasons ranging from Basmati’s cross-border spread in 
two countries to selection of varieties of the rice that qualifies for GI registration
1
 
(Rangnekar and Kumar, 2010; Das, 2009; Giraud, 2008). Jasmine rice has been 
granted GI registration in Thailand in 2007 (Ngokkuen and Grote, 2012). The 
purpose of combining these two case studies is to show the implications of GI 
registration for the livelihood of smallholder farmers from the period of transition to 
establishment of GI protection.  
 
The existing literature about income and welfare impacts of GI products on 
producers is scarce and limited in their selection of method of analysis. Most of the 
empirical studies used rather a descriptive analysis of price increases of GI goods 
before and after the GI registration to show the monetary benefits of a GI. The key 
issue in this branch of research is to measure the magnitude of impact and to 
distinguish it from other factors that may play a role in shaping the overall 
performance indicators. Keeping this broad objective in mind, this paper has 
employed a treatment vis-à-vis control group in which the treated farmers are the 
adopters of either Basmati rice or Jasmine rice and the control farmers are the non-
                                                             
1 The debate surrounding a US-based company Rice Tec’s patenting of Basmati rice and subsequent 
legal wrangling between the Government of India and the company over the patent is well 
documented in many studies (Rangnekar and Kumar, 2010; Marie-Vivien, 2008). Finally, Rice Tec 
had to withdraw the patent yet it was the beginning of a real concern in developing countries 
especially in India about protection of the so-called unique goods originating in these countries. 
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adopters who cultivate other varieties of rice. The paper uses propensity score 
matching method and Heckman selection method to correct for the selection bias 
related endogeneity.  
 
The paper is structured as follows – section 2 provides a review of the literature. 
Data collection methods and empirical models are explained in section 3. Section 4 
presents the empirical results and finally concluding observations are laid out in the 
last section. 
 
2. Literature Review 
GI products expressing the peculiarities of rural areas are regarded as one of the most 
evident manifestations of locality and often play a central role in the rural 
development strategies carried out by local actors in rural areas (Belletti et al., 2002). 
The production, processing and/or preparation of these GI products usually take 
place in the defined geographical region (Loureiro and McCluskey, 2000). The link 
of a GI product with its area of origin makes it unique and may represent an 
important differentiation leverage for producers to gain a price premium coming 
from the intrinsic quality of the product and/or from the image of the area it comes 
from (Belletti et al., 2001; Giovannucci et al., 2009).  
 
A number of papers analyzing the attitude of consumers towards GIs by evaluating 
their willingness to pay (WTP) do confirm a positive WTP for GI products. Loureiro 
and McCluskey (2000) for example found that GI labels for high quality cuts of meat 
like the Spanish Glacian Veal can obtain a premium. Hassan and Monier-Dilhan 
(2006) in their analysis of the WTP for French GI ham also stated that GI ham price 
is about 15% higher than the average price. The Italian Tuscany olive oil case study 
conducted by Origenandino (2008) reported a 20% increase of the price for this olive 
oil since it was registered as a GI in 1998. Not only the consumers in developed 
countries are willing to pay for the price premium for quality products, also the 
consumers in developing countries demand such quality products and are somewhat 
willing to pay for the higher price. Seetisarn and Chiaravutti (2011) used auction 
methodology to study the WTP of 60 participants for three GI food products, i.e. Doi 
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Tung Coffee, Thung Kula Rong-Hai Thai Hom Mali Rice (TKR) and Chaiya salted 
eggs. The results suggest the influence of the GI label on the participants’ WTP. 
However, since the origin of each product was also printed on the label together with 
the GI sign, there is no confirmation that the GI label can create an influence on the 
participants’ WTP for Doi Tung Coffee and Chaiya salted eggs. But the GI label did 
have an influence on the consumers’ WTP for the TKR.  
 
Supported by empirical evidence of both developed and developing countries, price 
premia ensured by GI protection, thus, have been accrued to GI goods based on their 
place of origin and their special quality. The price premium may give origin to 
economic rents which benefit both owners of the assets used in the production 
process of GI products, and other actors whose assets are directly or indirectly 
connected to the GI products. However, the rent of origin can guarantee only a 
normal remuneration for the assets which are less efficient than the standard ones. In 
fact, production costs of such typical products as GIs are much higher than 
“conventional” (or industrial) ones due to the use of labor-intensive and traditional 
techniques in the production process. And this is often realized in marginal or 
disadvantaged areas (Belletti et al., 2001). 
 
Several other theoretical and empirical papers investigating the welfare implications 
of GIs have been provided. A theoretical study of Zago and Pick (2004) e.g. found 
that producers of high-quality goods are better off, while producers of low-quality 
goods are worse off. The study of Lence et al. (2007) highlighted that stronger 
intellectual property right protection for producer organizations may enhance welfare 
even after a differentiated product has been developed. A supportive role of GI 
certification on a competitive provision of quality was found e.g. by Moschini et al. 
(2008). They concluded that if the production of high-quality products is drawn on 
scarce factors which the producers own, these producers may reap some benefits. 
Likewise, in a comparison study of Darjeeling and Oolong teas, Kolady et al. (2011) 
showed that the benefits sharing from a GI going to producers/landowners increases 
with a less elastic supply of land or with more elastic demand for output, or with 
increased elasticity of substitution between land and other inputs, all of which 
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increase the derived demand for land. And in extreme case, when the supply of land 
is fixed or perfectly inelastic, all benefits from a GI go to landowners. They 
suggested that countries must select their GIs very carefully as the confluence of 
product familiarity in international markets and land ownerships patterns which are 
needed for the generation and widespread distribution of benefits will be rare events.  
 
Anders et al. (2009) used the equilibrium displacement model for markets segmented 
by regional-origin labeling with quality to investigate the role of governmental 
support levels on farmers’ welfare. They found that welfare implications for 
producers crucially depend on costs of participation including quality control and on 
the co-financing mechanism between the government and producers.  
 
Menapace and Moschini (2011) developed a reputation model to assess the role of 
certification for agricultural and food products with GIs in a context. They concluded 
that if their assumption that all factors of production are in perfectly elastic supply is 
relaxed, it is possible to envision benefits to GI producers that are not accounted for 
in their model.  Likewise, the study of Mérel and Sexton (2011) found that by 
providing a credible certification mechanism to establish product quality, the GI 
framework has a clear potential to improve producer welfare. Consumers can receive 
also correct information on product quality.  
 
Further papers which relate the concept of rural development directly to the concepts 
of rural livelihoods have focused on the impacts of GI adoption on rural 
development. Tregear et al. (2007) conducted a case study and examined the role of 
product qualification for regional foods in rural development. Their overall results 
suggested that the product qualification is a means by which local actors can attract 
revenues from non-local actors and institutions. Applying a microeconomic model 
with the co-operation of farmers for the production of a differentiated agricultural 
good, Callois (2004) found that there is a trade-off between the number of 
differentiated farmers and their individual income. His results implied that the rise in 
some farmers’ income does not benefit the rural region as a whole. On the contrary, 
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this income rise benefits urban workers who get a higher wage and can improve their 
utility while consuming new products. 
 
3. Background Information, Data and Empirical Methods 
The following section provides some background information, describes the 
sampling method and briefly characterizes the area of survey in both case studies. 
Furthermore, the theoretical underpinning as well as empirical methods are 
discussed. 
 
3.1 Background information 
Rice is important to India and Thailand not only because it is a major staple food for 
domestic consumption, but also because its exports to the world market have resulted 
in considerable export revenues for the countries in general and for the individual 
rice farmers in particular. As shown in Figure 1, the export values of Basmati and 
Jasmine rice have gone up every year since 2005. 
 
In Thailand, approximately a third of the total rice export value stemmed from 
exporting Jasmine rice which brought foreign currency of around US$ 2 billion to the 
country in 2011. Jasmine rice export makes up for more than a quarter of Thai rice 
exports each year. 
 
Similarly, Basmati rice is considered as potentially one of India’s most valued GIs. It 
is an established brand in the international market and is known for its specific 
characteristics such as aroma and size of the grain in contrast to relatively recent GIs 
such as Feni liquor from Southern India that still need investments into their 
marketing. This also means that the former has a large export market whereas the 
latter is yet to create its brand name (Jena and Grote, 2010). Nearly two-thirds of all 
Basmati rice produced in India is exported. Its total export earnings during 2010-11 
were close to Rupees (Rs.) 105.7 billion (approximately US$ 2,321 million), which 
accounts for about 98% of total rice exports (see Table 1). Its share of total 
agricultural exports was about 24%, which is quite significant. Furthermore, 
according to FAO (2008), Basmati trade (from both India and Pakistan) has 
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increased from 5.2% to 8.3% of all rice world trade from 2003 to 2008, with a record 
of 2.45 million tons on milled basis. Recent volatility in prices of agricultural 
commodities has affected the rice trade market, but Basmati trade remained 
unaffected and its price is still the highest among all the rice varieties in the world 
rice market.  
 
Figure 1.  Total export value of Basmati and Jasmine rice from 2005-2011 in 
billion US$ 
 
Source:  Own presentation based on data from India’s Agricultural and Processed 
Food Products Export Development Authority (APEDA) (2011) and from 
Thailand’s Office of Agricultural Economics (OAE) (2011) 
 
Under the purview of “The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and 
Protection) Act, 1999” (GI Act) which came into force with effect from 15 
September 2003 in India, the Central Government of India has established the 
‘Geographical Indications Registry’ with all-India jurisdiction at Chennai, where the 
right holders can register their GIs. 
 
An application for GI registration for Basmati rice was forwarded to the GI Registry 
of the Government of India way back in 2004 (Geographical Indications Registry, 
2006) and subsequently several attempts have been made to ensure a national GI 
registration for Basmati rice which continues to date. Rangnekar and Kumar (2010) 
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have offered certain alternative models through which a successful GI registration 
can be contemplated for Basmati.  
 
In Thailand, there is the “Act on Geographical Indications Protection” since 2003. 
Under this Act, the provincial governmental bodies had applied for registration of 
their Thung Kula Rong-Hai Thai Hom Mali Rice (TKR) as GI at the Department of 
Intellectual Property (DIP) under the Ministry of Commerce of Thailand. The TKR 
was registered in September 2007 and is regarded as the first GI Jasmine rice in 
Thailand. It is the most popular GI rice from the Northeast, bears a well-known 
denomination and has a particular appeal to foreign markets. Its exports mainly go to 
the European Union (EU) where there is an attempt for its registration with the EU 
GI Registry.  
 
3.2 Sampling and area of data collection in India and Thailand 
Basmati rice in India is grown in the states of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Jammu 
Kashmir, and Uttarakhand. The survey has been undertaken in the Uttarakhand state 
which is situated in the Northern part of India on the foothills of the Himalayas. The 
state is believed to have been home to Basmati cultivation since long and several 
varieties of Basmati such as Type-3 (Dehradun Basmati), Pusa Basmati 1, Basmati 
370, Taraoari Basmati, Sugandh 4 and Kasturi are cultivated in the state
2
 (Singh et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, a sizable number of small-scale farmers predominantly 
depend on agriculture for their livelihoods in the state. Basmati rice is cultivated in 
four districts of Uttarakhand such as Hardwar, Udham Singh Nagar, Dehradun and 
Nainital. The topography of these districts can be divided into two distinct 
production environments such as plains and hills. Both Dehradun and Hardwar 
belong to the plain areas where soil is highly fertile, irrigation facilities are well in 
place and climatic conditions suit higher yields; on the other hand, Udham Singh 
                                                             
2 Different varieties of Basmati seed can be grouped under two categories such as traditional variety 
and evolved variety. The traditional varieties are – Basmati-370, Basmati-386, Type-3, Taraori 
Basmati (HPC-19), Basmati-217 and Ranbir Basmati (IET-11348) (Nagaraju et al., 2002). Evolved 
varieties are – Pusa Basmati-1 (IET-1064), Super Basmati, Punjab Basmati-1 (Bauni Basmati), 
Haryana Basmati-1 (HKQ-228/IET- 10367), Mahi Sugandhi and Kasturi. It is important to note that – 
EU recognizes all the six traditional varieties and two evolved varieties such as Pusa Basmati-1 (IET-
1064) and Super Basmati as the original Basmati from India (European Commission, 2004). 
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Nagar and Nainital belong to the hilly region with terrace topography that relies 
entirely on rainfall which resulted in poor productivity (Singh et al., 2006).  
 
A sample of 299 farm households has been selected using a multi-stage sampling 
procedure for this study. In the first stage, Dehradun district is chosen on the basis of 
quantity of production. Out of the six blocks in Dehradun, Basmati rice is cultivated 
in four blocks, namely Vikasnagar, Sahaspur, Raipur, and Doiwala. In the second 
stage, 30 villages were randomly selected from the four Basmati producing blocks of 
the Dehradun district and finally, 10 households were randomly selected from each 
of the villages. A structured household survey has been undertaken in the selected 
villages during August-September 2008. It is to be noted that since villages differ in 
their population size, the probability weights are different for the samples drawn 
from the villages.  
 
Jasmine rice involves millions of rural poor households in the Northeast of Thailand 
which is the delimited area for GI Jasmine rice production. From the two GI Jasmine 
rice products of the region, the TKR originating from the respective Thung Kula 
Rong-Hai (TKRH) area is regarded as one of the most well-known local peculiarities. 
The TKRH area with its unique sandy loam and rain-fed upland is a huge area 
covering 12 districts of five provinces: Roi Et, Surin, Srisaket, Mahasarakam, and 
Yasothorn.  
 
We conducted a cross-sectional survey in two districts of the TKRH area, i.e. 
Kasetwisai and Rasrisalai districts from March to June 2009. A total representative 
sample of 541 randomly selected farm households including 180 GI households and 
361 non-GI farm households was used for data analysis. 
  
The field survey in both case studies was conducted using face-to-face interviews 
with a structured questionnaire including sections on farm household characteristics, 
the production pattern, farm and non-farm income, perception about GIs, social 
capital such as cooperation, trust and network building, bargaining power, obstacles 
in the GI registration procedure, costs and benefits of certification, assets, 
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expenditures on food and non-food consumption, shocks, borrowing and savings, and 
finally housing conditions of the farm households. 
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy 
The theoretical underpinning of this paper is based on Strengmann-Kuhn’s (2000) 
definition of household welfare and Scoones’s (1998) rural livelihood resources 
classification in his rural livelihoods framework. The household uses productive 
resources to derive monetary income. Added to this are any monetary transfers the 
household receives from the government or other households; subtracted are any 
private transfers given to the other households or taxes paid to the government. The 
disposable income is used for consumption and savings. Besides buying goods, it is 
also possible to use goods from home production or to receive them from other 
households or the government. All these goods together determine the household 
welfare and it is possible to measure welfare and poverty in all stages of this welfare 
production process (Strengmann-Kuhn, 2000).  
  
The welfare function can be written as: 
 
  );();(* iiiiii xrWxrcWW       (1) 
 
where the resources of individual i are called ri. The individual welfare Wi is directly 
dependent on a bundle of goods ci*, which is dependent on resources ri. The bundles 
of goods ci* may not necessarily be identical to the observable bundle of goods ci, as 
preferences of the individual may differ from those preferences implied by the 
welfare function W defined by society. ci* is the result of maximizing the socially-
defined function Wi subject to the available resources ri. Relevant for poverty 
definitions is this value of Wi which depends on an optimization process theoretically 
restricted by available resources. This is the well-known resource definition of 
poverty (Hagenaars, 1986; Strengmann-Kuhn, 2000). The empirical approach in this 
paper uses this resource-based welfare definition to estimate the welfare impacts of 
GI good production, treating the latter as a positive resource intervention or as an 
additional livelihood strategy which the individual farm household can pursue in 
154 
 
order to reach desirable outcomes, i.e. for example well-being improvement and 
poverty reduction. The underlying hypothesis is that benefits from GI protection 
enhance the adopters’ resource base. Controlling for other sources of income, the GI 
producers are likely to experience a higher level of welfare compared to the non-GI 
producers who share almost the same level of socio-economic characteristics. The 
welfare function (1) is transformed into a reduced-form equation such as:  
 
iiiii LHRGIY   43210    (2) 
 
In (2) Yi is the welfare indicator proxied by net rice income and consumption of a 
household. GI is the positive resource intervention that is hypothesized to increase 
adopters’ income level. Ri is a vector of other resources that affect income. Hi is a 
vector of household-specific characteristics which represents the social and cultural 
capital which can also affect the income level, and Li relates to land-specific 
characteristics such as elevation of land. i  is the stochastic error. 
  
The GI variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the household is a GI good adopter 
(Basmati or Jasmine rice farmer) and 0 if it is a non-GI rice farmer. If being a GI 
good producer - controlling for other factors - increases the welfare indicator Yi then 
the hypothesis that GI adoption increases producer welfare is supported. However, 
there could be an endogeneity problem in the above specification. The causality in 
specification (2) which states that a GI farmer earns more income than a non-GI 
farmer could as well flow in the reverse direction.  
 
Endogeneity bias is well documented in the literature and is quite prevalent in cross-
sectional studies (Heckman, 1979). To correct such self-selection bias, we have 
followed the propensity score matching method and a Heckman selection model for 
the Thai and Indian case studies, respectively (for more details on the methods for 
the Indian case study, see Jena and Grote, 2012).  
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4. Results and Discussion 
The results of this paper are presented in three parts: first the case studies are 
compared with respect to some basic figures on yields and the livelihood situation of 
households. Second, the impact of GI adoption on household welfare in terms of 
consumption expenditures from the Basmati case study in India is analyzed and 
discussed followed by the Jasmine rice case study in Thailand. 
 
4.1 Comparative figures on the two case studies 
Comparative figures on yield, price, net rice income earned from one ha of land 
allocated to rice, and the poverty incidence for both GI and non-GI groups for both 
India and Thailand are provided in Table 1. Basmati is generally a low yielding rice 
variety compared to non-Basmati rice varieties. Basmati farmers have reported a 
yield of 2.75 tons per ha while the same for the non-Basmati farmers is 4.8 tons per 
ha. The price in PPP US$ per ton of paddy is substantially higher for Basmati, i.e. 
US$ 964 compared to non-Basmati rice which is US$ 421. The higher prices for 
Basmati compensate the lower yield and higher costs for it relative to the non-
Basmati rice. This is evident in the net rice income earned per ha. Basmati farmers 
have earned US$ 1,930 per hectare compared to US$ 1,361 for the non-Basmati 
farmers. This is also evident in the lower poverty incidence for the Basmati farmers. 
Although, the poverty incidence for the whole sample is quite low, i.e. 13.4% owing 
to fertile land in the region and adequate access to off-farm sources of income, the 
poverty incidence for Basmati farmers is lower than for non-Basmati farmers. 
 
Table 1:  Comparative figures on Yield, Price, Net rice income and Poverty 
incidence in India and Thailand 
Indicators 
India Thailand 
Basmati Non-Basmati 
GI 
Jasmine 
Non-GI 
Jasmine 
Yield (ton/ha) 2.75 4.8 1.43 1.4 
Price (US$ in PPP exchange rate/ton) 964 421 804b 790b 
Net rice income (US$ in PPP exchange rate/ha) 1,930 1,361 511 464 
Proportion of households below poverty linea (%)  8 22 19 25 
Note:  a  For Thailand, the consumption poverty line is used as baseline (Baht per month per capita). 
The poverty line for India is calculated using the World Bank poverty line of $ 1.25 at 2005 
PPP exchange rate.; b Price of 2008 (after GI registration in 2007). 
Source: Own calculations 
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Compared to Basmati, Jasmine rice has a much lower yield, lower price and amounts 
to a lower net rice income per ha. Both Jasmine farmer groups reported almost the 
same yield, i.e. of around 1.4 ton per ha. GI farmers reported a higher price of paddy 
rice, namely US$ 804 compared to US$ 790 for the non-GI group. The net rice 
income per ha for both Jasmine rice groups is very low compared to Basmati and 
non-Basmati groups which can be partly explained by the lower yields. However, the 
GI group has a slightly higher net rice income per ha amounting to US$ 511 as 
compared to the non-GI group with US$ 464. This is also evident in the lower 
poverty incidence for GI Jasmine farmers of 19% compared to 25% for the non-GI 
Jasmine farmers.  
 
4.2 Welfare impacts in the Basmati case study 
A mean comparison test between the Basmati and the non-Basmati groups reveals 
that there is significant difference between the groups in terms of both annual 
household income and daily per capita income. While the average annual income for 
the Basmati groups stands at Rs. 93,406 (€1,557 using an exchange rate of 1€ = Rs. 
60) the same for the non-Basmati group is Rs. 73,949 (€1,233). The per capita 
income of the Basmati group is Rs. 55 as opposed to Rs. 40 for the latter. A further 
investigation of the different sources of income between these groups yields that the 
two groups differ significantly in terms of income from rice cultivation and off-farm 
income (which does not include remittances). Intuitively, this indicates that 
controlling for off-farm income, the income from rice cultivation affects the 
household income and hence requires to be analyzed whether Basmati cultivation 
plays any role in determining the household income. 
  
Both OLS and Heckman selection models are estimated with the dependent variable 
being the net income from rice. The regression results are reported in Table 2. The 
estimated figures of the OLS regression show that the Basmati dummy is statistically 
significant and positive with a coefficient of 15.10. Since the model controls for the 
likely impacts from other explanatory variables on income, the magnitude of the 
Basmati coefficient shows the incremental income that Basmati rice cultivators have 
earned over their non-Basmati counterparts, which is in the order of Rs. 15,000. The 
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estimated coefficients from the Heckman selection model show that most of the 
variables retain their sign and level of significance between the two specifications 
that is with the organic certification and without the certification. The Basmati 
dummy is positive and highly significant with the coefficient of 15.12 (Col. 3). 
Hence, there is a consensus between both the models about the impact of the Basmati 
dummy on income. A household by choosing to cultivate Basmati rice over non-
Basmati rice earns an increment of Rs. 15,000. Together with the findings from the 
descriptive statistics and from the regression results, it is evident that Basmati 
cultivation adds more income to an average household. 
 
Table 2: Income regressions  
Explanatory 
variables 
OLS Heckman Endogeneity-corrected 
 With organic 
certification 
Without 
organic 
certification 
With organic 
certification 
Without 
organic 
certification 
Intercept - 26 (6.48)*** -13.82 (6.7)** -21.63 (7.24)*** -6.66 (7.27) 
Age 0.04 (0.06) 0.007 (0.07) 0.04 (0.07) 0.02 (0.07) 
Edu dummy 1 2.61 (2.71) 4.26 (2.68)* 3.01 (2.42) 5.21 (2.41)** 
Edu dummy 2 3.10 (2.52) 1.54 (2.39) 2.76 (2.5) 0.5 (2.53) 
Basmati 15.10 (2.16)*** 10.62 (1.99)*** 15.12 (2.26)*** 10.55 (2.05)*** 
Yield of rice 5.21 (0.74)*** 4.58 (0.8)*** 4.9 (0.96)*** 4.05 (0.95)*** 
Land size  1.81 (0.23)*** 1.16 (0.25)*** 1.72 (0.11)*** 1.00 (0.14)*** 
Cost of cultivation -0.006 (.002)*** -.005 (.002)** -.007 (.002)*** -.006 (.002)*** 
Elevation of land 1.53 (2.21) 0.14 (2.38) 1.12 (2.58) -1.27 (2.83) 
Idiosyncratic shock -0.17 (1.93) 2.10 (2.24) -.17 (1.94) 2.47 (2.04) 
Covariate shock -0.51 (2.96) 2.8 (2.88) -.56 (2.49) 3.04 (2.75) 
Household labor 1.37 (2.02) -.87 (1.81) 1.25 (1.34) -1.52 (1.38) 
Observations 
R² 
Wald stat 
Inverse-mills ratio 
237 
0.62 
159 
0.48 
292 
 
283.01*** 
- 7.16 (3.84)*** 
201 
 
112.10*** 
- 10.65 (3.5)*** 
Note:  The estimated standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * show levels of significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The standard errors are estimated using the robust standard 
error method.  
Source: Jena and Grote (2012). 
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Among the control variables, the amount of land owned is positively significant, 
indicating that land as an asset increases the income potential. As per the human 
capital is concerned, there are two dummy variables used for the education level of 
household heads in the regression. The education dummy 1 takes the value 1, if the 
household head has school education and the education dummy 2 takes the value 1, if 
the head has a college or university degree; otherwise 0 in both cases. School 
education is significant and positively contributing to rice income in the regression 
specification 2 where the organic GI group is excluded. The variable “higher than 
school level education” is not statistically significant which is due to the fact that 
only few household heads have such education level. The yield rate is, as expected, 
positive in its impact on income. Further, the unit cost of cultivation has been found 
to be significant and negative. The shock variables such as idiosyncratic shock and 
covariate shock are found to be statistically insignificant, but have the right sign, i.e. 
negative. Other control variables such as age of the household head, household labor 
(number of members of household in agriculture) and elevation of land have 
appeared with statistically insignificant coefficients.  
 
4.3 Welfare impacts in the Jasmine case study 
Table 3 reports the first stage logit coefficient estimates from the propensity score 
model. The results indicate that GI households headed by young household heads are 
more likely to pursue this newly introduced livelihood strategy based on the 
information about GI they got from the governmental bodies. The significant result 
on age squared indicates that the relationship between age and the logit is non-linear. 
Thus, with increasing age, the household heads are less likely to adopt GI 
certification. The social capital also significantly determines the participation in the 
GI system of the TKR households in particular those who are members of the 
agricultural cooperatives, follow the Good Agricultural Practice (GAP), and often 
participate in the village meetings.  
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Table 3: Propensity Score Model Coefficient Estimates 
Notes:  With stratified sampling, the propensity score estimator generally must take account of the 
sampling weights. However, in the presence of choice-based sampling, the sampling weights 
can be neglected both for the propensity score and in the weighted matching estimator 
(Froelich, 2007).   
Source: Own calculations 
 
Table 4 summarizes the results of the PSM which produces the treatment effects of 
GI certification on outcome variables of interest. The outcome variables of this 
model are log consumption per adult equivalent and poverty headcount. The poverty 
headcount is calculated by using both the national poverty line of Thailand and the 
regional poverty line of Northeastern Thailand. The results show that the estimates of 
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) using the three matching 
estimators, i.e. the Nearest Neighbor Matching (NNM), the Kernel Matching (KM), 
and the Radius Matching (RM) for log consumption per adult equivalent are 0.15, 
0.13 and 0.11, respectively and are statistically significant. These positive treatment 
effects suggest that the GI certification has increased the household welfare. By 
choosing to adopt GI certification, Jasmine rice households earn an increment of 
monetary income between 12,713 Baht (by using RM) and 15,400 Baht (by using 
NNM) annually as compared to the non-GI farm households.  
 
Variables Coefficient z P>│z│ 
Age of household head -0.043850 -2.02 0.043 
Age of household head squared 0.000683 3.27 0.001 
Gender of household head 0.067283 0.23 0.820 
Education of household head 0.015233 0.45 0.654 
Experience 0.000706 0.06 0.951 
Household size 0.090968 1.19 0.233 
Dependency ratio -0.002190 -0.95 0.343 
Off-farm employment 0.203032 0.83 0.408 
Log yield  -0.441571 -0.52 0.600 
Good Agricutural Practice (GAP) -0.286837 -2.08 0.037 
Rice seeds group member -0.364547 -1.28 0.202 
Information 0.994815 4.20 0.000 
Membership of cooperative 1.3986 5.75 0.000 
Participation 0.882201 2.45 0.014 
Log time to markets 0.202998 1.18 0.239 
Constant -2.61228 -2.39 0.017 
Number of Observations 
Pseudo R2 
505 
0.16 
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Table 4 also demonstrates the impact estimates of the three matching estimators for 
the poverty reduction outcomes. The estimates are statistically significant and 
negative indicating that the incidence of poverty (poverty headcount) is lower among 
GI farm households compared to the non-GI ones. GI adopters are more likely to 
have experienced poverty reduction relative to the non-adopters.  
 
Table 4:  GI Adoption Effect on Households’ Welfare and Poverty Matching 
Estimates 
 
Estimates 
Matching estimators 
NNM  KM RM 
Log consumption expenditure per adult equivalent 0.15** 0.13* 0.11* 
  (1.98) (1.82) (1.67) 
Household poverty (national) -0.12** -0.12** -0.11** 
  (2.27) (2.42) (2.21) 
Household poverty (Northeast) -0.11** -0.12** -0.11** 
  (2.24) (2.42) (2.38) 
Balancing property satisfied yes yes yes 
Common support imposed yes yes yes 
  
   Observation total 505 505 505 
Treated 169 169 169 
Controls 334 334 334 
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis; * Significant at α = 10%; ** Significant at α = 5%; *** Significant at 
α = 1%. 
Source: Own calculations 
 
These differences in welfare and poverty status remain unchanged after controlling 
for all confounding factors using the PSM. This outcome supports the results of the 
simple comparison of means of consumption expenditures both annually and per 
adult equivalent and of the poverty status both at the national and Northeast regional 
levels.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper analyzes the welfare impacts of GIs taking two empirical case studies 
from India and Thailand. The findings of the paper support a positive impact of GI 
protection on the livelihoods of farm households in rural communities in both 
countries.   
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GI adoption has contributed to improving well-being and reducing rural poverty. 
Production of both, Basmati and Jasmine rice involves labor-intensive and traditional 
techniques of production which increases their production costs relative to modern 
varieties of rice. Although our study cannot show the direct impact of GI adoption on 
the consumer price, i.e. the magnitude of the price premium that might have accrued 
to the producers from GI adoption, the findings imply that producing a GI good does 
provide the producers extra earnings through its quality signaling.  
 
Both Basmati rice and Jasmine rice have been long recognized in the international 
market as high quality rice varieties with certain characteristics such as fragrance that 
draws huge popularity among consumers. However, without formal protection, the 
likelihood of counterfeiting is very high. GI protection, by successfully delimiting 
the geographical boundary of the GI good, has effectively controlled the volume of 
supply which in turn raised the price of the good and created economic benefits for 
the producers. For the rural community as a whole, GI protection for such 
agricultural products is seen as an important means by which local actors can attract 
revenues from non-local actors.  
 
Our findings advocate a stronger intellectual property rights protection regime since 
such protection can enhance the rural livelihoods. GIs as collective property rights 
not only hold significant potential for amelioration of the rural livelihoods, it also 
preserves the traditional heritage of the locality that produces a GI good.  
 
However, to further support these findings, a number of research needs have been 
identified. While the current data sets could serve as baseline surveys, a follow-up 
survey is needed after a longer period of GI adoption. Only then, it can be seen 
whether the GI adoption is a sustainable system with positive long-term effects on 
the producers. Closely related to this, it needs to be analyzed to what extent the GI 
certification and marketing costs can be covered by the farmers themselves after a 
certain period of time. Finally, GI product adoption is expected to have positive 
effects on the development of rural areas. However, little is known about the synergy 
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effects so far. This is partly due to the lack of indicators being available for the 
analysis.  
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3 SYNTHESIS 
3.1  SUMMARY 
The thesis uses cross-sectional data collected from a household survey in two 
districts of the Thung Kula Rong-Hai area in Northeastern Thailand. These data were 
collected between March and June 2009. A disproportionate stratified random 
sampling technique was used to select representative sample households. In total, 
541 farm households were interviewed. The analysis yielded some important results 
in view of the research objectives summarized in the following paragraphs. 
Article (1) in Module I describes GI protection in Thailand and discusses its 
challenges being relevant to developing countries and especially Thailand (Objective 
1). Some facts which derived from detailed investigation of GI protection are 
important to note. First, negotiations on extending the GI protection to products 
other than wine and spirits, e.g. agricultural products, have given rise to a separation 
of the WTO Member countries into two main positions, i.e. GI proponents and GI 
opponents. As a consequence, there is no multilateral GI register of GI products so 
far. Besides, no unique approach of GI protection at the multilateral trading system is 
available. The WTO member countries can implement the TRIPS standards on GI 
protection at the national level through two different approaches, i.e. either through 
(i) the sui generis system of GI protection following the collective or public approach 
inherent to GI; or through (ii) the common-law system of certification trademarks 
(CTMs) pursuing an individual ownership or private approach. The majority of 
countries have chosen to protect GIs using the CTM system. For Thailand, the 
released sui generis GI Act in 2003 was driven not only due to the requirements of 
the TRIPS Agreement under the WTO, but also due to the issue of biopiracy, 
especially with the well-known case of Thai Jasmine rice. The Thai GI Act provides 
for a GI registration system through application. All related stakeholders can benefit 
from having GI certification by applying for membership in the particular GI club in 
order to be allowed to use the GI label for their packages. GI certification thus 
provides for rural households such as Jasmine rice farm households a new livelihood 
strategy which they can pursue to reach the desirable livelihood outcomes.  
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Second, there is a rising trend in bilateral and regional trade negotiations due to slow 
progress in completing the current Doha Round at the multilateral trade level. This 
trend has been induced (i) by Article 24.1 of the TRIPS Agreement encouraging the 
WTO Members to have recourse to bilateral agreements, and by (ii) minimum IP 
standards of the TRIPS which allow the creation of higher standards in any IP 
Agreement negotiated subsequent to TRIPS among the WTO members. This 
changing trend in trade negotiations has challenged the GI protection in Thailand 
since a series of FTAs and RTAs includes the TRIP-plus and TRIPS-minus 
provisions which have a higher level of flexibilities. For Thailand, rice gene patent 
registration with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has caused 
another challenge for GI protection. While it is necessary as claimed by rice gene 
proponents, NGOs and many Jasmine rice farmers see it rather harmful for the future 
of Jasmine rice.  
Module II identifies key determinants which influence the behavior of Thai Jasmine 
rice households in the TKRH area in the Northeast of Thailand in adopting GI 
certification (Objective 2). The linear random utility model is applied in order to 
provide an alternative interpretation on the individual’s utility of two choices, i.e. to 
adopt GI certification or not to adopt GI certification. This is done by considering the 
observed choice - between the two revealing choices - which provides the greater 
observable utility (Green, 2003). The variables’ selection in this study is generally 
guided by the review of earlier empirical studies on adoption behavior and it is 
particularly guided by the model of innovation-decision process of Rogers (1962). A 
logit model is used to help selecting key variables which could best explain the 
behavior of farm households to adopt GI certification. The findings show that GI 
adoption behavior of the Thai Jasmine rice households has been influenced positively 
and significantly by three important determinants, i.e. information on GI from 
governmental bodies, gender and the membership in cooperatives. All other factors 
turn out to be insignificant determinants to influence the adoption decision of the 
Jasmine rice farm households. The marginal effects of the three key factors also 
indicate the same trend as the parameter estimates of these three factors. 
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Module III evaluates the impact of GI certification adoption on rural livelihoods 
(Objective 3). Article (4) assesses the causal effect of GI certification on the well-
being of Thai Jasmine rice households and rural poverty. The study uses cross-
sectional data for analysis. The non-parametric PSM method is used in order to 
correct the estimation of treatment effect controlling for the existence of confounding 
factors. The sensitivity analysis has been conducted after the effect estimation with 
the purpose to check the robustness of the treatment effects obtained to the 
possibility of hidden bias from unmeasured variables. The findings indicate a 
positive and significant impact of GI certification on the household welfare and rural 
poverty reduction. The results of Rosenbaum bounds sensitivity analyses indicate a 
robust effect of the GI certification on reducing rural poverty but a less robust effect 
of the GI certification on the household welfare. Nevertheless, given a conservative 
nature of the Rosenbaum bounds and their strong assumption of the effect of 
confounding variable on the outcome variable, the following conclusion still holds 
that the household welfare is a pure effect of the GI certification adoption. 
Given two kinds of GI products, i.e. the officially registered GI Jasmine rice and the 
GI-like Basmati rice with unofficial GI status, article (5) in Module III also provides 
a synthesis of two case studies conducted in India and Thailand. The results imply 
that a positive role of GIs on rural livelihoods in both countries does exist for both 
types of GI products. The findings from the Basmati case study show that adopting 
Basmati cultivation increases the net income of the rice farmers while the findings 
from the GI Jasmine rice case study show that adoption of GI improves the 
consumption possibilities of the adopters and reduces rural poverty. 
    
3.2 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
The findings of this study lead to a number of conclusions and recommendations. 
Given no multilateral standard GI registration system and no unique approach of GI 
legal system, GI protection is costly, since the GI registration application must be 
done in each Member country. For small developing and least developed countries 
with a lack of capital and resources, the costs of GI protection can outweigh the 
benefits.  
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Moreover, it is clear that obstacles and conflicts of interests regarding the GI 
protection exist. Given the rising trend in bilateral and regional trade talks and 
conflicts of interests regarding two different types of intellectual property rights, i.e. 
GI vs. patent, the GI protection has been challenged. The TRIPS-plus and TRIPS-
minus provisions in a series of RTAs and Thailand’s rice gene patent registration in 
the US have put Thailand to a plight. On the one hand, Thailand is a GI-proponent, 
but on the other hand, its rice gene patent sends a wrong signal to other trading 
partners given its interest of no patent protection for plants, animals and 
microorganisms. Besides, 20 years of patent protection for a newly registered Thai 
rice gene are too short compared to a much longer history of Jasmine rice. Not only 
the issue of GI protection per se has been challenged, but in this regard also its 
potential benefits for such rural GI assets as Jasmine rice would not be sustained. 
Hence, before committing itself to each RTA or FTA, a thorough and comprehensive 
cost-benefit analysis of each agreement is required in due consideration of general 
public interest. Information should be fully available to the general public at the 
national level to provide all affected parties enough time for voicing their views as 
well as for adaptation in case of the conclusion. 
How a GI system is successfully introduced and promoted in specific GI regions 
depends crucially on the information about GIs provided to the rural farm households 
and finally on the information sources. Agricultural cooperatives serve as a crucial 
intermediary between farm households and the government being the primary source 
of information about GIs. The effectiveness of information dissemination can be thus 
promoted by strengthening the role of the agricultural cooperatives. However, the 
descriptive findings in the adoption study in Module II indicate that the GI rice sale 
is involved with high transportation costs and not all certified GI producers sold their 
rice to the thirteen certified buyers given the price premium payment guarantee. 
Limited marketing options of GI certified rice, characterized by high transportation 
costs and limited availability of the certified buyers, may thus be a potential 
constraint to GI certification adoption. A restructuring of the value chains with better 
access to points of sale for certified GI rice farm households should be provided in 
order to increase the farmers’ incentives to adopt GI certification. 
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Although it has been shown in Module III that the poverty incidence is reduced due 
to the GI introduction and the household welfare is increased, a crucial point for any 
policy-makers is a long-lasting positive effect. The positive effect of GI introduction 
can only last longer given the active and sustainable participation of all stakeholders 
of the GI product value chain. This suggests the challenge of the local and national 
policy-makers and policy implementers in creating a persuasive atmosphere among 
all stakeholders. The motivation of collective action and increase of the participation 
level within the GI value chain are also crucial, particularly by those TKR farm 
households who are unassertive to participate in this value-added process using the 
GI label. The awareness of the TKR farm households to make use of their embedded 
right to apply for GI certification is crucial, since the rate of GI adoption of the TKR 
farm households can guarantee a long lasting positive effect of GI certification on the 
household welfare and poverty reduction in rural areas. In order to facilitate the 
registration process for GI certification of the TKR farm households, the GI 
registration system should be sustainable, well-functioned and for the producers 
reachable. 
It is important to note that, both Basmati rice and Jasmine rice have been long 
recognized as high quality rice varieties with certain characteristics such as fragrance 
in the international market and have been popular among consumers. Thus, without 
formal protection the likelihood of counterfeiting is very high. GI protection, by 
successfully delimiting the geographical boundary of the GI good, has effectively 
controlled the volume of supply which in turn raised the price of the good and 
created economic benefits for the producers. For the rural community as a whole, GI 
protection for such agricultural products is seen as an important means by which 
local actors can attract revenues from non-local actors. The findings of the paper 
support a positive role of GI protection on the livelihoods of farm households in rural 
communities in India and Thailand. Production of both Basmati and Jasmine rice 
involves labor-intensive and traditional techniques of production which increases 
their production costs relative to modern varieties of rice. Although the study cannot 
show the direct impact of GI adoption on the consumer price, i.e. the magnitude of 
the price premium that might have accrued to the producers from GI adoption, the 
findings imply that producing a GI good does provide the producers extra earnings 
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through its quality signaling. The findings of analyzing the two cases support the 
importance of stronger intellectual property rights protection since such protection 
can enhance the rural livelihoods even after such a differentiated product has been 
developed. GIs, as collective rights, are thus considered as the most appropriate and 
fittest alternative for the rural livelihoods, not only in terms of their economic 
prominence, but also in terms of the preservation of the traditional knowledge 
embedded in a GI good as well as the traditional heritage of the locality that produces 
it which has positive externalities both in short run and long run. 
 
3.3 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND FURTHER RESEARCH NEEDS 
Article (1) in Module I tries solely to highlight aspects being relevant to GI 
protection. However, the issue of intellectual property right protection is very broad 
given different types of intellectual property rights and complex given different 
positions or interests of countries on each intellectual property right type as well as 
different effects and implications of each intellectual property right type on each 
stakeholder. A framework of protection on each intellectual property right is shaped 
depending on its importance each country has put on. An effective GI protection 
depends on the design of the GI law including a practical guide or tool for those 
involved in national legislative processes. And a successful GI protection depends on 
the active participation of all stakeholders. However, it is important to note that an 
effective protection of one type of the intellectual property right does not 
automatically mean an effective protection of other types of the intellectual property 
rights. Given the conflicts of interests of GIs vs. patents, a quantitative analysis can 
help compare the impacts and implications of both types of intellectual property 
rights for a particular product. 
The price premium seems essential in compensating the transportation costs which 
are associated with the GI certification adoption and more importantly in 
guaranteeing the net benefit of being GI farmers. However, not all GI certified farm 
households sold their rice to the certified buyers. It is not clear what exactly 
determines the selling behavior of GI certified households in the TKRH area. As 
shown in the descriptive data, high transportation costs involved with the rice sale 
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may play a key role in the selling behavior of the GI households. Furthermore, GIs 
were fairly new to the Jasmine rice farm households at the survey time. 
Misperceptions about GIs may have driven the GI households hesitating to reap 
benefits offered. In these premises, a value chain analysis could reveal to what extent 
the access of GI farm households to their point of sale can be improved. How the 
decision-making processes within the households affect the GI certification adoption 
is also another area that merits further research. 
It is important to note that by using cross-sectional data in analyzing poverty, this 
study can observe the change of poverty incidence only at one particular point in 
time. This study can only observe how the poverty incidence has been changed due 
to GI introduction and how the welfare of Jasmine rice farm households in the 
TKRH area has been improved. Without longitudinal data, it is impossible to study 
the dynamic impact of the GI system implementation on the rural livelihoods. Since 
there is a yearly renewal of GI club membership application, it is possible to collect 
panel data of Jasmine rice households for further investigation provided that there are 
enough TKR club members having been renewed their GI certified status with the 
DIP at the survey time. 
Furthermore, the sustainability of a certification system often depends on whether the 
GI certification and marketing costs can be covered by the farmers themselves in the 
long run. Thus, cost-benefit analyses are needed to consider more adequately the 
costs of GI certification and the costs related to their successful marketing. 
The findings in this study stress that GIs do contribute to rural poverty reduction. The 
economic performance of supply chains is likely to be linked to rural development 
benefits. However, although this study found a positive impact of GI on livelihoods 
of rural households, it could not assess the synergy effects on the GI region as a 
whole. It also could not consider inequalities in the distribution of costs and benefits 
of GI protection, or the underlying power relations due to data limitations. The 
experience with a case of Mexican Tequila already showed that it is possible that GI 
schemes can be manipulated to benefit powerful local actors while excluding the 
farmers and rural regions that GIs are theoretically designed to protect (Bowen and 
Zapata, 2009). Well-considered governance structures would guarantee that 
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economic benefits of GIs are to be shared across the supply chain and among 
stakeholders (Giovannucci et al., 2009). How successful GI contributes to rural 
development and whether GI protection leads to a fair and appropriate distribution of 
costs and benefits among the stakeholders, requires a detailed investigation of the 
governance structure within each GI supply chain. 
References 
Greene, W.H. (2003). Econometric Analysis. Fifth Edition. Pearson Education 
International, New Jersey.  
Rogers, E.M. (1962). Diffusion of Innovations. The Free Press, New York. 
Bowen, S. and Zapata, A.V. (2009).  “Geographical Indications, Terroir, and 
Socioeconomic and Ecological Sustainability: The Case of Tequila”, Journal of 
Rural Studies, vol. 25, pp. 108-119. 
Giovannucci, D., Josling, T., Kerr, W., O’Connor, B. and Yeung, M. T. (2009). 
Guide to geographical indications. Linking products and their origins, 
International Trade Center (ITC), Geneva, Switzerland. 
175 
 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A:  SAMPLING PLAN 
 
D1 = Kasetwisai District  
D2 = Rasrisalai District 
 
A = GI Households 
B = Pure non-GI Households 
C = Non-GI Households with organic farming practice 
Source: Own presentation 
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APPENDIX B:  SAMPLING RATES AND SAMPLING WEIGHTS EMPLOYED IN THE STUDY 
District Stratum 
size 
No. of 
households 
in district 
Sampling 
rate 
Weight Sum of 
weights 
Kasetwisai      
GI households 90 330 0.2727 3.67 330 
Non-GI households (pure) 90 10061 0.0089 111.79 10061 
Non-GI households (organic farming) 90 226 0.3982 2.51 226 
Rasrisalai      
GI households 90 102 0.8824 1.13 102 
Non-GI households (pure) 90 1804 0.0499 20.04 1804 
Non-GI households (organic farming) 90 112 0.8036 1.24 112 
Total 540 12523   12523 
Source: Own calculations 
177 
 
APPENDIX C:  QUESTIONNAIRE OF HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
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